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ABSTRACT
For j>5 years, Aboriginal self-determination policy privileged local autonomy in the 
autonomy-relatedness dynamic central to Aboriginal sociality. This privileging brought a 
major change to Aboriginal sociality and collective identity. The self in self- 
determination policy had a strongly local focus through which it was thought community 
development would thrive. Key connected factors in the privileging of local autonomy 
are socio-cultural reification, juridification and entification. The reification is with respect 
to identity associated with land-based tradition. All three of these factors are contrary to 
the profound processes of relatedness in the Australian Aboriginal domain. The so-called 
intervention by the Commonwealth into Northern Territory Aboriginal affairs in 2007 
diamatically changed the policy settings in the N i at least. But local autonomy remains 
privileged over relatedness. As such, this thesis argues, the foundation for an Aboriginal 
civil society able to negotiate the now very fluid policy environment and make the most 
o f the opportunities presented in community development projects like the thesis case 
studies in fact remains generally weak.
The thesis argues that recognition of relatedness is the basis of civil society in the 
Aboriginal domain and a key to improvements in Australian Aboriginal communities, 
without dismissing local autonomy. The common good inherent in community 
development is limited without this recognition. So is cultural match, said to be important 
in development project governance in the Indigenous domain. The thesis examines these 
matters through three case studies, community development projects that use moneys 
paid to Aboriginal people from the use of Aboriginal land for mining and a national park. 
An important finding is that autonomy-relatedness balance reflected in the governance 
arrangements of community development projects is needed for Aboriginal people to 
properly identify with the projects and thus participate meaningfully in them in order to 
lealise tangible and sustainable community benefits from them. Meanwhile, commercial 
development like mining continues to favour the certainty afforded in the localising 
factors of reification, juridification and entification.
Aboriginal self-determination has been characterised as a policy of disengagement of 
wider society from Aboriginal people. Consistent with this, and again contrary to 
relatedness, an underlying theme in the thesis is that of separation. As well as the 
disengagement of the policy, this separation includes the separation of some Aboriginal 
people from other Aboriginal people arising from locally emplaced identity, tradition 
from modernity and community development from economic development and the 
market economy. At this level, the thesis points to the importance of an intercultural 
approach to development entertaining the notion of hybridity including that of the hybrid 
economy.
This is not to deny the benefits of self-determination policy over its policy predecessors, 
much less to suggest a return to assimilation policy in particular, but to suggest some 
ways to help resolve the serious problems still facing remote Aboriginal communities as 
well as to flag the limitations of community development in this context.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Worldwide, community development is seen as a powerful approach to poverty 
alleviation. It is frequently seen as inherently collaborative, about poor people 
participating with others who can assist in poverty alleviation projects through agencies 
of civil society. There, those assisting can build the capacity of the poor, towards 
sustainable improvements to their well-being. But among Australia’s poorest people, 
Aboriginal people, community development has had little impact on poverty alleviation 
largely because it has come with their disengagement from wider society. This outcome 
is not necessarily a function of their self-determination per se, nor necessarily about 
neglect. Rather, key elements of Aboriginal self-determination policy, in place for some
I
35 years, have brought about the disengagement by privileging autonomy or localism 
over the otherwise strong strains of relatedness in Aboriginal sociality. The privileging of 
autonomy in fact constitutes a major change to Aboriginal sociality. It has upset the 
balance of autonomy with relatedness that many anthropologists have noted is central to 
Aboriginal sociality. They refer to an Aboriginal autonomy-relatedness dynamic to 
capture something of the processes, the fluidity as well as the tension, in the usual 
balance between these two states.
Important closely connected factors in privileged Aboriginal autonomy/localism include 
reification, juridification and entification. I use the Macquarie Dictionary definition of 
reify: “to convert into or regard as a concrete thing” (Macquarie Dictionary 1982). Fluid 
Aboriginal socio-cultural identity processes have been regarded and converted in this 
way, specifically those associated with land-based tradition and thus land ownership via 
which autonomy now tends to be asserted. 1 use the definition Christos Mantziaris and 
David Martin provide for juridification as “the use of positive law to identify and enforce 
obligations deriving from social relations hitherto considered non-legal” (Mantziaris and 
Martin, D. 2001: 127). This is clearly akin to reification but with an emphasis on law and 
its force. The obligations, and the social relations they are derived from in Aboriginal
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Australia, are among widely related people; the effect of juridification is to limit this 
relatedness and the people wrho identify as related. Land rights law and its definition of 
traditional Aboriginal land owner are central here. I use the term entification in summary 
as used by Thomas Ernst in Papua New Guinea: the making of quite permanent, 
exclusive entities from what were previously contingent social categories formed and 
reformed from activity or process (Ernst 2004). I consider exclusive to be the operative 
word here, though process and the reduced part it plays is significant. The more exclusive 
the entities, the more localised is their focus and the identity of those associated with 
them.
Further, I make use of the concept of cultural match as applied by the Harvard Project on 
American Indian Economic Development in the United States. Chief researchers on the 
project say cultural match “is not an appeal to tradition; it is an appeal for legitimacy” in 
development (Cornell and Begay 2003). Cultural match, they say, means development 
institutions that: “Embody values that Indigenous people feel are important; Reflect their 
contemporary conceptions of how authority should be organized and exercised; Are 
generated through Indigenous efforts; Therefore have the support of those they govern” 
(ibid. Underline in original). Critically, these institutions “also have to work. They have 
to be able to get the job done” (ibid). Reification, juridification and entification have 
meant a cultural half-match at best in development in the Australian Aboriginal domain. 
That is, these three factors reflect Aboriginal socio-cultural organisation, but strongly 
only part of it, that part associated with autonomy. The part -  and the values -  associated 
with contemporary processes of relatedness are not well reflected. Development has 
proceeded with, and in fact has facilitated, reified, juridified and/or entified groups that 
do not adequately reflect Aboriginal socio-cultural organisation and values. It has thus 
not often enough got the job done, as the Harvard Project might put it.
Much development has, then, struggled for legitimacy in the eyes of Aboriginal 
participants and translated into their lack of identification with development projects. 
There are significant levels of discord between their contemporary collective identity and 
that found in project governance arrangements. Participants’ lack of identification with
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projects is more fundamentally important than any lack of ‘ownership’ of projects, to use 
a common community development refrain. It is more typical than outright opposition to 
development from Aboriginal people. It has limited their participation and furthered their 
disengagement from wider society. Yet reification, juridification and entification have 
been attractive to development providers, and some participants at the outset of 
development phases, because these factors in contemporary Aboriginal local autonomy 
provide development certainty, including investment certainty. With this attraction, the 
strong emphasis on the local has spread.
1 examine reification, juridification and entification through three community 
development case studies to show that the upshot has not only been disengagement of 
Aboriginal people from wider society. Aboriginal people have been separated from each 
other. Tradition has been separated from modernity whereas these otherwise, of course, 
exist on a continuum. Community development has become separated from economic 
development. The former has suffered, in its own right and as an aid to the latter. I 
suggest recognition of relatedness is the basis of civil society and a key to improvements 
in Australian Aboriginal communities, without dismissing local autonomy. The common 
good inherent in community development is limited without this recognition.
My research is on Northern Territory (NT) Aboriginal communities where a Liberal- 
National Party Commonwealth Government changed the self-determination policy 
settings dramatically with an intervention into NT Aboriginal affairs in mid 2007. This 
has included compulsory welfare income management and the seizure of communally 
owned or held land within 73 NT Aboriginal communities, among other measures 
(Australian Government 2007). The intervention was triggered by a report that found 
evidence of widespread Aboriginal child abuse in the NT against the backdrop of chronic 
alcohol abuse (Anderson and Wild 2007). Together these levels and types of abuse, along 
with other often quoted indicators of severe disadvantage, reflect an all too common 
malaise in NT Aboriginal communities.
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With a change to a Labor Government and its re-election as a minority government in 
2010, the intervention has been continued but reviewed, with greater engagement with 
NT Aboriginal communities recommended through a community development 
framework (Yu, Duncan and Gray 2008: 11,14). Other policy changes have occurred or 
been canvassed approximately contemporaneously, many under the Commonwealth’s 
national quasi policy framework of ‘Closing the Gap’ between Aboriginal and non- 
Aboriginal well-being indicators. The long-standing Community Development 
Employment Projects program (CDEP), often referred to as Aboriginal work for the dole, 
has been reformed towards greater engagement of its participants with the job market 
(Macklin 2008a; Australian Government 2008: 3,15; Australian Government 2009). 
Local government in the NT has been regionalised into shires, unsettling highly localised 
ideas of community as a manifestation of the collective self in self-determination. 
Government investment is now >, largely confined to the NT’s largest Aboriginal 
communities under a ‘Growth Towns’ policy (Northern Territory Government 2009), 
perceived by many Aboriginal people as a move to literally unsettle residents of smaller 
places. Meanwhile, the Commonwealth Minister for Indigenous Affairs Jenny Macklin 
has initiated moves to direct payments Aboriginal groups receive from the commercial 
and other use of their land to wider community benefit (Macklin 2008b; McClelland, 
Macklin and Sherry 2010; The Australian 2010).
My case studies are community development projects that spend such payments 
generated by the use of Aboriginal land in the NT for mining and a national park. In the 
shifting policy context I have just sketched, the foundation for an Aboriginal civil society 
able to make the most of the money remains weak. The case studies point to what scope 
remains for community development to make improvements to Aboriginal community 
conditions.
Thesis outline
In the next chapter I consider the concepts of community and development, define 
community development (CD), examine three CD traditions and discuss CD in
1 1
Aboriginal Australia. Chapter 3 examines self-determination policy to see how it has 
privileged autonomy/localism over relatedness and the broad CD implications. Chapter 4 
presents the three case studies and examines the localising factors of reification, 
juridification and entification through them. The implication for CD of the limitation to 
project legitimacy and participant identification with the projects is highlighted.
Chapter 5 examines change in the Aboriginal domain. 1 focus on outstations, tiny, far- 
flung communities that remain central to the CD aspirations of many remote Aboriginal 
people. I view outstations as microcosms of the Aboriginal domain as it changed under 
self-determination to privilege autonomy/localism. As Emma Kowal observes, they 
embody the now common assumption that when remote land ownership, what she calls 
“cultural autonomy”, and “minimal government support” coincide entrenched Aboriginal 
health problems, for instance, begin to disappear (Kowal 2010: 191). I go on to consider 
the key factors leading to this assumption, eg. entification, in the light of comparable 
change mediated by custom or kastom in nearby Melanesia. The comparison with 
Melanesia serves to emphasise the fundamental nature of the profound change privileging 
autonomy/localism.
The implications of privileged autonomy/localism for CD, particularly its governance and 
Indigenous participation through the governance, are advanced in chapter 6 with 
reference to cultural match. I examine both the dynamism of the Aboriginal domain and 
juridification in order to contrast specific processes of the kinship economy and 
Aboriginal collective identity effectively formed from legislated Aboriginal land tenure. 
The kinship economy processes are essentially those of relatedness while the legislated 
land tenure limits this relatedness. As such, the legislated land tenure, namely under the 
Aboriginal Land Rights (NT) Act, 1976 (ALRA), is integral to the cultural half-match I 
mentioned above.
There are indeed formidable challenges to CD presented to this point in my thesis. Some 
capacity for CD to improve Aboriginal community conditions nevertheless begins to 
emerge. But not fully before the breadth of the central challenge faced in the form of
12
privileged localism is elaborated in chapter 7. Chapter 7 posits the discussion first in the 
wider economy where certainty of land ownership available in legislated Aboriginal land 
tenure is a key consideration prior to investment in the land; then in the realms of the 
imagination where, paradoxically perhaps, the localism upon which the certainty is 
largely based is further spread. This leads via discussion of powerful ideological and 
international influences on localised identity to an examination of conflict, a key 
constraint on CD coming from the separation of some Aboriginal people from others.
Chapter 8 explores the possibility of an Aboriginal common good across regions without 
forsaking local loyalties. There is uncertainty in this, to be sure, which raises the prospect 
of the Indigenous process in it becoming a recipe for increased community dysfunction 
instead of community development. Via some critiques of development, I introduce the 
notions of hybrid culture and hybrid economy towards a way forward.
Chapter 9 concludes that CD can improve conditions in Aboriginal communities, but 
cannot do so adequately based on privileged localism and cannot sustain the 
improvements alone. Welfare reform is needed. Carefully overcoming the separation of 
community development from the market and economic development is important to help 
create jobs. But arguably wider separations that became marked in the self-determination 
era must also be carefully bridged: the separation of Aboriginal people from wider 
society and the state on its behalf, the separation of tradition from modernity and the 
separation of some Aboriginal people from other Aboriginal people. Such separation is 
an underlying theme in my thesis, running counter to relatedness.
Methodology and literature
The thesis methodology has three key elements: participant observation at meetings of 
the three community development projects that constitute the thesis case studies; 
reference to Central Land Council (CLC) CD Unit files on the projects; and reference to 
relevant literature to situate the case studies in a broader theoretical, ethnographic, policy 
and/or development context and ultimately to support the evidence in the case studies. As
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manager of the CLC Anthropology Section in which the CD Unit was situated and then 
co-coordinator of the Unit after it moved into the CLC’s Directorate Section, I was 
necessarily deeply involved in many of the meetings and other project operations. This 
will inevitably raise questions about the independence of my research. In truth, in writing 
my thesis it was at times difficult to step back from the three projects, as I was 
responsible or jointly responsible at an operational level for starting and/or progressing 
them over some five and a half years at the CLC. However, this responsibility also meant 
an immersion in the projects conducive to an adequate understanding of their workings.
Publicly available literature relevant to my thesis, in the listed references, can be grouped 
as follows: official documents such as acts of parliament, rules of incorporation of 
Aboriginal organisations and reports into or towards government policies or programs; 
related media releases, media reports, web pages, statements and speeches; applied 
academic research into such policies or programs or into relevant phenomena such as 
governance or cultural match; papers or books by or about key policy planners, 
particularly the planners of Aboriginal self-determination policy; papers or books on 
community development; critiques of varying strengths of development; a range of less 
applied academic research including ethnographies, taking in most journal articles and 
chapters within books in my reference list plus individually authored books such as 
Myers (1986) and Austin-Broos (2009). 1 mention these two books as examples of this 
last group of texts, but also because they are among the most important texts in the 
references as a whole: my mention of them here gives the reader some impression of 
what constitutes the literature most relevant to my thesis.
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Chapter 2
Community, development
In this chapter I define CD and outline and contextualise three intellectual traditions of 
CD following Camp fens (1997). These traditions can be labeled the societal and 
institutional guidance approach, the alternative development or social movement 
approach and the partnership approach. I explore the characteristics of CD in Aboriginal 
Australia up to the Commonwealth intervention into NT Aboriginal affairs in 2007. But I 
begin by considering the concepts of community and development, distilling that of civil 
society in the process.
Community
The Indigenous Community Governance Project (ICGP), which recently researched 
Indigenous governance arrangements across Australia, provides a useful definition of 
community as it is situated in the context of governance essentially for Aboriginal 
community development. Here community is:
a network of people and organisations linked by a web of personal relationships, cultural 
and political connections and identities, networks of support, traditions and institutions, 
shared socioeconomic conditions, or common understandings and interests (Hunt and 
Smith 2006: 5).
This definition converges with civil society as defined by the London School of 
Economics and Political Science Centre for Civil Society as “the arena of uncoerced 
collective action around shared interests, purposes and values”, populated by charities, 
non-government development organisations (NGOs), community groups, church groups, 
professional associations, trade unions, self-help and advocacy groups, social movements 
and coalitions (London School of Economics and Political Science 2010).
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The ICGP findings identify four levels of community: administrative communities such 
as electoral wards, communities of interest, residential communities, and “communities 
of identity” (Hunt and Smith 2006: 5). Anthropologists, Peter Sutton for example (2009: 
48), frequently question whether there is in fact sufficient community of interest or 
identity in many Aboriginal residential communities for any CD initiatives to last. They 
tend to suggest these are in fact artificial communities, the larger ones at least established 
to administer Aboriginal affairs policy before self-determination, bringing people to live 
together who would not normally choose to do so. As such, it is said, there is very little 
common purpose to help CD initiatives achieve more than short term success. The above 
ICGP definition, read with the four ICGP levels of community, implies an inversion of 
this position. It suggests a community can potentially comprise people who live hundreds 
of kilometres apart, or those who live together despite what they consider to be disparate 
origins, with something strong nevertheless in common. There is regional development 
potential in this. It suggests that any tension between residential communities and 
communities of interest or identity is not necessarily debilitating.
Development
Writing about development among Indigenous people in Australia and Canada and 
drawing on Denis Goulet (1973), Elspeth Young provides a definition of development 
simply as a process offering “the opportunity to live full human lives” (Young 1995: 8). 
This need not necessarily carry the lofty classical liberal connotations of individual 
liberty and choice. It can simply be taken to mean the opportunity to live longer in better 
health than Aboriginal people are generally accustomed to, without fear of harm from 
abuse or neglect. It is with this meaning that I adopt the definition as the best among 
many for the purposes of my thesis.
Policies and programs ostensibly to maximise development opportunity en masse are 
widely seen to stem from US President Harry Truman’s speech upon taking office in 
1949. Truman declared then: “We must embark on a bold new program for making the 
benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement
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and growth of underdeveloped areas” (cited in Esteva 1992: 6). The instruments of this 
international development program were already taking shape following the 1944 Bretton 
Woods Agreement. This agreement triggered the creation that year of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
now part of the World Bank.
In chapter 8 I canvass some critiques of development, in particular community 
development or participatory development as it sometimes known. Suffice to say here, 
there are now characterisations aplenty of development that emphasise disastrous 
consequences for the world’s poor and disadvantaged, Gustavo Esteva’s chapter in ‘The 
Development Dictionary’ (1992) being one. The IMF and the World Bank are common 
targets in such views of development, seen as instruments of international capital not 
instruments of mass poverty alleviation. Yet such views only begin to check the 
nevertheless deep faith across the world in development essentially as economic growth 
and concomitant modernisation, despite the recent global financial crisis and the climate 
change almost certainly partly caused by the nature and pace of much of this growth to 
date. With the demise of the Soviet Union and its socialism, no one idea is now as widely 
promoted as is unhindered, unadulterated economic growth as the best way to help as 
many people as possible escape poverty, without stopping some becoming fabulously 
wealthy. Central is the assumption that some of the wealth generally created will 
eventually trickle down to the poorest of poor individuals, with assistance provided in 
some form where the trickle is insufficient.
Against this backdrop, Young suggests that successful development aid or assistance 
must take into account:
the aspirations of those ‘being developed’ (the clients), as well as the desires of the 
‘developers’ (the providers); secondly, that development occurs within a human society 
whose cultural and social attributes are vital influences on the process; and thirdly, 
because of the global linkages between the developed and developing world, that 
elements such as resource base and population growth have to be considered on an
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international as well as national or regional scale if development is to occur (Young 
1995:8).
She points out that environmental concerns and recognition of the long timeframes in 
successful development have locked the concept of sustainability into development 
discourse (ibid: 9,10) if not always into development practice. Together, Young’s 
comments here offer a useful development bottom line for contemporary Aboriginal 
Australia, notwithstanding the considerable power imbalance remaining between “the 
clients” and “the providers”. The power imbalance alone, the cause of concerns central to 
many anti development viewpoints, ensures this is just a bottom line.
Community development
After a review of the international literature, Hubert Campfens provides a definition, in 
effect, o f CD in a list of “common social values and principles that underlie the practice” 
(Campfens 1997: 23), edited here. There is resonance with civil society, as articulated 
above, in Campfens’ list:
• “....Men and women should be....mobilized for the purpose of mutual aid, self- 
help, problem-solving, social integration, and/or social action.
• At all levels of society....participation must be enhanced....
• As much as possible and feasible, CD should rely on the capacity and initiatives 
of relevant groups and local communities to identify needs, define problems, and 
plan and execute appropriate courses of action; in this, the goals are to foster 
confidence in community leadership, to increase competency, and to reduce 
dependence on state, institutional, and professional interventions.
• Community resources (human, technical and financial) and, where necessary, 
resources from outside the community (in the form of partnerships with 
governments, institutions, and professional groups) should be mobilized and 
deployed in an appropriate manner in order to ensure balanced, sustainable forms 
of development.
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• Community integration should be promoted in terms of two sets of relations: 
‘social relations’ among diverse groups distinguished by social class or 
significant differences in economic status, ethnicity, culture, racial identity, 
religion, gender, age, length of residence or other such characteristics that may 
cause tensions or lead to open conflict; and ‘structural relations’ among those 
institutions -  such as public sector agencies, private sector organizations, not-for- 
profit or charitable organizations, and community organizations and associations 
-  that take care of social challenges at the community level. Regarding the latter, 
the aim is to avoid unnecessary competition, lack of coordination, and 
duplication of services.
• Activities....should be organized that empower marginal or excluded population 
groups by linking them with the progressive forces in different social sectors and 
classes in the search for economic, social, and political alternatives.
• Those who are marginalized, excluded, or oppressed should be given the 
essential tools that will enable them to critically analyse and become conscious of 
their situation in structural terms, so that they can envisage possibilities for 
change” (ibid: 24).
Just as some change is implicit in development generally (Kenny 2006: 12), Susan Kenny 
argues that the aim of CD is to enable communities to gain greater control over the 
change (ibid: 10). Accordingly there is close convergence between CD and self- 
determination, though these are not the same. Campfens’ first principle and value above, 
for instance, raises the question of who expects and should do the recommended 
mobilisation. If it is the providers more so than the clients, in Young’s terms, they might 
have motivations that cause divergence of CD and self-determination in practice. And 
despite the common denominator of change, neither is development per se synonymous 
with community development as is sometimes assumed in Central Australia. Through a 
so-called social contract, development providers in two o f my case studies for example -  
miners -  are now widely and heavily implicated in development above and beyond 
development of the land; but their work does not necessarily involve community 
development. CD is a particular development practice, though there is variety within it. 
Together with Campfens’ values and principles used to define CD as above, its three 
traditions should clarify the main forms of the practice.
19
Three community development traditions
The above values and principles I have used to define CD are really ideals, adapted to fit 
specific circumstances (Campfens 1997: 25), while the intellectual traditions from which 
these values and principles grew shed more light on practice worldwide. Campfens 
identifies three main traditions: the tradition of “societal and institutional guidance”, that 
of “alternative development or social movement” and one that he refers to simply as 
“involving professional practitioners working in partnership with community or 
community groups” (ibid: 40). The first tradition, says Campfens, has influenced CD as 
planned change “from above” (ibid: 20,40). So, the rhetoric that CD is always to counter 
so-called top down development does not sit easily with this first tradition. This tradition 
was part of the modernisation and industrialisation strategies of United Nations agencies 
in the 1960s, and of the IMF and the World Bank (ibid: 20,27). They were strategies well 
supported financially, as wealthy nations, especially the US, sought to replicate in the 
third world the Marshall Plan designed to rebuild Europe after World War 2 (ibid: 17). 
As a new social technology, CD was enlisted by governments to mobilise local 
communities as part of third world nation-building efforts to achieve socio-economic 
development, drawing heavily on, and imparting, scientific knowledge, including that of 
social scientists (ibid: 20,27). It was in this context, says Campfens, that CD gained 
international prominence (ibid), though NGOs have also launched CD programs within 
this tradition (ibid). In fact, this tradition fits best with what Campfens suggests is 
standard reliance on “the modernist framework in defining development”, including the 
continued “preeminence of Western science and technical reason” (ibid: 39). Emphasis 
on statistical measures of Aboriginal well-being fit well within this framework.
The second intellectual tradition underlying CD, that of “alternative development or 
social movement”, has influenced community development as a form of social 
mobilisation “from below”, according to Campfens (ibid: 40). This, he says, is 
distinguished from the first tradition in that the second asserts “the primacy of direct 
collective action from below” (ibid: 28). Indeed, from this tradition springs much of the
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rhetoric that promotes CD per se as a bottom up guard against top down development. 
Within this tradition, Campfens discerns three sub-traditions: “Confrontational Politics”, 
“Utopianism and Disengagement” and “Voluntary Association, Mutual Aid, and 
Communitarianism” (ibid: 28-31). The latter two sub-traditions within this broader 
tradition “from below” most closely match the type of CD pursued in remote Aboriginal 
Australia under self-determination policy, given their goals to create self-managing, self- 
governing, cooperative communities separate from the state and the encapsulating society 
(ibid: 30,31). Common is a strong emphasis on the local. CD in these sub-traditions has 
elsewhere, however, largely been directed at communities of poor, subsistence farmers 
growing their food in the face of powerful global agricultural market forces. It is in the 
context of their aspirations towards self-sufficiency in food growing that quests for 
separateness here should be seen, a somewhat different motivation to those abroad in the 
Australian Aboriginal domain, the subject of my next chapter. .
It is worth noting meanwhile that CD in this second tradition under Aboriginal self- 
determination policy intersects perhaps surprisingly with the neo-liberal version of the 
‘development as economic growth’ paradigm. Ascendant internationally since about 
1980, if increasingly questioned since the global financial crisis, neo-liberalism is 
characterised by a generally sharply reduced role for the state, with a shift from state care 
to community care for the disadvantaged (ibid: 14) and individual responsibility and 
entrepreneurship for the bulk of the population (Kenny 2006: 56). In Australia this did 
not translate into a reduction of Aboriginal affairs funding from its steep increase at the 
formalisation of Aboriginal self-determination policy when the welfare state still mied 
supreme (Griffiths 2006: 62; Hollinsworth 1996: 121). Neo-liberalism may, however, 
have helped maintain the path of most of this funding into a multitude of localised, self- 
governing Aboriginal community organisations as ‘community care’, even if some of 
these entities began life under what Kenny characterises as a welfare state organisational 
model (Kenny 2006: 204,205). That is, this care was thoroughly outsourced and the state 
further separated from its delivery.
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Nor did neo-liberalism translate into any real diminution of the welfare payments 
provided to individual Aboriginal people under the welfare state, though the recent 
changes to CDEP may be the start of this. In turn, the CDEP changes may be seen as part 
of a wider reliance on Aboriginal individuals to close the statistical gap between 
themselves and non-Aboriginal people, part of the neo-liberal trend (Altman 2009: 1). 
Continued widespread Aboriginal dependence on welfare payments is commonly cited as 
a key reason why development practices applied internationally, frequently in places with 
little or no welfare support, have not made more improvements in Aboriginal 
communities. It is here, perhaps, that there is what Kenny calls an “ironic convergence” 
of CD and neo-liberalism (Kenny 2006: 56): both see the limitations prolonged 
dependence on welfare can place on the control people have over their destinies. The 
main point of departure is where neo-liberalism emphasises the individual as the source 
of social improvements and CD, in whatever tradition, emphasises the community, by 
definition (ibid: 56,80). Another departure point may be in state and other development 
provider strategies to clarify or demarcate land ownership. Even when short of privatising 
this land, this is, in international development circles at least, painted in a neo-liberal 
light, recently by Thomas Sikor and Christian Lund (2009), Sara Berry (2009) and Rikke 
Broegaard (2009) for instance. Such strategies, including legislated Aboriginal land 
tenure, have a major bearing on identity in Aboriginal Australia, emphasising local 
identity.
The CD sub-traditions of self-managing, self-governing, cooperative communities, 
separate from the state and the encapsulating society as manifest in Australian Aboriginal 
self-determination policy intersect too with a heightened globalisation. Despite their 
isolation, remote Aboriginal communities are not immune from the effects of 
globalisation, which have likewise unfolded in complex ways. 1 defer discussion of some 
of these ways until chapter 7.
The third intellectual tradition in CD, involving professional practitioners working in 
partnership with communities or community groups, sits between the extremes of the two 
traditions outlined above. I have labelled this the partnership approach to CD. Campfens
22
dubs it the “social learning” CD tradition (Campfens 1997: 40). Indeed strong in this 
tradition is the popular education work and “critical consciousness” theory of Paulo 
Freire which Campfens says “implies a search for knowledge: a critical reflection on 
reality, followed by action that carries an ideological option up to and including the 
transformation of one’s own world”, including one’s community (ibid: 37). This tradition 
blends the benefits of the first and second traditions of CD above, for instance in the form 
of so-called liberation theology in which the point of view of the poor is paramount but 
their insights must come with improved material conditions for there to be effective 
development. As Campfens puts it here, “the poor, not science and technology”, should 
be the focus of development and liberation; “this is not to minimize the importance of 
science and technology but rather to emphasize the correct priority” (ibid: 38). Within 
this third CD tradition, then, there is a “reconstruction of the development expert” (ibid: 
39) rather than his or her rejection. I suggest it is in this thjrd tradition that CD is most 
likely to improve conditions in Aboriginal communities, to overcome the 
“compartmentalization of the changing and the unchanging”, to quote Francesca Merlan 
(1998: 232), that is inhibiting positive change here. By implication, I suggest the other 
two traditions of CD are less likely to achieve such improvements, in fact have set them 
back.
Community development in Aboriginal Australia
In the self-determination era from 1972 to 2007 the Aboriginal affairs policy setting was 
stable compared to more recent years, though not unproblematic in retrospect. During this 
time, David Hollinsworth believes Australian Aboriginal CD can best be understood in 
terms of a contradiction between community autonomy and the surveillance resulting 
from the requirements of financial accountability for the funds to facilitate this autonomy 
(Hollinsworth 1996: 123). As I elaborate below, this facilitation meant the proliferation 
of autonomous Aboriginal community organisations, associations and councils under 
self-determination policy. The proliferation shows little sign of abating. Consistent with 
the second intellectual tradition of CD above, the proliferation of such entities is not 
necessarily confined to the Aboriginal domain (Onyx 1996: 101). To a degree it is
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characteristic of civil society more generally. But as I will demonstrate, the proliferation 
rate is far greater in the Aboriginal domain than in the wider community. Nor should the 
accountability requirements of funding to those organisations, councils and associations 
in the Aboriginal domain be considered unique to the neo-liberal governments who 
sponsored their growth in numbers through much of the self-determination era. As 
Hollinsworth observes, a certain degree of such incorporation within the state apparatus 
is probably inevitable for these entities in the absence of a firm and independent 
economic base for the vast majority of Aboriginal communities (Hollinsworth 1996: 
119); and, I would add, in the absence of more discemable development success from 
Aboriginal self-determination, otherwise the general public would not countenance what 
many already see as their taxes perennially wasted here. The public at least wants to be 
able to see the efforts to which this money continues to be put, however patchy the 
results. >
What is remarkable in this context is the dearth of sufficient support for the resulting 
multitude of Aboriginal organisations, associations and councils to optimise their 
capacity for sustainable development, including their capacity to acquit funds. That is, 
their existence and surveillance alone has constituted the character of CD in Aboriginal 
Australia. Begun in 1977 in the early days of Aboriginal self-determination, CDEP 
offered community development potential. Indeed expectations of CD tended to be 
focused on CDEP, and a variety of organisations got something of a workforce and 
additional funds through the program, becoming so-called CDEP organisations. But as 
late as 2001, Jon Altman could comment that “to make the transition to their role as 
development agencies” CDEP organisations would require “resourcing for board and 
member empowerment.” In particular, he said, “there is a need for an additional injection 
of funds for training boards and for participatory planning” (Altman 2001: 131).
It seems the existence of the multitude of self-determined Aboriginal organisations, 
associations and councils, linked or not to CDEP, has been justified by little more than 
the strength of an implicitly local and explicitly traditional Aboriginal culture. This, it 
still seems to be assumed, will best serve community development if kept largely separate
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from outside influences and capacity assistance. As such, Jim Ife and Frank Tesoriero, for 
instance, assert in a general text on CD that the primary aim of community development 
in Indigenous communities “is to legitimize and strengthen Indigenous culture” (Ife and 
Tesoriero 2006: 235); and that “a particularly important initiative is the establishment of 
programs using Indigenous spiritual values and traditions as a way of organising 
alternative approaches to social problems and human services, such as health, alcohol, 
housing and justice issues” (ibid: 237). Indigenous peoples must set the development 
agenda and retain “complete control” over development processes and structures (ibid: 
235), it is said.
With this emphasis, Sutton believes land-based Aboriginal organisations, associations 
and councils, at least, now vie with legally recognised Aboriginal traditional land owner 
status “as among the more intrinsic of Indigenous people’s modes of being related to 
place” (Sutton 2008: 173). In the NT, traditional land ownership constitutes collective 
legislated Aboriginal land tenure under the ALRA. This and the organisations, 
associations and councils can be seen as connected “territorializing strategies” (Sikor and 
Lund 2009: 14) in the state’s jural order. Says Sutton:
The cultural stuff of legal incorporation may still be rather foreign for many Aboriginal 
people, but the fact and consequence of belonging to a place or group in a legally 
incorporated way has, for many, become deeply assimilated as a focus of economic and 
political striving and a key medium for transactions between kin and others (Sutton 2008: 
173).
That is, this became a key focus and medium of Aboriginal identity in the self- 
determination era; and of change, despite the underlying emphasis on tradition. The focus 
is a local one, as is that of traditional ownership under the ALRA.
In much of remote Aboriginal Australia, as in remote Indigenous Canada, change, 
including community development, has been strongly influenced in one way or another 
by resource extraction, if only because of the coincidence of resource wealth across vast 
areas where Aboriginal people live dispersed in relatively large numbers as part of small
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general populations otherwise concentrated in a few centres (Young 1995: 2,32). In the 
pre self-determination Aboriginal assimilation era in Australia, from circa 1939 to 1972, 
resource extractive industries were encouraged to the NT with the expectation that they 
would provide Aboriginal people with jobs, an essential step in their assimilation. Land 
rights, a key component of self-determination policy, was as least partly conceived as 
giving Aboriginal people a more significant stake in this sort of development (Rowse 
2000: 34,35). Gough Whitlam, the Prime Minister who proposed land rights legislation in 
the NT and introduced Aboriginal self-determination policy nationally, has written that 
foreign companies “more avidly seeking mineral rights in the Territory than in the States” 
(Whitlam 1985: 469) was one reason the Woodward Commission on Aboriginal land 
rights focused on the NT. There was also a convenient lack of the impediment of state 
rights; Commonwealth law and policy prevail in the NT to a far greater extent than in the 
states. And with Aboriginal people, many still living in remote reserves, making up at 
least 25 per cent of a nevertheless very small NT population, there were ready subjects of 
a move towards land rights combined with relatively low likelihood of electoral fallout. 
These and other reasons for the move recognised, writing and applying land rights 
legislation -  the ALRA -  to facilitate an Aboriginal stake in mining investment without 
causing Aboriginal collective land ownership to deter that investment has become a 
significant part of the story of Aboriginal self-determination and CD in the NT.
Development resting, however unsteadily, on mining has resulted. There are nearly 30 
Aboriginal associations established to receive royalties or compensation from resource 
exploration or extraction in the southern part of the NT alone. They are good examples of 
the land-based organisations, associations and councils Sutton mentioned above as now 
intrinsic Indigenous modes of being related to place. The finances of these entities are 
managed by the Aboriginal Associations Management Corporation, part of the CLC. The 
CLC is an organisation of 90 delegates elected from communities across southern NT, 
with some 130 core staff (and additional community-based rangers) in roles ranging from 
legal advice to anthropology, land management to media liaison, and now community 
development -  in addition to financial management. The CLC is itself enshrined in the
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ALRA, which leverages monies like royalties and compensation, and is largely funded by 
mining royalty equivalents from government.
More broadly, Young describes Aboriginal self-determination as having a “community - 
based development approach” (Young 1995: 36) (emphasis added). Intentional or not, the 
use of ‘based’ is apt, as it evokes the intellectual tradition most closely akin to the CD of 
self-determination. That we struggle to say more than this is partly because governments, 
and others, clearly struggled to reconcile Aboriginal self-determination with the 
‘development as economic growth’ paradigm and its increasingly neo-liberal slant. David 
Martin notes that, from as early as 1987, the original community development emphasis 
of CDEP, for instance, has been gradually replaced by a focus on enterprise development 
and preparing individuals for mainstream employment but in communities ill-prepared 
for it. Poor Aboriginal health, and education levels and minimal business development 
and employment opportunities have historically been only part of this ill-preparedness 
(Martin, D. 2001: 34). Martin says:
A fonnally ‘economic’ focus for CDEP ignores the severely disadvantaged and 
sometimes quite dysfunctional state of many contemporary Indigenous communities, 
particularly those in rural and remote areas. It assumes that, somehow, meaningful 
employment, training, and enterprise development activities can take place within 
situations all too often characterised by chaos, conflict and family and personal distress 
(ibid).
Throughout the 1980s, the Aboriginal Development Commission (ADC) administered 
most Aboriginal development programs apart from CDEP. The ADC initially had three 
functions: 1. to help acquire land for Aboriginal communities and groups, 2. to lend 
money to Aboriginal people for housing and other purposes and 3. to lend and grant 
money for Aboriginal business purposes (Young 1995: 111). It later took on other 
responsibilities, such as overall responsibility for Aboriginal housing. In fact, making 
loans and grants for housing became the ADC’s major activity in expenditure terms 
(Rowse 1992: 12,14). This was a social program, but hardly a community development 
one if we consider Campfens’ values and principles of CD above. Processing loans and
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grants is not generally the stuff of the engagement explicit in these values and principles. 
Economic development in modernist, increasingly economic rationalist, terms was the 
ADC’s measure of development success. CD was downgraded and commercial viability 
of enterprises became paramount (Young 1995: 113,114). The record of Aboriginal 
enterprise failures in terms of commercial viability is a long one. While there are many 
reasons for this failure rate, the phrase ‘set up to fail’ was commonly said about 
Aboriginal enterprises and other entities at this time. The phrase evokes their formal 
establishment in large numbers without the necessary follow-up support to optimise the 
chance of success.
According to Young, the ADC had inherited conflicts over “social and economic 
priorities” (ibid: 111) from its predecessors, the Aboriginal Loans Commission, the 
Aboriginal Land Fund Commission and the Commonwealth Department of Aboriginal 
Affairs (DAA) enterprise section (ibid). And it appeared to bequeath these when it was 
amalgamated in 1990 with DAA in full to form ATSIC, through which Commonwealth 
funding for Aboriginal organisations passed for 14 years until ATSIC in turn was 
abolished. ATSIC certainly had a clearer social and community development role than 
the ADC. This and its regional council system were a clear attempt at greater government 
engagement with Aboriginal communities. But Young observed in 1995 that the ATSIC 
regional council system was under-resourced and lacked “essential support and advice”; 
and that ATSIC still had “problems in developing programs which effectively link 
economic and social needs into a more holistic form of development” (ibid: 107). That is, 
there was a separation of economic and community development imperatives. This within 
a self-determination policy where CD came with the separation of Aboriginal people 
from the state and wider society and from each other, frequently on the basis of tradition, 
as I will show.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have briefly considered the terms community and development and their 
coming together as community development. I have outlined three community
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development traditions and explored community development in Aboriginal Australia in 
the influential self-determination policy era. During this era the existence and 
surveillance alone of an increasing number of autonomous or localised Aboriginal 
organisations, associations and councils constituted the character of CD in Aboriginal 
Australia. The existence of these entities seemed justified by little more than an implicitly 
local, traditional cultural strength such that they as likely lacked the necessary capacity 
building support for sustainable CD. Although conceptually many are themselves 
communities of interest, these organisations, associations and councils have divided up 
any wider community of interest and/or identity across far-flung residential communities. 
Meanwhile, community development became separated from economic development. 1 
will now look in more detail at how this happened under self-determination policy.
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Chapter 3
Self-determination
Aboriginal self-determination policy, including land rights, has provided Aboriginal 
people with a base for empowerment and some independence. After years of Aboriginal 
assimilation policy in which any development of communities came from the top down, it 
was expected that bottom up forms of CD would thrive upon the self-determination base. 
Communities hitherto run by superintendents shifted, formally at least, to the control of 
community councils. Aboriginal affairs funding increased significantly to such 
organisations proliferating within the second, the bottom up, alternative development or 
social movement CD tradition. But sustainable CD was in fact weakened. In this chapter I
examine the self-determination era and CD in detail. I focus on three key architects of the
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policy to see how it privileged autonomy/localism over relatedness and why, then, it did 
not have the expected beneficial results, why it continues to limit the capacity of CD to 
improve Aboriginal community conditions. The reasons are farther highlighted through 
an example in the area of Aboriginal health, specifically alcohol abuse, and one in an area 
akin to the case studies in my thesis. Reification, juridification and entification are factors 
that come to the fore. I conclude the chapter with brief examination of the disengagement 
that encompassed and continues to accentuate key problems arising from self- 
determination.
The policy
For some 35 years from 1972, self-determination policy guided Australian Aboriginal 
affairs, including CD. The policy framework was in place with little substantial change 
until the Commonwealth intervention in the NT brought a radical policy departure. 
Almost mid way through the self-determination era, in the course of an evaluation of the 
policy, the DAA described it as:
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based on the recognition of the equal right of Aboriginal people along with other 
Australians to determine their own future within the Australian community. It explicitly 
acknowledges that Aborigines are a distinct cultural group as well as recognising the 
worth of Aboriginal culture and the right of Aborigines to pursue lifestyles which are in 
accordance with that culture. Self-determination also seeks to improve the social and 
economic circumstances of Aborigines by encouraging them to take charge of their own 
affairs (Australian Government 1988: 228).
Four years later, Tim Rowse observed that under the policy “Aboriginal people 
nominally enjoy the right to run their own affairs, but actually find themselves having to 
learn to do so according to the forms of land tenure and administrative process created for 
them by the state” (Rowse 1992: 19). What this suggests is that their relative 
independence was conditional, as was predictable with the government funding to 
facilitate it; and that with the conditions came not only tension in the arrangement but 
also changes to Aboriginal socio-cultural organisation and identity informed by links to 
land.
Rowse identifies the key elements of self-determination policy as: the formation of a 
national assembly of elected Indigenous representatives; the encouragement of 
Indigenous service delivery organisations including community councils; land rights 
legislation in the NT; and support for the outstation movement in remote areas (Rowse 
1998a: 205), ie. the movement of some Aboriginal residents of larger remote 
communities to smaller, more remote communities. The last three elements have proved 
most significant, as they embody the key forms of land tenure and administrative process 
Rowse refers to. These forms emphasise the local in Aboriginal land tenure, culture and 
social organisation. Therefore, despite the DAA inference above of support for an 
Aboriginal culture in the singular, these forms went to the opposite extreme of Aboriginal 
cultural pluralism. Further, they tend to emphasise a reified, timeless tradition as the 
essence of Aboriginal culture/s and the opposite of modernity. In short, these forms 
together elevate difference -  not only between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people but 
between local Aboriginal groups. With Aboriginal self-determination, Australia moved to
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what Rowse calls “an open-ended plurality of norms”, and thus a “new and uncharted 
project of Australian governance” (ibid: 217). The project, says Sutton, introduced a:
profound contradiction between liberal democratic support for cultural diversity with its 
attendant alleged devolution of power to Indigenous communities, and a seeming 
difficulty in facing and dealing with the very reality of that diversity and devolution on 
the ground (Sutton 2001: 133).
On the ground, there has been juridification and entification as ways of trying to deal 
with the diversity and devolution. David Martin says the “unavoidable question” that will 
continue to confront Australians is how much support for diversity is justifiably provided 
by the state where this results in substantial Aboriginal socio-economic disadvantage 
compared to the general population (Martin, D. 2006: 10). This in turn suggests that self- 
determination (including land rights) ultimately transferred a lot less power to Aboriginal 
people than was planned in the policy; that the policy may have eroded power just as it 
provided it to Aboriginal people. The shared interests, purposes and values of civil 
society have fractured here into many, many small pieces.
Self-determination was, of course, largely a reaction to the assimilation policy which 
sought to obliterate differences between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal individuals; and 
which, in fact, facilitated little by way of Aboriginal community development that might 
have slowed the assimilation. Yet self-determination also gradually grew out of an 
Aboriginal civil rights movement in which Aboriginal people demanded to be treated the 
same as other Australians. Maggie Brady has examined this in the context of alcohol 
policy for Aboriginal people. She sees the 1967 referendum that gave the Commonwealth 
power to make laws for the specific benefit of Aboriginal people and required them to be 
counted in the census as a key point in the transformation of the civil rights movement 
into a self-determination campaign (Brady 2004: 18). Civil rights merged through the 
new census requirement with a liberal vision of the waged Aboriginal citizen, 
unencumbered with tradition, everywhere individually realising the ultimate goal of 
assimilation (Rowse 1998a: 210). But at the same time “the idea began to form that 
Aboriginal people deserved an extra kind of recognition apart from equality” (Brady
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2004: 19). The Commonwealth’s new found power to make Aboriginal-specific laws no 
doubt informed this idea, or vice versa. So too Aboriginal activism on the world stage 
which saw Aboriginal leaders in solidarity with the likes of the African American Black 
Power movement, North American Indigenous groups and developing countries newly 
independent or seeking independence. What Jeremy Beckett calls “the politics of 
embarrassment” (cited in Brady 2004: 22) was often enough played out at home. That 
then Federal Opposition leader Whitlam was acutely sensitive to the embarrassment is 
evident in his November 1972 policy speech where he said:
Let us never forget this: Australia’s real test as far as the rest of the world, and 
particularly our region, is concerned is the role we create for our own Aborigines. In this 
sense, and it is a very real sense, the Aborigines are our true link with our region. More 
than any foreign aid program, more than any international obligation which we meet or 
forfeit, more than any part we may play in any treaty or agreement or alliance, Australia’s 
treatment of her Aboriginal people will be the thing upon which the rest of the world will 
judge Australia and Australians (cited in Whitlam 1985: 466).
Whitlam went on that day to outline his proposed Aboriginal self-determination policy, 
and to quickly implement the policy upon the election of his government in December 
1972. Young notes that it was no accident that this momentous change in the direction of 
Australian Aboriginal affairs coincided with processes of decolonisation and 
independence among so-called third world nations (Young 1995: 36). Whitlam and 
prominent Aboriginal leaders had specifically made the link that would be manifested in 
Aboriginal local autonomy. In fact, Will Sanders says “Whitlam clearly had a sense that 
the handling of Indigenous affairs in Australia was part of a much larger global process 
of international law-making” in the context of decolonisation (Sanders 2002: 2).
The main legal instruments of Aboriginal self-determination policy -  the ALRA and the 
Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act also of 1976, the latter to allow for the formal 
incorporation of what Rowse refers to above as Indigenous service delivery organisations 
-  were not made law until after the Whitlam government was famously replaced by the 
Liberal-Country Party Fraser Government. But by then Whitlam had set up and heard
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from the Woodward Commission, proposed the NT land rights legislation that the 
commission recommended and doubled direct Commonwealth expenditure on Aboriginal 
assistance programs (Brady 2004: 20). Much of the money went straight to the then still 
relatively few Aboriginal-controlled organisations. This was consistent with the emphasis 
on the local in Aboriginal self-determination. But Brady suggests it also reflects the 
Commonwealth’s power, courtesy of the 1967 referendum, to by-pass the states on 
Aboriginal affairs, and Whitlam’s frustration that the Commonwealth Government 
between the referendum and his election in late 1972 had not done so (ibid: 25). It seems 
he was making up for lost time.
The proliferation of localised Aboriginal organisations
Aboriginal organisations sprang up under self-determination policy (Sanders 2002: 3) and 
grew steadily in numbers nationwide in a “highly localized and highly functionally 
specialized” pattern (Sanders and Holcombe 2006: 2). By 1986-7 there were 554 
registered with the then Commonwealth Office of the Registrar of Aboriginal 
Corporations and 2861 by 2002-03, with objectives in their rules covering art and culture, 
community council services, media, health, housing, CDEP, education, sport and 
recreation and employment and training, etc (Rowse 2005: 208, 209). Taking into 
account incorporation under state and territory legislation too, David Martin believes 
there were more than 6,000 Indigenous corporations nationwide in 2003 (Martin, D. 
2003: 1). At the 2006 census, the Aboriginal population was 517,200 people, making for 
one corporation for every 86.2 Aboriginal people, assuming the number of coiporations 
did not grow between 2003 and 2006 and they no doubt did grow. Considering half of 
these people at most were adult, this equates to one corporation for every 43 adult 
Aboriginal people. Kenny reports that estimates of the number of comparable 
organisations in the general community have ranged from 15,000 to 120,000, with the 
higher figures including the likes of professional associations for lawyers and accountants 
(Kenny 2006: 201) and presumably the Aboriginal organisations too. But even at this 
very high end of the estimate, against the 2006 census figure for the general Australian 
population of 20.7 million people, it equates to one comparable organisation for every
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172.5 people and means the per capita rate of Aboriginal organisation to Aboriginal 
people is at least double the per capita rate of like organisations in the general population. 
Kenny notes that in community development generally, local “is bestowed with a positive 
connotation” (ibid: 357) regardless of which CD tradition and despite tendencies for the 
local to become parochial (ibid). But these figures alone suggest this connotation is much 
stronger in the Aboriginal domain than the general Australian population.
Along with the local emphasis in Aboriginal self-determination policy, the growth in 
Aboriginal organisations is partly explained by the need for incorporated organisations, 
as opposed to individuals and families, to receive the increased Commonwealth 
Aboriginal affairs funding under the policy. The state cannot generally provide money to 
individuals beyond social security payments; it can to incorporated bodies for specific 
social purposes. The growth is further explained by the geographically dispersed 
circumstances of the Aboriginal population, including in outstations, circumstances that 
only became more pronounced when land rights gave ownership of large remote reserves 
to Aboriginal people and as the remote Aboriginal population increased. That is, there 
have been steadily growing numbers of Aboriginal people living across remote Australia 
requiring services however delivered. They may now be owners of the land by virtue of 
their traditional connection to it, and still draw some sustenance from it, but that does not 
mean they can live on it without services. Outsourcing service delivery to organisations 
where Aboriginal people live is ostensibly an efficiency, frequently eroded by conflicting 
agendas. As late as 2007, Janet Hunt and Diane Smith could report that government 
departments:
tend to see Indigenous organisations as deliverers of services and implementers of 
government programs, whereas Indigenous organisations see themselves as decision­
makers and government funding as being available to support their priorities and goals 
(Hunt and Smith 2007: 41).
Neither perspective slowed the proliferation of Aboriginal organisations under the policy 
of self-determination. With the growth came inevitable duplication of services, another 
significant inefficiency. More importantly, as government sponsored sites of CD these
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entities nevertheless had insufficient government support beyond mere funding to enable 
most to become consistent providers of effective community development.
But lest it appear that Aboriginal self-determination and CD within it simply evolved due 
to legal, operational and demographic demands, I turn now to the plans of the three 
people besides Whitlam perhaps most responsible for the policy.
Policy planners: Rowley, Cooinbs and Woodward
As Professor of Political Studies at the University of Papua and New Guinea, and 
Director of the Social Science Research Council of Australia’s Aborigines in Australian 
Society Project from 1964 to 1967, political scientist cum anthropologist Charles Rowley 
made strong recommendations for a move away from assimilation policy for Aboriginal 
people. Volume two of the project’s report series focused on Aboriginal people in settled, 
as opposed to remote, areas of Australia. Yet here Rowley nevertheless outlined a new 
policy framework he hoped would be adopted Australia-wide (Rowley 1971a: 422). In it, 
he emphasised the need for governments to facilitate “internal discipline” within 
Aboriginal society (ibid: 421), when the opposite has arguably occurred. It was a genuine 
plea to start to empower Aboriginal people. But there was a strong sense Rowley sought 
to marshal that power lest it get out of hand. “Either Aboriginal influence comes sooner 
or Aboriginal ‘black power’ comes later”, he wrote (ibid).
This Aboriginal influence should follow the growth of Aboriginal organisations and 
pressure groups becoming legal ‘Aboriginal companies’ (ibid: 419,424,425), Rowley 
recommended. Their internal discipline should build upon a structure of authority, in turn 
requiring a clear definition of the limits of Aboriginal social group membership (ibid: 
422). Rowley made it clear he recommended a local definition here, against something 
more inclusive. “It is essential, I believe, that the Aboriginal company be the objective of 
the national strategy in local organisation,” he wrote (ibid: 424). “Nothing seems to me so 
adaptable to different circumstances and therefore so suitable for a national policy” (ibid: 
431). Conceding they may need to form into regional networks (ibid: 431,439), Rowley
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proceeded, optimistically, to itemise some of the expected objectives of the companies 
themselves: to hold land and facilitate economic development on that land (Rowley 
1971b: 193,194,196) and to manage everything from hostels, savings and loans, to 
transport for seasonal work, legal representation and pre-school training for Aboriginal 
mothers (Rowley 1971a: 439,440), in what “could be the first large-scale community 
development operation in this country” (ibid: 424). According to Rowse, with the 
influence of Rowley:
the ideal indigenous citizen was not any longer to be an individual wage worker or 
housewife who had left his/her Aboriginal identity far behind; he/she was a person able to 
participate in that modified form of group life known as the organisation (Rowse 2000: 
132).
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The organisation was invariably a local one with an emphasis on reified tradition. 
Aboriginal identity followed suit, even if Aboriginal people maintained a life outside the 
organisation.
In advocating the incorporation of local groups as a key Aboriginal self-determination 
measure and vehicle for CD, the Council for Aboriginal Affairs (CAA) under the 
chairmanship of H.C. (‘Nugget’) Coombs was clearly influenced by Rowley (Rowse 
2000: 131). The CAA ran from 1967 to 1976, advising the Commonwealth Government 
on the transition from assimilation to self-determination policy. Coombs endorsed 
Rowley’s view that authority structures in Aboriginal groups necessarily occur locally. 
He suggested wider structures are inherently unstable. “Aboriginal society traditionally 
was composed of small groups whose relationships with one another were frequently 
suspicious and hostile,” he wrote in the late 1970s. “It has only been since white 
occupation and the emergency need for groups, however separate and mutually 
suspicious, to work together to resist a common danger, that some sense of identity 
between Aborigines of different kinds has begun to emerge” (Coombs 1978: 240). By the 
mid 1990s he was still confident “that social control is most effective in small 
communities and where Aboriginal Law and ceremonial life is strong” (Coombs 1994: 
19).
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In small local groups and their organisations, Coombs saw value in a degree of exclusion 
of others, saying “socially and ethnically homogeneous” groups possessed authority 
structures and processes adequate to conduct their own traditional affairs (ibid: 46). He 
also saw in the local critical Aboriginal links to land. To him, “the effectiveness of all 
these processes derived from the authority inherent in the relationship of people to the 
land and the primacy of that authority within their own territory” (ibid: 46,47). The 
authority was, then, in identity found in reified, locally emplaced tradition; and around it 
we see signs of entification, involving the limitation of processes of relatedness. That 
local authority could and must be maintained, according to Coombs, is evidenced in his 
support for outstations as a key element of self-determination. In many ways Aboriginal 
outstations are Coombs’ main legacy to Aboriginal affairs, sites at which the local and 
the traditional converged even more closely than in most Aboriginal organisations. In 
outstations (which often were and remain organisations as well as locations in order to 
attract funding), Coombs invested what now can be seen as idealism at best, otherwise an 
unrealistic weight of expectation, although it was never expected that more than a small 
proportion of remote Aboriginal people would move to an outstation. Despite their very 
small size and very remote location, Coombs thought for instance that outstations “may, 
for some time, continue to be largely autonomous and self-sufficient economic units” 
(ibid: 25). More significantly, he believed they rehabilitated Aboriginal traditional 
authority and decision-making structures (ibid: 26,28,29) derived from traditional 
Aboriginal law and ceremony, in turn derived from the land. He saw the outstation 
movement as part of the land rights movement (ibid: 43); indeed, the former would 
hardly be possible without the latter. Together they “lend power to traditional authority”, 
he said (ibid: 47). However, Coombs also saw outstations as sites of gradual change, 
albeit mediated by traditional authority structures (ibid: 29,30).
At few places was the outstation movement as strong, the number of outstations as many, 
as around Hermannsburg, in country considered that of the Western Arremte people, west 
of Alice Springs. Diane Austin-Broos says “the deep contradiction that lay in land rights 
and the outstation movement was that modernity came to the Arrernte in the form of a
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state-sponsored return to tradition” (Austin-Broos 2009: 4). In later chapters I tease out 
the particulars of this sponsorship. Their outstations might not have been so numerous, 
but modernity came in a similar way to other language groups too. Yet even though 
modernity and tradition occurred in this way simultaneously, in a very real sense they 
also occurred separately. This may well be Coombs’ other enduring legacy. Nowhere is 
this clearer than in Coombs’ efforts on the CAA to cultivate what he called an Indigenous 
intelligentsia (Rowse 2000: 8), efforts that dovetail with Rowley’s recommendations 
above. In these efforts Coombs focused on the local. The local again meant local 
Aboriginal organisations. And, given Coombs’ comments above, it also meant 
outstations, that other emerging source of entification. But without any conceivable 
government or other capacity to provide schools for most of these tiny, far-flung 
communities, despite funding increases, the educational foundation for this intelligentsia 
was largely missing. Where there was a school, Coombs applauded some “distinctive 
developments in education” (Coombs 1994: 27): “school time has been restricted and the 
curriculum limited so that while still providing basic skills of literacy and numeracy, 
scope is left for traditional instruction and to minimise assimilationist influences” (ibid). 
He saw it as beneficial that an increasing proportion of the Indigenous intelligentsia is 
“tradition-oriented” (Coombs 1978: 242). In short, present simultaneously, tradition and 
modernity remained polarised in the Aboriginal domain during the self-determination era.
The influence of Coombs was simultaneous to that of Woodward. As a Queen’s Counsel, 
Mr Justice Woodward had been the counsel for the plaintiffs in the so-called Gove case, 
Milirrpum and Others versus mining company Nabalco and the Commonwealth of 
Australia, that culminated in 1971. The case was a critical step towards Aboriginal land 
rights. Two years later Prime Minister Whitlam appointed Woodward to head a royal 
commission into the establishment of land rights in the NT, the Woodward Commission. 
The brief included inquiry into appropriate bodies for the granting of rights in or in 
relation to land (Woodward 1974: paras 1,2). As such, Woodward’s findings, written in 
two parts, became the blueprint for Aboriginal self-determination in the form of both land 
rights and of incorporated Aboriginal organisations, or companies as Rowley tended to 
call them. Land rights law and the incorporation of entities are the significant sources of
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juridification as a factor in self-determination localism. The Whitlam and Fraser 
governments were guided more by the second part of Woodward’s findings, in which he 
overturned some key findings and recommendations made in his first report.
In his first report, Woodward struggled with whether or not any piece of NT land was 
traditionally held by one Aboriginal group to the exclusion of other Aboriginal groups 
(Woodward 1973: para 63). When it came to recommending how to vest land under land 
rights legislation, he recommended in his first report that land be vested in Aboriginal 
residential communities instead of clans. Woodward here favoured vesting land in 
communities largely because, he said, despite the traditional importance of separate clans, 
communities reflect contemporary Aboriginal socio-political organisation (ibid: para 
108). He also flagged inequities were land to be vested in traditional land-holding groups 
like clans (ibid: paras 113,114). Against the resulting dilemmas of how, then, to divide 
the vast lands that stretch between communities and how to account for the fact that 
residence in, and identification with, a particular community is not always fixed, 
Woodward recommended each NT Aboriginal person register in one community of their 
choice, in a system that accommodated “transferees” (ibid: para 109). This was always to 
be a more regional system than the alternative clan model of land owning/holding. In 
fact, the actual instrument Woodward recommended here was something he called a 
community land board, consisting of representatives chosen by a community “or by 
several communities jointly” and incorporated under special legislation (ibid: para 284). 
This representation should, Woodward suggested, give attention to “the different clans 
holding land in the community area” and ideally achieve a balance of older and younger 
people on the board (ibid: para 285).
Woodward’s thoughts on the incorporation of Aboriginal organisations in his first report 
included incorporation of such land owning bodies, community councils with a local 
government role, whole of community enterprises and enterprises of groups within a 
community (ibid: para 168). He warned of the proliferation of organisations in this 
context but opted for their “freedom of choice” to incorporate (ibid: paras 171,173). This 
freedom, coupled with Woodward’s change of heart on the vesting of land in his second
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report, assured the proliferation. The change of heart endorsed localism with 
traditionalism as primary principles on which to justify the establishment of an 
Aboriginal organisation and its funding. The resulting legal instrument for such 
establishment, the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act, only replaced in 2006, said 
organisation rules may be made according to Aboriginal custom (Aboriginal Councils 
and Associations Act, 1976: Section 23) and many of course were. There followed in the 
NT the Local Government Act of 1978, under which there were 56 separate Aboriginal 
community councils by 2006 (Sanders 2006: 3), still just the tip of the iceberg of 
incorporated Aboriginal organisations covering a range of objectives, as above.
In his second report, Woodward contemplated that his first report’s position that land 
should be vested in Aboriginal communities “undervalued the continuing importance of 
the clan structure” (Woodward 1974: para 82). Community councils or community land 
boards or the like holding the land, he now said, would be “an unwarranted interference 
with the Aboriginal authority system” (ibid). Created by “outside authority” (ibid: para 
366), interference in the form of such institutions would cause “confusion and 
uncertainty” (ibid) Woodward concluded. With this, he relegated the contemporary socio­
political organisation he had supported in his first report, a social system that is regional 
and flexible in nature; and he gave his powerful judicial imprimatur to an interpretation 
of Aboriginal sociality that highlights local and traditional links to land. If incorporated 
Aboriginal organisations began moulding the identity of their members according to this 
interpretation, NT land rights via Woodward locked it in and took it from the ritual realm 
to the mundane modem world. Here was reification, entification and juridification 
together. While these effects have arguably assisted what I distinguish as commercial 
development/investment, as I will explain, and indeed been attractive to some of their 
Aboriginal subjects, the effect has not necessarily been to help community development.
The traditional and local in self-determined Aboriginal health
That a privileging of local autonomy has not brought sustained CD benefits to Aboriginal 
communities is borne out in an examination of Aboriginal health issues, specifically
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relating to alcohol abuse. Brady’s analysis of alcohol policy at the height of the 
Aboriginal self-determination era shows how the traditional and the local separated 
Aboriginal organisations from outside, non-Aboriginal authorities in this important health 
field, for fear of interference. Her book ‘Indigenous Australia and Alcohol Policy’ (2004) 
is subtitled Meeting Difference with Indifference. It is not, of course, a call to deny 
differences between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people nor to deny the need for some 
special measures for Aboriginal people, but one account of the mishandling of difference. 
It shows how an emphasis on tradition translated into a cultural over-sensitivity on the 
part of government health policy makers (Brady, 2004: 43) and the sidelining of 
mainstream health advice generally in favour of help from native Canadians promoting 
traditional treatments (ibid: especially 73-79) in the context of increasingly localised 
service delivery. Culturally appropriate health measures became synonymous with 
culturally specific ones, ie. specific to locality (ibid: 46,47). Health education products on 
alcohol consumption and other health issues had to be designed to meet local community 
needs, using local knowledge, delivered only by Aboriginal health workers in “their 
own”, ie. entified, health organisations (ibid: 47,48,52,63). In the area of HIV/AIDs, 
Brady observes that, as a result of the lack of baseline research input and an 
unwillingness among health professionals to offer guidance in this environment, “several 
of these locally devised products may indeed have been ‘culturally appropriate’, but 
lacking expert advice their value is questionable” (ibid: 48,49). In contrast, the popular 
‘Condoman’ campaign provided an instantly recognisable and widely accepted 
Aboriginal sexual health ‘hero’ that was “in no way ‘traditional’ and was a universal 
rather than a culturally specific icon” (ibid: 49). According to Brady, it was 1997 before 
there was some acceptance that clinical and genuinely educational components of sexual 
health strategy should be “integrated with cultural relevance and appropriateness, rather 
than simply stressing the latter” (ibid: 50). Meanwhile, in alcohol policy, it appeared to 
have become accepted at the highest levels that causes of Aboriginal alcoholism include 
“cultural deprivation” and that a disease model of the condition was “outdated” and 
“western” (ibid: 52, citing the National Aboriginal Health Strategy report 1989: 192).
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Brady notes how Aboriginal health policy makers were increasingly unwilling to make 
definitive statements unless these had been referred to Indigenous organisations (ibid: 
56). She believes this made for “paralysing inaction” on Aboriginal health problems, the 
marginalisation of Aboriginal health issues and their reduction in major government 
reports to several paragraphs alluding to the difference between Indigenous and non- 
Indigenous Australians (ibid). On the ground, a strong sense of cultural similarity with 
other Indigenous people came to the fore, particularly those from Canada, and an 
acceptance that cultural revitalisation was the key to better Aboriginal health. By 1992, a 
residential alcohol treatment program was operating at the Central Australian Aboriginal 
Alcohol Planning Unit that included a Canadian smoking ceremony, for instance (2004: 
75). Brady, borrowing Marshall Sahlins’ term ‘universal nativism’, believes this 
phenomenon “serves to loosen associations with that which is non-indigenous” (ibid: 77, 
citing Sahlins 1995: 65), to polarise Indigenous and non-indigenous health models (ibid: 
97). It helped to bring innovation without real change to the problem of addressing 
widespread alcohol abuse in Aboriginal communities (ibid: 79). Funding for Aboriginal 
health organisations continued while:
government or quasi-government agencies were slow to encourage training or support for 
them to implement broader therapeutic modalities that would enrich, rather than replace, 
their existing focus. The social and professional isolation of many Aboriginal alcohol 
programs meant that they had insufficient networks -  both with public health 
professionals and with similar therapeutic communities treating members of the general 
population -  that would enable them to keep in touch with these ideas (ibid: 126).
Brady’s emphasis on the social and professional isolation of health programs points to the 
possibility that geographic isolation -  the physical remoteness -  of the places where 
many such programs were implemented was a relatively insignificant implication of the 
local privileged in Aboriginal self-determination. The following example of one 
particular Aboriginal organisation, outside the health field and within a field akin to that 
of my case studies, suggests the more significant implication is exclusion. Exclusion, part 
of entification, is of course a delimiting of the community participation central to 
effective CD, to say nothing yet of the conflict that commonly results.
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The local and traditional in a self-determined royalty organisation
Robert Levitus’ examination of Gagudju Association shows that even where the market 
came to remote Aboriginal communities, and with it a potentially much lower level of 
accountability to and surveillance by the state, self-determination did not necessarily 
become any easier for these communities. Privileged localism is again a significant 
impediment to community development. Uranium mining in the remote Kakadu region 
on what was to become Aboriginal land under the ALRA put significant amounts of 
money into something of a development start-up fund for Aboriginal people, peaking at 
around $3m annually in the mid 1980s (Levitus 2005: 30). Levitus says, then, the so- 
called investment deficit that inhibits development in most remote Aboriginal 
communities was, for much of the Kakadu region, cancelled. As importantly, mining and 
tourism led to significant improvements in transport, communications and services. And 
with these came the promise of Aboriginal employment and expanding retail 
consumption. So, says Levitus, “the unprecedented combination of Aboriginal land and 
capital occasioned by the Land Rights Act occurred in a region in which, by the end of 
1970s, locational disadvantage had been substantially overcome” (ibid). CD had the 
potential to flourish in its own right and as an aid to economic development.
But like Brady above on alcohol policy, Levitus explains how the articulation, often by 
prominent whites, of a profound difference in values and aspirations between Aboriginal 
and non-Aboriginal people played down the potential for Aboriginal uptake of the 
opportunities presented. Accordingly, the Ranger Uranium Inquiry, completed in 1977, 
paving the way to the grant of Aboriginal land under the Ranger uranium mine lease, 
anticipated that the primary school to be built at nearby Jabiru and employment at the 
mine would attract few Aboriginal people (ibid: 31). “Positive change for Aborigines was 
expected from other points”, says Levitus, with the inquiry suggesting much depended on 
the recognition of traditional ownership of the land and on local people being assisted in 
forms of development they found “congenial” (ibid). The inquiry supported Aboriginal
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calls for separate education curricula, for instance (ibid: 32). The inference here of course 
is that mainstream employment and education are un-Aboriginal.
Established to receive and manage moneys flowing from the mining, Gagudju 
Association initially interpreted matters to do with its membership and associated 
obligations broadly. Says Levitus: “There seemed to be, in general, a reasonable balance 
between mutually respected self-interest and concern to reach good decisions on matters 
with wider implications for country and people” (ibid: 33). Gagudju’s early stability and 
relative success stemmed from this balance, according to Levitus, from lack of 
competitors and from important regional agencies, such as the Australian National Parks 
and Wildlife Service, engaging with it (ibid: 34). But by the mid 1990s, Gagudju was 
heavily in debt. More importantly, it now faced competition from Aboriginal 
organisations with a much more local focus and thus exclusive membership, more 
entified organisations in an increasingly juridified environment. The Northern Land 
Council effectively replaced Gagudju with Gundjehmi Aboriginal Corporation, 
“consisting of the immediate traditional owners of the mine site and some closely 
associated ‘company’ clans, totaling less then thirty people” (ibid: 35). The Djabulukgu 
Association was established with an exclusive group of traditional owners of the Jabiluka 
mine only 20kms north of the Ranger mine (ibid 36). And the process of “political 
sectoring” consistent with the localism of self-determination policy continued when a 
small group claiming traditional affiliations to the extreme north-west of what had 
become the surrounding Kakadu National Park incorporated as the appropriately named 
Minitja Association and sought housing funding (ibid). As everyone’s organisation in 
comparison, Gagudju had become no-one’s (ibid).
Sanders has written of the “exit option” among members of Aboriginal organisations in 
the context of self-determination, one often “easier and more attractive than the option of 
staying in existing organisations and voicing and resolving differences” (Sanders 2002: 
12). John von Stunner calls the resulting creation of new organisations “institutionalized 
individualism”, where “everyone seeks his own ‘channel’, his ‘captive European’, his 
tame organization” (von Sturmer 1982: 98) managed day to day by the European though
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formally controlled by a discrete Aboriginal group. Levitus, citing von Sturmer, says 
Gagudju failed to adequately deflect such “fissive pressures” (ibid: 35, citing von 
Sturmer 1982: 99), pressures built up under self-determination’s localism. It seems there 
was a simultaneous failure to foster the community of interest that originally emerged in 
Gagudju, and a failure of key agencies to remain engaged with it. Levitus regrets that not 
many other people appeared to care about its demise but him (Levitus 2005: 36). They 
may have seen a tendency towards exclusion in entiflcation enforced in juridification as 
an inevitable consequence of the monies available from mining to Aboriginal people in 
Kakadu and elsewhere: fewer organisation members of course tallies as more money, or 
other benefits, for each member. Levitus does not see this exclusion as inevitable. His 
account of Gagudju is a glimpse of the common good in Aboriginal civil society. He 
says:
In 1987, when I researched the Association’s membership, I found an emerging sense of 
Gagudju as a collectivity. Certain clans were becoming implicitly understood as jointly 
covered by the umbrella of the Association, their memberships perceived as central to 
‘Gagudju mob’, their contiguous countries informally related as ‘company land’. 
Underneath the series of political and financial tribulations that began in 1989, it was the 
falling away of that tenuous sense of commonality that turned the vision of collective 
self-determination into a mirage (ibid: 38).
Disengagement
Aboriginal self-determination can now be seen as a prolonged missed opportunity for 
community development to improve Aboriginal communities. Governments helped 
establish a multitude of Aboriginal organisations but didn’t, and/or couldn’t because of 
their numbers, provide many with the practical support needed to equip them to bring 
lasting improvements through CD. What these organisations did do is preclude or 
fracture broader communities of interest and identity that may have assisted. The 
Aboriginal groups that formed, or potentially formed, broader institutional memberships 
became separated from each other, as governments disengaged from the organisations 
collectively. In 1982, von Stunner wrote of Gagudju as something of a model of self-
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determination or self-management (von Sturmer 1982: 78,79). It was a model not 
followed; entification, for instance, was preferred to Gagudju’s relatively informal, 
implicit and inclusive processes. In the same article von Sturmer wonders whether self- 
determination or self-management was otherwise a case of governments conveniently 
handing back to Aboriginal people intractable problems largely created by others, 
“government of the weak by the weak, dereliction of responsibility by the society at large 
dressed up in fancy words” (ibid: 75). Unrealistic reliance was placed on Aboriginal local 
autonomy. It and the associated tradition were privileged against the odds of them 
actually bringing lasting benefit.
Disengagement is a useful notion with which to understand this. Michael Dillon and Neil 
Westbury, the former the chief advisor to the current Commonwealth Minister for 
Indigenous Affairs, recently devoted a book to the “long-standing and ongoing 
government disengagement” (Dillon and Westbury 2007: 9) with Indigenous Australia. 
This, they say, was “propelled” under self-determination policy (ibid: 10, 175-198, 209), 
the “basic mechanism” (ibid: 179) of which they say was the establishment of Aboriginal 
organisations funded to deliver services at the community level. They note that 
Indigenous control of service delivery does not of itself guarantee effective organisational 
governance or outcomes (ibid: 184,190). Yet mainstreaming of services, on the other 
hand, is now commonly seen as inadequate “account given to cultural concerns” (ibid: 
198) and non-Aboriginal intrusion into Aboriginal affairs, in turn the cause of Aboriginal 
disadvantage (ibid: 196). Working with and capacity support for Aboriginal organisations 
is frequently seen similarly, the thin edge of the mainstreaming wedge. I have shown how 
an adequate account given to cultural concerns has come to mean a focus/reliance on 
local tradition, as opposed to broader, regional, contemporary cultural processes. This 
was meant to provide culturally appropriate improvements to Aboriginal communities, to 
alleviate their disadvantage appropriately. Key factors are reification and juridification as 
well as entification. Any early improvements to Aboriginal communities have not been 
sustained, though the certainty facilitated is attractive in development more generally so 
adherence to privileged localism has spread.
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Back in 1982, von Sturmer called for something approaching the sort of engagement that 
Dillon and Westbury see as missing in the self-determination era: “real consultation, the 
sheer grind and leg work necessary to establish the informed climate in which proper 
decisions can be made” (von Stunner 1982: 88,89) by Aboriginal people. Critical, von 
Sturmer said, is a comprehensive understanding of the groups concerned (ibid) plus the 
careful determination of their goals and objectives, the assessment of project feasibility, 
and the development of project implementation strategies (ibid: 107), all with “the 
assimilation of researchers, government personnel and relevant others” (ibid: 107) into 
the projects. This, 25 years later, is akin to Dillon and Westbury’s recommended “hybrid 
institutional frameworks” for development (Dillon and Westbury 2007: 183) and 
foreshadows my later discussion of hybridity. Of the three intellectual traditions in 
community development outlined above, von Stürmer’s call resonates most strongly with 
the third tradition. Instead, according to Diane Smith, Aboriginal self-determination saw 
governments essentially abandoning CD where this means “collaborative engagement on 
the ground” (Smith 2007: 11) with Aboriginal people. She says “the result was a failure 
to keep up with international best practice in community development that might have 
enabled a more sophisticated approach to the issues involved in the current intervention” 
(ibid) by the Commonwealth Government into NT Aboriginal affairs. That is, an 
investment in such practice, though involving a type and duration of engagement above 
what is perhaps generally expected of governments, may have obviated the forcefully 
reactive and expensive re-engagement that is the intervention in essence. There is a false 
economy exposed here. And it is not the first in Australian Aboriginal affairs.
Disengagement when it comes to community development was not something unique to 
governments in the self-determination era, though governments, particularly 
Commonwealth governments, were unusual in that they spent steadily more on 
Aboriginal affairs throughout the era while disengaging. Their disengagement was not 
because of a lack of funding, rather it relates to how that funding was applied: via a 
proliferation of Aboriginal organisations. It was an annually budgeted response to 
increasing demands for self-determination in that form, almost an end in itself. During 
this time, the CLC applied few resources to assist the recipients of rent, royalty and
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affected area payments to use the money for community development/benefit, though this 
is generally its purpose. The money flows from land the CLC successfully claimed on 
behalf of recipients and/or from agreements between the CLC, on the recipients’ behalf, 
and land users such as miners. There is therefore arguably a CLC duty of care required, 
considering the amount of money involved. This duty was instead effectively transferred 
to Aboriginal organisations taking receipt of the payments but without operational 
capacity, without practical support, to apply the money sustainably to CD or even hire 
people who have the capacity. Many members of such organisations themselves now 
consider the expenditure of much of the money in this period to be a wasted opportunity. 
The CLC is now taking a different approach as reflected in my case studies. Just how 
different depends to a large extent on degrees of reification, juridification and 
entification.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have looked in some detail at how Aboriginal self-determination policy 
shaped the capacity for community development to make improvements in Aboriginal 
communities. I have examined the role here of three key architects of the policy, or 
policy components, as well as the influence of the policy on an important area of 
Aboriginal health as indicative of the influence on community development more 
generally. Likewise, I have examined the influence of the policy on an Aboriginal 
organisation that received payments from a land use similar to that in two of my case 
studies. The effect of the policy has been to de-emphasise relatedness in the Aboriginal 
domain and privilege local autonomy in which reification, juridification and entification 
are key factors. Whereas CD in civil society builds on the common good in relatedness 
towards lasting improvements in disadvantaged communities, the idea of community in 
CD has instead become a delimited one under Aboriginal self-determination policy. 
Reflecting this idea of community, Aboriginal groups and organisations have become 
disengaged from the encapsulating society as represented by governments and separated 
from each other. The next chapter will show the associated effects of Aboriginal self-
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determination policy within my case studies; and what scope the projects studied have to 
nevertheless assist Aboriginal communities.
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Chapter 4
Three case studies
While Aboriginal self-determination ushered in community development opportunities, 
these were often lost because the policy privileged local autonomy over relatedness as the 
basis of civil society. The focus on localism delimited the communities of interest and 
identity in Aboriginal civil society, indeed those in contemporary Aboriginal socio­
cultural organisation. It curtailed the common good inherent in CD, largely, though not 
necessarily easily, bom of relatedness when it comes to the Indigenous domain. 
Development more generally was distorted by a focus on local tradition. Tradition 
became separated from modernity, community development from economic development
and Aboriginal people from each other as they became disengaged from wider society in
V
the self-determination era. Reification, juridification and entification are key factors in 
localism privileged from this time. In this chapter I discuss this from the perspective of 
the three CD projects that constitute my case studies, what I have called the Rent Project, 
the Royalty Project and the Affected Areas Payment or AAP Project. After clarifying the 
particular type of CD in these projects and observing their aim, there follows a summary 
of the legislative context common to them, specifically how the ALRA makes possible 
the monies they use. I then make some comparative remarks about the three projects, 
specifically regarding their governance arrangements. Here I observe the extent, if at all, 
to which they avoid the above key factors in privileged localism, factors contributing to 
localism at the expense of relatedness. I highlight the significance of this in terms of 
participant identification with the projects, a mark of project legitimacy considered a pre­
condition of Indigenous participation. I go on to spell out the projects’ governance 
arrangements step by step.
I focus on the projects’ governance arrangements because it is here, as opposed to in their 
day to day operation, that factors of localism arising from self-determination are most 
readily apparent. This focus is also because it is upon suitable governance arrangements 
that consistent engagement can be built between the participants and organisations like
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the CLC running such projects; and through this a potentially useful engagement of the 
participants with wider society. Without such arrangements, engagement and the sort of 
community development processes that constitute my definition of CD in chapter 2 tend 
to be haphazard, as implied in my section on disengagement above. Participation in these 
processes then becomes haphazard. Without effective participation, CD is not 
sustainable.
CD funded from land use agreements
In addition to its more well-known land claim and land use agreement negotiating work, 
the CLC has long had carriage of or assisted in projects that develop Central Australian 
Aboriginal communities in various ways, Aboriginal cattle station support for instance. 
However, my case studies are of a type of community development on which the CLC is 
now clearly concentrating CD efforts, expertise and resources and regularising CD 
processes: CD using monies flowing to Aboriginal people from land use agreements. 
Other land councils and native title representative bodies are at least contemplating 
similar CD, with a new mining boom generating such monies in large amounts to a 
number of Aboriginal groups across Australia. In 2005, the CLC established a CD Unit to 
progress the Rent Project and the Royalty Project. It began the AAP Project in 2008. It is 
guided by a comprehensive CD framework document approved by the CLC executive in 
2009. Part of the framework is a CD monitoring plan to monitor initiatives under my case 
study projects and like projects. This monitoring is different to evaluating their 
governance arrangements or models. But the plan acknowledges the ultimate aim is for 
participants to have more control over and be able to cany out more informed 
management of their resources, especially the rent, royalty and affected area payments of 
my case studies. This refers to project governance if not by name. A subtext is concern 
that, in the light of the Commonwealth intervention into NT Aboriginal affairs, 
governments are in the mood to remove the money concerned, or key decisions about its 
expenditure, from Aboriginal people if they perceive it is wasted. As a participant in the 
Rent Project once said, “this money got a lot of obligation. Lot of people watching all
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round.” He was no doubt referring as much to government people as he was to his own 
people, related residents of many communities in a vast area of Central Australia.
Land rights legislation leverage
To remove the money or key decisions about it from Aboriginal people would only be a 
matter of amending a section of the ALRA. This legislation makes possible the monies 
used in my case study projects largely under its section 23, which defines the functions of 
NT land councils, section 35 covering the application of monies through these land 
councils and section 64 covering payments from a fund reserved for the benefit of NT 
Aboriginal people. The functions of NT land councils include to consult with the relevant 
Aboriginal people about proposals to use Aboriginal Freehold land and to negotiate on 
their behalf with the proposed users (ALRA: section 23(l)(c) and (e)). Section 35(4) 
requires the land councils to pay monies received from resulting leases and licences etc 
“to or for the benefit of the traditional Aboriginal owners of the land” (ibid: section 
35(4)).
Section 64, with 35(2), deals with payments out of what is known in the ALRA as the 
Aboriginals Benefit Reserve but is now called the Aboriginals Benefit Account or ABA. 
These payments are used in the AAP Project. An often made distinction between these 
payments and those in my other two case studies is that the former pass through 
government. Not only is the ABA closely administered by the Commonwealth 
Government Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous 
Affairs, but the path of ABA monies through government make them public monies with 
strings thus finally attached, according to some commentators. Another distinction is that, 
whereas most rents and royalties commonly acknowledged as private money are the 
result of negotiations between land users and the relevant Aboriginal people or the 
relevant land council on their behalf, payments via the ABA are not negotiated as such. 
Rather, amounts equal to royalties received by the Commonwealth or NT governments 
from mining on Aboriginal Freehold land in the NT, ie. so-called mining royalty 
equivalents, are paid back out of the ABA to NT Aboriginal people in the following
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proportions: 30 per cent via the land councils to “any Incorporated Aboriginal 
Associations the members of which live in, or are the traditional Aboriginal owners of, 
the area affected” by mining, as well as to “Aboriginal Councils” in the area (ibid: section 
35(2). Emphasis added); another 30 per cent in the form of ABA grants available to the 
general Aboriginal population of the NT; and 40 per cent in funding for the land councils 
and the ABA’s administration. A third distinction, then, that might be made is the 
blurring here of the difference, otherwise marked in the ALRA, between traditional 
owners and other Aboriginal people, namely community residents.
It is worth noting at this point the further difference sometimes made within the 
community residents between those simply living away from land to which they have a 
traditional connection and those with no known connection of this nature to land 
anywhere, so-called ‘historical people’ to emphasise their relatively shallow rootedness 
to any place. This calibration can be ignored to the effect that all mere residents and their 
progeny are sometimes disparagingly known as historical people. But it should also be 
said that the traditional/historical differences can as often be rejected or massaged, 
especially in larger communities. As a participant in one of my case study projects 
confidently put it with little argument from others at a project meeting: “all people bom 
in the community are traditional owners too”. That is, she said, the differences between 
historical people/residents and traditional owners soon fall away in reality irrespective of 
the legislation. A person’s point of view here sometimes depends on the context.
As a result of the ALRA’s land claims function, over half of the CLC region (the 
southern part of the NT) is now Aboriginal Freehold land or the subject of successful 
claim but not yet formally scheduled as such land. There is, therefore, significant 
geographic scope for the ALRA to facilitate monies to Aboriginal people through land 
use agreements. Further, while much of the land is poor for pastoral use, large areas have 
proven mineral, petroleum or oil rich or at least prospective. Contrary to popular opinion, 
the ALRA does not provide Aboriginal people with a mining veto should they be 
opposed to actual resource extraction on Aboriginal land. The veto applies only to 
exploration. Where exploration is vetoed, the effect is a moratorium on further
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exploration applications for five years (ibid: section 48). In fact, Aboriginal people in the 
CLC region appear increasingly keen to enter into negotiations for the paid use of their 
land. Under the Native Title Act, 1993, ‘right to negotiate’ provisions, lesser rights but 
similar interests are now extended to the vast lands in the NT (and elsewhere) that are not 
Aboriginal Freehold under the ALRA.
Key points of comparison, and primary participant groups
In the following comparative remarks about the case studies, and in their description in 
Figures 2, 4 and 6, 1 refer to their primary participant groups. These are the groups or 
bodies that form the governance levels of the projects at which relatively large allocations 
are publicly made of the monies, ostensibly and indeed often actually for a common 
good. By public I mean here an Aboriginal community public, not the general public. It is 
in the primary participant groups in each case that regular public responsibility for, as 
well as opportunity available in, the allocations is most pronounced. Another term for 
these groups might then be ‘main decision making groups’, without quite the CD 
connotations.
The key points of comparison in my case studies are as follows. The Rent Project 
generally avoids factors that contribute to localism at the expense of relatedness. It is the 
only one of my case studies that to date does not privilege localism. This contributes to 
relatively high participant identification with the project; it seems legitimate in their eyes. 
Their identification with it has assisted a close CLC engagement with the participants, 
particularly the primary participant group. The Royalty Project does not avoid factors that 
contribute to localism at the expense of relatedness, namely juridification. The 
participants seem to struggle to identify with the project; it does not seem as legitimate to 
them as the Rent Project does to its participants. More positively, the project has an 
intercultural potential and in this a potential, as yet unrealised, for strong and broad 
engagement between the participants and wider society. My third case study, the AAP 
Project, also does not avoid factors that contribute to localism at the expense of 
relatedness, in this case entification. However, it is a relatively new project and its
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participants appear to be exploring if and how they identify with it. There is some scope 
for this identification in the project process vis-a-vis their socio-cultural processes. The 
AAP Project’s legitimacy might be said to be under negotiation. The CLC engages very 
thoroughly with its participants at this critical time.
An expanded comparison
In the Rent Project, the primary participant group, in this case the group of traditional 
owners of the national park yielding the rent, now adjusts its membership if necessary 
from meeting to meeting of the group. Prior or parallel reification of the membership is in 
this way reversed in the project. The members were necessarily first brought together for 
the project in 2005 with reference to the ALRA definition of traditional Aboriginal land 
owners so as not to contravene this underlying law. They are resident in a number of far- 
flung communities despite common links to the park land. The group has evidently 
decided to keep its membership quite stable and discrete since 2005. But in the project 
the group may wish to include individuals who are more distantly, but to the group no 
less importantly, related than the ALRA definition prescribes, and have done so from 
meeting to meeting simply by including them in discussion. The group may wish to 
similarly exclude such individuals, but this has not occurred. The group need not concern 
itself with incorporation rules in this regard as there are none. In fact, the project funds -  
the rent -  passes through no necessarily incorporated body. The project as a whole is not 
juridified, where again juridification is defined by Mantziaris and David Martin as the use 
of positive law to identify and enforce obligations deriving from social relations hitherto 
considered to be non-legal.
Identity at the primary participant group level and beyond derives fairly directly from 
these social relations, including their obligations, ie. from Indigenous processes of which 
those making up the autonomy-relatedness dynamic are central. Another way of looking 
at this is the Rent Project is a development process that accommodates and reflects 
Indigenous social process and the collective identity it informs. Either way, compared to 
my other case study projects, the primary participant group -  the traditional owners -  and
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the communities concerned in the Rent Project appear to identify with the project which 
in turn promotes their participation. Evidence of this, to the extent it can be collected by 
participant observation, will unfold in accounts of the Rent Project in operation 
throughout the remaining chapters. Any relevant data under the CLC CD monitoring plan 
mentioned earlier in this chapter was not compiled at the time of my research.
Each of the Rent Project’s residential communities as a whole (as opposed to only 
members of the traditional owner group or other communities of interest or identity as 
entified subsets of residential communities) has an ongoing, formal, though not juridified, 
place in the project governance. They might be said to constitute the autonomy part of the 
autonomy-relatedness dynamic, a dynamic that is relatively well balanced in the project. 
Relatedness is activated as above in the primary participant group from meeting to 
meeting. This group is thus people who are ALRA-defined traditional owners of the 
national park and potentially those recognised regardless of any legislation as 
‘countrymen’ in a wider area around the park. Indeed some of them are already 
recognised in this way as regional elders and their role in the Rent Project now appears to 
be a factor in this. The project is regional largely by virtue of their contemporary, shifting 
social relations -  relatedness -  across the region, as I will demonstrate. But it is 
beginning to experience the spread of privileged localism, in the form of outstation 
support.
Through the project governance arrangements, engagement by the CLC with the primary 
participant group is strong and consistent, in regular traditional owner meetings that 
include reports on tangible project benefits and/or reasons for delays, though the 
regularity is slipping in practice.
Again, in summary the Rent Project generally avoids factors that contribute to localism at 
the expense of relatedness. There is relatively high participant identification with the 
project; it seems legitimate to the participants. This has aided a close CLC engagement 
with the participants, particularly the primary participant group.
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In my second case study, the Royalty Project, the primary participant group, again the 
traditional owners concerned, is to a greater degree than in the Rent Project determined 
by legislation, ie. the ALRA and its definition of traditional Aboriginal land ownership. 
The royalty receiving association, made up of the traditional owners, is incorporated, 
with rules on membership. The rules refer back to the legislation. The royalty receiving 
association is the legal trustee of project funds, equipped with a trust deed. An advisory 
committee advises the association on the project, a committee not incorporated but with 
formal rules. The committee membership includes an incorporated peak Indigenous 
education organisation. The Royalty Project as a whole is thus heavily juridified, indeed 
quite cumbersome, in this way. Identity derives much less directly from social relations, 
including their obligations, ie. from Indigenous processes, than from positive law. In the 
primary participant group it is a quite localised identity by virtue of the ALRA and its 
traditional ownership definition. The Royalty Project does not much reflect Indigenous 
social process and the collective identity it informs. It does not reflect relatedness well. 
The relevant Aboriginal people seem to struggle to identify with the project. In fact the 
project at large has experienced something of an identity crisis, explained below.
The four communities deemed eligible to receive the services from the funds, education 
services, are those with a majority of residents from a particular language group. That is, 
the project is regional in that sense by virtue of a quite fixed and bounded ethnicity. A 
strong sense of regional relatedness does not otherwise emerge in the project, so any 
sense of autonomy-relatedness balance is missing.
More positively, the Royalty Project is intercultural, potentially at least, in ways the Rent 
Project is not, through its advisory committee for instance. That is, the committee is a 
forum that allows for the convergence of different cultural perspectives of Indigenous 
educators and non-Indigenous people with education expertise or access to it. It provides 
the CLC and government agencies with the potential for creative engagement with the 
project participants, if one that is not yet realised.
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Again, in summary the Royalty Project does not avoid factors that contribute to localism 
at the expense of relatedness, namely juridification. Amidst this autonomy-relatedness 
imbalance, the participants seem to struggle to identify with the project; it does not seem 
as legitimate to them as the Rent Project seems to its participants. The sheer range and 
depth of juridification may well be simply alienating to the Royalty Project participants, 
in addition to questions of their identity and identification with the project. Yet the 
project has an intercultural potential and in this a potential, yet to be fulfilled, for strong 
and broad engagement between the participants and wider society.
In the third case study, the AAP Project, there is a primary participant group for each of 
the eight far flung communities acknowledged as affected in some way by the large scale 
mining in the project area. These primary participant groups come together as a project 
specific committee elected in each community according to the rules of what I have 
called AAP Project Association 1. There is no requirement the committee members be 
traditional owners, defined by the ALRA, of land under the communities or of the mine 
sites from whence the payments derive. This is because, under the ALRA section 35(2) as 
above, the money concerned must be paid via the CLC to an association the members of 
which live in, or are the traditional Aboriginal owners of, the area affected by the mining. 
AAP Project Association 1 is this association. The committees, eight relatively 
autonomous subsets of the association, must merely be drawn from the respective 
community’s residents who join the association and remain eligible to be a member by 
complying with the association’s other rules. So, the consequent equality of traditional 
owner and non-traditional owner community residents in the applicable part of the ALRA 
is reinforced in the association rules. Any traditional ownership claimed to the mine sites 
or the wider mining-affected area and communities becomes incidental, a bonus at best. 
Membership identity at the primary participant group level is thus largely devoid of 
associations with the traditional so is not reified in this way. It can and does derive from 
social relations in the communities, ie. from Indigenous processes there, and so reflects 
these processes to an extent. But these processes are curtailed by regulation, the rules of 
the association receiving the funds from the CLC, AAP Project Association 1. As a result 
of these rules yet overall less legal trappings than the Royalty Project, the AAP Project
59
can be said to be moderately juridified. Some juridification is perhaps understandable 
given a history of perceived irregularity in the association.
More significantly for my purposes, under the project the association’s funds are 
ultimately forwarded according to the rules and via the committees to a large number of 
organisations in each of the eight communities, supporting the proliferation of these 
organisations. Especially where these organisations are articulated as associated with 
tradition or culture, the effect tends strongly to be one of entification. Collective identity 
is entified. The AAP Project is consequently a highly localised, regional project, despite 
the apparent contradiction in this: it is ultimately carried out via quite autonomous 
committees in a large number of separate entities in far flung communities and, 
significantly too, their outstations across a wide region deemed affected by mines. There 
is autonomy-relaxedness imbalance, with the weight on the autonomy side. Newer than 
the Rent and Royalty projects, it seems the primary participant groups and their wider 
communities are still exploring if and how they identify with the AAP Project amidst this 
imbalance. Project legitimacy might be said to be still in the negotiation phase.
Meanwhile, engagement efforts between the CLC and the primary participant groups in 
the fonn of the above committees are very thorough despite there being eight such 
groups. Likewise between the CLC and the wider communities these committees 
represent.
Again, in short the AAP Project does not avoid factors that contribute to localism at the 
expense of relatedness, in this case entification. Yet it is still quite a new project and its 
participants appear to be exploring if and how they identify with it. There is some scope 
for this in the project process vis-a-vis Aboriginal socio-cultural process. The AAP 
Project’s legitimacy could be described as under negotiation. The CLC engages very 
thoroughly with the project participants at this important time.
The land use in the case of the Rent Project is a national park. In both the Royalty Project 
and the AAP Project the land use is mining. The funds in the AAP Project come in the
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form of mining royalty equivalents, as above. The Royalty Project uses a negotiated 
royalty paid by the company concerned on condition that it be used only for education 
and training in the relevant Aboriginal communities. The rent in the Rent Project derives 
directly from the property rights of the relevant traditional owners under a lease 
negotiated and issued on their behalf by the CLC for the national park -  beneath the park 
is Aboriginal Freehold land granted under the ALRA, as is the land under the mine sites 
relevant to the other two projects.
Finally, before I spell out the governance arrangements in all three case studies step by 
step, readers should note there is considerable overlap in the Royalty Project and AAP 
Project areas: the four communities involved in the Royalty Project are also involved in 
the AAP Project, which is implemented in four other communities as well. The Rent 
Project area does not overlap with the Royalty Project and AAP Project areas and 
communities.
The Rent Project
Figure 1: The initial division of the rent
THE
RENT
PROJECT
The land relevant to the CLC’s Rent Project for many years provided about SI.3m 
annually in rent to the Aboriginal traditional owners via the lease that established the 
national park on this land. Over $lm  of this was distributed to traditional owner family
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heads, with some ad hoc or ‘voluntary’ collective investment, via an incorporated 
association here called Rent Association l 1 after passing through the CLC. Rent 
Association 1 was incorporated in 1994. The traditional owners directed the rest of the 
rent, about $.26m per year, to the community nearest the national park and home to many 
though not all the traditional owners, Rent Project Community A. The money was paid to 
the community council. The traditional owners’ intention here was tangible benefit for 
that whole community. This council, incidentally, is one of few such local community 
councils to remain following the advent of regional shires in the NT.
A portion of the rent is made up of some of the park entry ticket takings. In 2004, these 
takings rose sharply, resulting in about $.75m more rent per year for Aboriginal people. 
Because the ALRA requires all the rent to be paid first to the CLC to distribute to or for 
thq benefit o f  the traditional Aboriginal owners, the CLC, via a resolution of its executive, 
took the opportunity to apply the extra money immediately to wider and more sustainable 
benefit than was perceived possible via Rent Association 1. The Rent Project arises from 
this resolution.-
The $.26 annually directed to the community council in Rent Project Community A was 
eventually instead combined with the extra $.75m. Traditional owners had repeatedly 
expressed to the CLC concerns that the council in Rent Project Community A could or 
would not deliver tangible community benefit with its cut of the money. Records showed 
some spending irregularities. With the combined amounts, the Rent Project had some 
$lm  in capacity each year to apply across the project area, encompassing a number of 
communities where the relevant traditional owners live, including Rent Project 
Community A. This figure is now falling because park visitor numbers are falling. It may 
bounce back. In round figures set out in Figure 1, approximately $.4 is reserved each year 
within the project for Rent Project Community A, though it is not paid directly to that
1 Rent Association 1, unlike Royalty Project Association 1 and AAP Project Association 1, has no role in 
the Rent Project as such so is without Project in its name in the thesis. The constitutions of all three of 
these associations are those in force before being replaced by standardised rule books initiated by the 
Office of the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations (ORIC) in mid 2009 pending consultations with the 
associations to finalise rules compliant with the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act, 
2006.
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community’s council as before; and approximately $.6 is shared between other 
communities. Sim annually continues to be paid to the traditional owner family heads via 
Rent Association 1 outside the Rent Project auspices.
The Rent Project’s key governance steps to facilitate the CLC’s release of about Sim 
of the rent annually for community development through the project are:
1. The traditional owners of the national park annually choose three communities to 
receive some S.6m in rent between them, while providing Rent Project 
Community A with some $.4m annually. The three are from a possible 15 or so 
communities associated with the traditional owners, including a number of 
outstations. In addition, the traditional owners have nominated their main region­
wide concerns, concerns deemed to be common to many of these communities 
and potentially attracting rent funding on that basis. The traditional owners, as 
relatively broadly defined to an extent by the group itself, are the project’s 
primary participant group.
2. The traditional owners endorse (or withhold endorsement for) roughly costed 
initiatives for rent expenditure in each of the three chosen communities and in any 
regional initiatives in response to their region-wide concerns. A project working 
group in Rent Project Community A works to progress initiatives prioritised by 
that community at large for rent expenditure there.
3. The CLC executive or council approves initiatives in the three chosen 
communities and any regional initiatives, as endorsed by the traditional owners, 
plus priority initiatives in Rent Project Community A.
4. The CLC signs funding agreements with project managers to further develop, 
implement and complete the approved initiatives.
These steps are reflected in Figure 2.
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THE
R EN T
P R O JE C T
Around the above four key steps are the following arrangements:
• The working group in Rent Project Community A is selected by the community at 
large. It is convened regularly by the CLC’s CD Unit in a higher level of 
engagement than in other communities in the project, largely to reflect Rent 
Project Community A’s annual receipt of a significant proportion ($.4m) of the 
project’s funds and the relatively large size and complexity of some of its 
initiatives as a result. For example, the project there is planning for a swimming 
pool and a project manager has been engaged to renovate the recreation hall, both 
as part of a youth/recreation zone in the community. Such initiatives are, 
however, determined against project-wide criteria and principles for expenditure, 
ie. those applied to all initiatives in all communities under the project.
With respect to the remaining $.6m annually in the project:
• The CLC convenes a meeting of the relevant traditional owner group ideally three 
times annually to canvas a range of relevant issues, including this project.
• Towards and at these meetings, a CLC anthropologist advises other relevant CLC 
staff on membership of the traditional owner group with reference to the ALRA
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definition of traditional ownership. This informs the list of those notified about 
and/or picked up for the meetings by CLC staff. But otherwise membership of the 
group is adjusted by the group itself from meeting to meeting.
• Significantly, the group is not legally incorporated. There is no intention to 
incorporate it, and no apparent desire by the group at large for this.
• At its meetings with CLC, the group has progressively determined and/or 
endorsed the project’s criteria and principles. After initially spreading the rent 
further annually, the group has determined that only three different communities 
will be targeted for a portion of the $.6m available each year. These are chosen by 
the group at its first meeting of the year.
• The three communities chosen are larger places (as is Rent Project Community A) 
where members of the group live along with other Aboriginal (and non- 
Aboriginal) residents; or they are outstations associated with and often at most 
only temporarily occupied by certain families within the group.
• CD Unit staff consult in these three communities with the residents at large and 
with the associated families in the case of the outstations, to prioritise and plan 
project initiatives there, later contracting some of the planning and the 
implementation out to suitable other agencies, including Aboriginal organisations 
with sufficient capacity. These agencies thereby become the project managers of 
the initiatives. One such agency commonly contracted is the national Aboriginal 
organisation, the Centre for Appropriate Technology, based in Alice Springs. The 
CD Unit likewise lets contracts on regional initiatives in response to the group’s 
region-wide concerns if there are sufficient funds for such initiatives after the 
three communities’ priorities are addressed.
• Roughly costed priority initiatives from the three communities are returned to the 
next traditional owner group meeting for the group to effectively endorse the 
initiatives or not, ostensibly according to the key project principle of need. That 
is, the $.6m at stake is not divided evenly among the three communities targeted 
each year; rather communities/initiatives that demonstrate high relative need can 
secure more than a third of this amount, indeed as much as the traditional owner 
group considers is warranted. Of course, other factors apart from need come
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powerfully into play, as I will show in subsequent chapters. Examples of the 
initiatives completed here include: a roof over a basketball court and renovation 
of a workshop and a community art centre, utilising local Aboriginal labour; 
provision of a range of supports to another art centre, including support for an 
exhibition of works in Adelaide; and installation of a community solar/diesel 
power supply, one initiative among several that has attracted significant 
supplementary government funding.
• After three communities’ needs are accounted for each year, the same or a 
subsequent traditional owner meeting either likewise endorses the regional 
initiative/s or effectively carries the remaining funds into the following year. A 
resulting regional initiative is a social history computer database set up in four 
communities in the region, with computer hardware, training, a wages component 
for casual work to populate it with data and ongoing support. y
In these arrangements, the Rent Project largely avoids the reification, juridification and 
entification that contribute to localism at the expense of relatedness in the Indigenous 
domain.
The Royalty Project
$4.5m annually, half to traditional 
owners, half invested and historically 
some applied ad hoc to community 
benefit projects, all via Royalty 
Association 1
Between $1.2 and 
$1 ,5m annually into 
an education and 
training trust
Figure 3: The initial division of the royalties
THE
ROYALTY
PRO JE CT
Prompted by requests from Aboriginal women associated with schools in the Royalty 
Project area, in 2001 the CLC proposed a new agreement on behalf of the relevant 
traditional owners whth the mining company concerned to provide an additional mining 
royalty on condition it be spent only on education and training. The company and the 
traditional owners reached such an agreement. As per Figure 3, the additional royalty of 
between $1.2m and $1.5m annually is paid into an education and training trust for the life 
of the relevant mines. What I have called Royalty Project Association 1 is the trustee. 
The royalty of approximately $4.5m annually under the original CLC-company land use 
agreement remains, outside the Royalty Project auspices. Approximately half of this is 
invested, half is paid to the traditional owners individually and historically some is put to 
community benefit projects on an ad hoc basis, all via the CLC then via Royalty Project 
Association 1 according to the association’s rules. Like Rent Association 1 and many 
others, Royalty Project Association 1 has been incorporated since self-determination 
times, 1993 in this case. (This association in its original role will hereafter be known in 
the thesis simply as Royalty Association 1, as investments and distributions to 
individuals/family heads are not part of the Royalty Project; it will be known as Royalty 
Project Association 1 only where it intersects with the Royalty Project.)
Guided by a trust deed, the Royalty Project’s key governance steps to facilitate the 
CLC’s release of a royalty of between $1.2 and $1.5m through the project annually are:
1. An advisory committee of representatives from the Commonwealth and NT 
education departments, the relevant mining company, the CLC and the peak 
Indigenous education organisation for the area, plus an independent teacher 
turned anthropologist, makes recommendations on expenditure of the royalty to 
the trustee of the trust. In this way it advises the trust.
2. As the trustee, Royalty Project Association 1, or a subcommittee of the 
association, approves (or withholds approval for) expenditure upon this advice. 
Made up of the relevant traditional owners, the association is the Royalty 
Project’s primary participant group.
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3. The trustee authorises the CLC as its formal agent in administering the trust to 
progress the initiatives approved for expenditure consistent with the trust deed.
4. The CLC signs funding or partnership agreements with project managers to help 
develop and implement the approved initiatives. As the trustee’s agent, the CLC  
also brings reports and budgets on proposed initiatives to the advisory committee 
for discussion and the committee’s consideration.
These steps are reflected in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: R oyalty Project key steps and o ther governance  arrangem ents p r o j e c t
Around the above four key steps are the following arrangements:
•  The incorporation rules o f Royalty Project Association 1 say members must be (a) 
traditional Aboriginal owners o f land the subject o f the mining activity, or (b) fall 
within the definition o f Aboriginal owners in the rules, ie. “those Aboriginal 
persons who in the opinion o f the CLC have responsibilities and rights in
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Aboriginal tradition” for all or part of relevant land. For the purpose of (a), 
traditional Aboriginal owners is defined as a local descent group of Aboriginal 
people who “have common spiritual affiliations to a site on the land, being 
affiliations that place the group under a primary spiritual responsibility for that 
site and for the land”, and who “are entitled by Aboriginal tradition to forage as of 
right over that land” (ORIC website). This is the verbatim definition of traditional 
Aboriginal owners in the ALRA (ALRA: section 3). The inclusion of (b) appears 
to be to give some scope for the members of the association and/or the CLC to 
include other Aboriginal people whose identity is not quite as tightly bound by 
descent group membership and tradition as those in (a). But this inclusion is 
instead resisted, as I will show.
• The Indigenous education organisation represented on the project’s advisory 
committee is incorporated with a set of associated rules;, the advisory committee 
itself is not incorporated but nevertheless follows a set of formal, written rules, 
adding to the project’s juridification.
• The advisory committee meets approximately quarterly, usually in Alice Springs, 
preceded by a meeting of the Indigenous education organisation’s all-Aboriginal 
representation, a project specific subcommittee of this organisation.
• Expenditure recommendations from the advisory committee to Royalty Project 
Association 1 as the project trustee are not generally made without the support of 
this education organisation.
• The trust deed does not name the communities that the royalties must help with 
education and training, but instead says the royalties must assist the traditional 
owners of the relevant mine sites and members of and communities largely 
populated by their named language group who are affected by the mines. But the 
project has developed in such a way that it is now recognised as almost 
exclusively for the four largest communities in the region associated with this 
language group. This is partly because there are established schools in these 
communities and many of the Indigenous drivers of the project are school 
teachers, though the project is by no means confined to school education.
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• The CLC’s CD Unit engaged a consultant to report on remote Indigenous 
education and training best practice, complete with a set of program options to 
fund in the project area.
• The CD Unit then consulted on these options in the project area’s four largest 
communities. All four communities prioritised the same three program options, 
and a fourth option was developed directly from the consultations.
• Based on a CLC report on these consultations, the project advisory committee 
endorsed four broad Royalty Project programs corresponding with the prioritised 
options: an Early Childhood Health and Education program, a Youth and Media 
program, a Learning Community Centres program and a program of support for 
secondary students schooling locally and at boarding schools. Learning 
community centres are effectively training centres doubling as small libraries with 
internet access. Almost all project initiatives the advisory committee recommends 
for expenditure now come under these broad programs.
• The CLC’s CD Unit, in league with other relevant Aboriginal organisations in the 
area and a large NGO, is now developing and/or implementing program initiatives 
across the four communities, in some cases with these organisations as fonnal 
project managers or partners. As a result, for example, a learning community 
centre is built and open in one community and another is close to operational, 
youth and media activities are running in three of the four communities and 
playgroups and nutrition support are now available for young children.
• Consultations in the relevant communities are now carried out as needed largely 
by the project managers/partners. There are no further regular community-wide or 
wider traditional owner group consultations by the CLC for the project. As per 
step 2 above, the traditional owners, or to be more exact a subset of them as a 
subcommittee of Royalty Project Association 1, are consulted towards approval 
for initiatives under the project’s four broad programs. In these consultations they 
are asked to approve project spending but historically not to participate more 
profoundly in the project. Accordingly, Royalty Project Association 1 has not 
actually endorsed, and has not been asked to endorse, the project’s four large 
programs for instance.
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In these arrangements, the Royalty Project does not avoid factors that contribute to 
localism at the expense of relatedness, namely juridification.
The Affected Areas Payment Project
Between $3 and 
$3.5m annually 
invested
Between $3 and 
$3.5m annually 
divided between 
eight communities, 
and their associated 
outstations, according 
to population
Figure 5: The initial division of the affected area payment
THE
AA P
P R O JE C T
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What I have called AAP Project Association 1 has had the same rules for 20 years 
dictating how the mining royalty equivalent amount paid to it via the CLC should be 
spent. The initial division of the payment is according to Figure 5. But there are many 
subsequent divisions, as I have alluded to and will elaborate on below.
The CLC has always had something of a supervisory role over AAP Project Association 
1 written into several of the association’s rules, for instance a rule requiring reports on 
community use of the association’s money to be provided annually to the CLC (ORIC 
website). Despite this supervision, an interpretation of the rules and their subsequent 
application on the ground eventually left senior CLC staff concerned that the association 
was exposed to an adverse audit of its affairs with potentially serious implications. After 
all, as suggested above, its monies attract government conditionality and scrutiny in a 
way that monies in my other two case studies do not. Of particular concern was the 
number of vehicles registered in the name of and frequently used by individuals, bought
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with money provided through the association ostensibly for the benefit of outstations. 
The rules specifically rule out individual benefit in favour of broad community benefit 
reflected in the rules’ objective or purpose (ibid). The rules do include reference to 
“associated outstations” in the enumeration of the communities to be allocated money 
through the association (ibid), yet these outstations are generally not equipped to manage 
the money. The closest larger communities, or suitable bodies within them, must in effect 
service the outstations with some of it. The AAP Project was inaugurated in 2008 to 
assist AAP Project Association 1 to comply consistently with a strict reading of its rules, 
however limited these may be in terms of good community development practice. Indeed 
the project introduces some of this practice regardless of the limitations, instead of 
substantially changing the rules to overcome the limitations. Short of changing the 
underlying legislation, changing the rules is not simple, as association members have 
expressed resistance to this.
Central to the rules is the serial widespread dispersal of 50 per cent of the money, 
between $3m and $3.5m annually, paid to the association via the CLC. The other 50 per 
cent must be invested, according to the rules, outside the project. The dispersal is first 
between the now eight communities, including associated outstations, considered to be 
affected by the relevant mining operations. They are allocated a proportion of the 
available funds according to their population. Then the money is divided within each of 
the eight communities to any number of eligible community organisations selected 
annually by these communities, in amounts determined by a special committee elected 
biennially in each community (ibid), called here for convenience AAP Project 
community committees. As above, these committees are the project’s primary participant 
groups.
To make the most of the AAP Project Association 1 rules, the AAP Project tries to 
capitalise on the rule implying community beneficial planning. This rule says the powers 
of each of the AAP Project community committees charged with detennining the 
amounts to go to eligible community organisations include “the setting of goals” for these 
organisations (ibid). As the committees have very little capacity to exercise this power,
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quite apart from questions of committee members’ conflicts of interest or unwanted 
intrusion in the organisations, the CLC CD Unit now assists them to exercise the power 
via project plans and proposed budgets prepared with the organisations. In effect it 
exercises the power through the AAP Project on the committees' behalf, reporting back to 
each committee with a project plan summary, trying to build committee capacity in this 
respect in the process. Each project plan is developed mindful of the objective or purpose 
in the AAP Project Association 1 rules. Indeed organisations can only be considered 
eligible for funds from the association if their work is generally consistent with the 
association’s objective or purpose (and if they are deemed as beneficial as the average 
community organisation in the community concerned, as difficult as that is to measure). 
Project plans are made too with sustainability measures in mind. Project wide, however, 
sustainability is in question due to the serial dispersal of the project funds. This amounts 
to a proliferation of initiatives in any number of entities as eligible community 
organisations each year in eight communities, potentially hundreds of initiatives, large 
and small but all by implication localised, in which the CLC must have some 
involvement over any several year period. This highlights the problems of CD under 
arrangements originating in Aboriginal self-determination policy.
Consistent with AAP Project Association l ’s rules, the AAP Project’s key governance 
steps to facilitate the CLC’s release of between $3 and 3.5m through the project annually 
in an affected area payment are:
1. The money is paid to AAP Project Association 1.
2. The money is divided between eight communities, including outstations 
associated with each, commensurate with the population of each community.
3. Each community selects organisations active in the community and eligible to 
receive some of the money.
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4. AAP Project community committees, the project’s primary participant groups, in 
each community allocate (or withhold allocation of) the money to these 
organisations according to written project plans the organisations have for its 
expenditure.
5. As AAP Project Association l ’s formal agent in the project, the CLC signs 
funding agreements with these organisations consistent with their project plans.
These steps are reflected in Figure 6.
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Around the above five key steps are the following arrangements reflecting the CLC’s 
particularly thorough engagement efforts in the AAP Project above and beyond its role as 
AAP Project Association 1 ’s agent:
• A dedicated CD Project Officer within the CLC’s CD Unit carries out some 
community mapping in each of the eight communities. This is largely to assess 
existing community services and infrastructure and gaps in these against what key 
organisations in the communities -  health and education organisations, for
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instance -  consider to be the main issues and problems currently needing attention 
or support.
• The officer simultaneously monitors eligible community organisations’ existing 
initiatives, ie. those using AAP Project Association 1 funds from previous years, 
against their original project plans.
• The officer convenes AAP Project community committee meetings: to report on 
this monitoring; to allow the committees to hear directly from key organisations 
about current community issues or problems, eg. school attendance rates; and in 
response to do some preliminary vision planning with the committees on behalf of 
their communities whereby an attempt is made to articulate a collective vision for 
the community in the longer term.
• Next, community meetings are held in each community: to discuss, adopt or 
amend their community committees’ preliminary community vision, if one is 
forthcoming; to select the eligible community organisations for the current 
funding round (these are selected annually, and can be re-selected every year); 
and to elect a new committee membership (biennially) or to replace non-active 
existing committee members meanwhile. It is expected that the organisations 
selected as eligible for funding will be those to best help realise any emerging 
common vision for the community, though of course this expectation is not 
necessarily met.
• The CLC’s dedicated CD Project Officer develops project plans with the selected 
eligible community organisations, as above.
• The officer then re-convenes the AAP Project community committee in each of 
the eight communities for them to: consider project plan summaries; hear 
presentations on the project plans from the relevant eligible community 
organisations; and determine how much of each community’s share of the AAP 
Project Association 1 monies for the current year each organisation will receive.
• Upon the community committee resolutions on funding allocations for these 
eligible community organisations, the CLC writes legal funding agreements with 
the entities or puts in place other suitable funding arrangements.
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• The entities proceed to implement their funded initiatives. The AAP Project is 
more recent than CLC’s Rent and Royalty Projects, so few initiatives have 
reached completion. But some examples of the variety of initiatives funded 
include renovation of a men’s museum in one community, oval grassing works in 
another, a music and new media studio in a third, support for now town-based 
dialysis patients, wages funding for health and youth workers and buses for 
football teams and (ostensibly) for church outreach type work.
In these arrangements, the AAP Project does not avoid factors that contribute to localism 
at the expense of relatedness, in this case entification.
Conclusion
\^
In this chapter I have presented and provided comparative comments on my three case 
studies, CD projects funded by monies paid to Aboriginal groups under the ALRA. I have 
given detailed attention to the governance arrangements of these projects and compared 
the extent to which: they avoid reification, juridification and entification that contribute 
to localism at the expense of relatedness; there is thus a sense of project legitimacy 
according to the participants and their identification with the project; there is engagement 
between them and wider society or at least with the CLC through the projects. On this 
basis, what I have called the Rent Project appears best positioned as a community 
development project that can improve conditions in Aboriginal communities, as 
subsequent chapters will elaborate. Importantly, it reflects balance in the autonomy- 
relatedness dynamic where elsewhere there is often imbalance favouring local autonomy, 
curtailing a common good and restricting CD efforts in civil society in the Indigenous 
domain. In the next chapter I look more closely at the change behind this imbalance 
brought about in the self-determination era.
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Chapter 5
Change in the Indigenous domain
After discussing some key aspects of the Aboriginal domain, in this chapter I explore the 
significant change to it as represented by outstations. Here I consider outstations to be 
microcosms of the Aboriginal domain as it changed under self-determination policy to 
privilege localism over relatedness. They are thus an important point of focus at this stage 
in my argument. I proceed to discuss the critical factors in privileged localism in the light 
of similar profound change mediated by custom or kastom in Melanesia. This serves to 
emphasise the fundamental nature of the change. The parallels with Aboriginal Australia 
are not as surprising as this temporary swift geographical shift in my thesis might 
suggest. Little wonder, as the reification of kastom, and the associated localising factors 
including entification of Indigenous institutions that are important for development, occur 
together in the context of intensive land usage essentially the same as in some of my case 
studies. The foundation for civil society remains weak. I close the chapter with glimpses 
of better prospects coming of the comparison with Melanesia.
The domain
In a summary of ethnographic accounts, Rowse notes the albeit increasingly contested 
convention in anthropology whereby the Indigenous domain is considered a “conceptual 
isolate”, ie. with little or no reference to relationships with wider society (Rowse, 1992: 
22,57). As late as 1984 in his Wentworth Lecture on Aboriginal political life, Les Hiatt, 
for instance, said little about the relationship between Aboriginal people and the wider 
Australian and global society (cited in Rowse 1992: 22). My thesis takes for granted the 
Australian Aboriginal domain as a range of social and cultural dynamics inextricably 
linked to and deeply affected by the wider world whether or not through specific 
development projects.
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Bill Stanner had more interest than most in change within the Australian Aboriginal 
domain. He sat with Nuggett Coombs on the CAA, advising governments in the shift 
from assimilation policy to self-determination policy. Earlier, in an essay on continuity 
and change in the Aboriginal domain, Stanner suggested there are limits to the extent to 
which Aboriginal people can change in their “dusty encounter” (Stanner 1958: 62) with 
the wider world. He wrote:
Voluntarily, by compulsion, or simply because a particular rationale vanished, they 
abandoned or modified one kind of activity after another. Eventually they came to things 
they would not, or did not know how to, abandon or modify. They reached a kind of 
residuum: the conventional practices of life, the due forms of marriage, the initiations of 
youths, the machinery of grievance settlement, and mundane institutions of this order. 
What was left was a sort of Low Culture as distinct from the High Culture of tradition 
(ibid: 61).
We can see something of the Aboriginal frustration with this in an address by Warlpiri 
woman, Bess Price, from Yuendumu, to a recent forum in Canberra on family violence. 
And frustration with suggestions that development is a non-Aboriginal agenda, forced on 
Aboriginal people in their otherwise isolated domain. Challenging men who say 
traditional or customary Aboriginal laws provide women with no authority and the 
protection this might afford, Price said:
We didn’t have grog, money, houses, clothes, cars, none of those things that whitefellas 
have brought us. But everybody wants them. So if they want those things then they can 
change the laws too because now we live in a different world (Price 2009).
Aboriginal people now living in a different world that will not revert to the pre-colonial 
one seems to Price justification enough for development in the Aboriginal domain. But 
especially with the advent of land rights, including native title, opposition to change now 
has a broad political dimension. Says Merlan:
78
Because what is widely understood as worthy in what is ‘Aboriginal’ is assumed to 
involve certain distinctive and traditional forms of social relations -  in respect to place, 
dependence on the countryside for survival, intimacy with it, reproduction of personhood 
in relation to it, and so on -  to speak of change in those relations can be seen to deny 
Aboriginal identity and worth and to weaken any political position that Aborigines might 
achieve on the basis of deploying these representations (Merlan 1998: 169,170).
In short, she notes, “opponents of land rights would like to use the issue of ‘change’ to 
argue, where this takes the strongest form, that there is no longer a distinctive basis of 
Aboriginal entitlement to land” (Merlan 1994: 19). We can see here how socio-cultural 
reification can become a political weapon in defence of such rights and entitlements.
Of course change occurs regardless. What Stanner saw as remaining -  his residuum -  can
V
be taken to include not only the relatively discrete Aboriginal institutions constituting his 
“Low Culture” but also underlying principles and processes that may inform such 
institutions. The well-documented autonomy-relatedness dynamic in Aboriginal society 
is an example. This is a set of complex processes that remain in flux despite reification on 
the autonomy side and remain central to Aboriginal sociality despite the flux. There is 
perhaps no better insight into the complexities of and latent tensions in this important 
dynamic, in particular how it informs Aboriginal land tenure and thus collective identity, 
than Fred Myers’ ethnography of the Pintupi people associated with the remote NT well 
west of Alice Springs. In ‘Pintupi Country, Pintupi Self (1986) Myers reports that while 
a “general rule’' provides for men to effectively inherit country from their fathers, this 
does not result in named patrilineal descent groups associated with country because of the 
variety of ways Pintupi can assume land ownership (Myers 1986: 128,129,152,153). 
Myers determined that Pintupi can be related to many places, identification with places is 
not exclusive and membership of the group of people deemed to own a place is widely 
extended, the group not given or fixed (ibid: 128,130,131,135). Critical is the right to be 
asked to use named places, and the value placed on not having to ask about one’s own 
places (ibid: 99,156). This is the “content” or substance of Pintupi ownership of land, 
according to Myers (ibid: 99 and Myers 1987:101,105,107). Underpinning this content is 
the desire to maintain personal autonomy among related countrymen (Myers
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1987:101,105,107), because “ultimately, landownership is tied to a politics that 
emphasizes both the claims of relatedness and those of personal autonomy” (Myers 1986: 
129). Converting lesser rights and claims into actual ownership of a place requires the 
claimants to ask and convince the existing owners to include them in knowledge of and 
activity on the land (Myers 1987:107). It is in this requirement that personal autonomy is 
maintained and then extended to close others.
Through residence, claimants to places in the Pintupi world can more easily move from 
countrymen in the broad, regionally-related sense to countrymen in the more exclusive 
sense as land owner (ibid: 108). That is because knowledge of the land and all its 
meanings requires visits to sacred sites with those who already know these places (Myers 
1986: 149-151). Regular visits are easier when living nearby. As shared activity is 
integral to relatedness, it is in fact co-residence that “constitutes the substance of kinship” 
(ibid: 92) to Myers. He believes shared identity among the Pintupi is actually a cultural 
appropriation of relations of cooperation and exchange that were fundamental to Pintupi 
existence in their harsh desert environment: “sharing of food and labour within residential 
groups, and the openness of access to resources” (ibid: 104). He says Pintupi people 
come to know themselves only through such practical activity (ibid: 105). Relations are 
achieved and maintained through exchanges that demonstrate care and trust (ibid: 112). 
This can now occur in community development projects across regions, among other 
ways of course.
That autonomy and relatedness together are dynamic entails ongoing change. This key 
dynamic, like other elements of Stanner’s residuum, might then best be described as a 
case of continuity with change. As such, we are wise to pause to consider here Merlan’s 
advice to jettison dichotomies of persistence and change, of traditionally and non- or 
post-traditionality, and “begin in the middle” (Merlan 1998: 233). Easier said than done 
in the face of socio-cultural reification, but not impossible.
In 1977, in the first essay in a volume on Aboriginal people and change in the 1970s, 
Ronald Bemdt identified what he said was the “real” Aboriginal identity, defined in the
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secret-sacred associations of local descent groups (Bemdt 1977: 3,4). Not inconsistent 
with Stanner’s comments above, Bemdt said with increasing “alien” contact, this 
Aboriginal identity based on religion was “diffused” and secularised (ibid: 10). As a 
result, he said “the edges or boundaries between communities became less conspicuous. 
Social interaction spread over a wider area, among people who were now regarded as 
having a broadly similar if not identical life style, and with who it was possible to 
identify on that basis” (ibid). In other words, it seems Aboriginal people everywhere had 
begun to emphasise relatedness in the autonomy-relatedness dynamic, in what Sutton 
calls “families of polity” present primarily in urban and rural areas (Sutton 2003: 206- 
231).
In the remote NT, however, the opposite was in fact beginning to occur, quickly, largely 
courtesy of the ALRA and the outstations it facilitated. The localism here reinforced the 
localism occurring across Australia in the proliferation of Aboriginal organisations. The 
balance in the autonomy-relatedness dynamic was in this way shifting firmly by the late 
1970s towards autonomy. And identity hitherto associated with Aboriginal ritual 
increasingly, but not completely, came to inform Aboriginal identity more generally. 
Specifically, identity as a traditional Aboriginal land owner as defined in the ALRA -  as 
a member of a local descent group with primary spiritual responsibility for sacred sites -  
became paramount even where those responsibilities had lapsed. I will explain, with 
repeated reference to Austin-Broos’ recent analysis of change among the Western 
Arremte people associated with land immediately west of Alice Springs.
A key change
Central to Austin-Broos’ recent analysis, at one level a critique of the outstation 
movement, is that to the Western Arremte colonisation “brought practices that focused 
attention on bounded patrilineal estates. The balance provided by diversification was 
tipped toward consolidation” (Austin-Broos 2009: 109). The diversification here can now 
be equated with Bemdt’s diffusion, with wide relatedness, and consolidation equated 
with local autonomy in the autonomy-relatedness dynamic but also with reification.
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Patrilineal estates are areas, including a sacred site or sites usually associated with a 
Dreaming story or stories, said to be inherited collectively through the males of a certain 
local, and by implication patrilineal, descent group or patrician. Ironically, given the 
association of patricians with Aboriginal religion, specifically their primary spiritual 
responsibility for the sites, the consolidation Austin-Broos writes about occurred among 
the Western Arremte in the context of the Lutheran mission at Hermannsburg.
But the change was not confined to Hermannsburg and vicinity. A similar consolidation 
has occurred across the southern part of the NT at least, if not throughout the NT. It is 
part of a relatively rapid change from which Austin-Broos distils two key “moments”: 1. 
invasion of Aboriginal lands and pastoral settlement and 2. Aboriginal self-determination 
(ibid: 2,3,4). Austin-Broos suggests that of all the change Aboriginal people have faced 
and largely accommodated since first contact with non-Aboriginal people it is the second 
moment highlighted here that is currently most significant, even if her two moments must 
be seen together. I concur. Because it is in this second moment that modernity arrived for 
NT Aboriginal people. And because, paradoxically, it arrived with tradition.
This apparent contradiction -  the relatively recent arrival of modernity with tradition -  
should not surprise us. After all, culture only becomes discrete when there are two or 
more cultures juxtaposed (Wagner 1975 cited in Weiner 2006: 23; Weiner and Glaskin 
2006: 8), it is prolonged contact between peoples that ultimately “engenders social 
identity” (Eriksen 1993: 150), and when faced with the change inevitably accompanying 
prolonged contact groups “drop their heaviest cultural anchors”, symbols of the past 
“mythically infused with timelessness” (Cohen 1985: 102). Eric Hobsbawm points out 
the correlation between rapid social change and the increased rate at which traditions are 
invented (Hobsbawm 1983: 4), adding that “where the old ways are alive, traditions need 
be neither revived nor invented” (ibid: 8).
Stanner’s use of the term residuum harks back to a time when it was generally thought 
old Aboriginal ways were dead or dying, the practitioners of these ways gradually dying 
out too. If the years since have not exactly seen the routine invention of Aboriginal
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tradition, they have seen a certain form of tradition prevail over other Aboriginal cultural 
forms. If this involved the conceptual triumph of consolidation over diversification, in 
Austin-Broos’ terminology, and a focus on local descent groups, their estates and their 
primary spiritual responsibility, on the ground it meant land rights for those who could 
frame their connection to land and thus their identity in this way. Then, often, it meant 
outstations on or as close as possible to this land and payments from the commercial use 
of the land. As 1 have noted in my section on the planners of self-determination policy, 
Austin-Broos says the deep contradiction of modernity with tradition evident in land 
rights and the outstation movement as key policy elements was that the modernity came 
as a state-sponsored return to tradition. I suggest that in this sponsorship the state 
powerfully shaped Aboriginal tradition, ensuring its formation in the local.
To be sure, this started with settlement, in the Western Arremte case settlement in the 
Hermannsburg mission, though evidence continues to accumulate that remote Aboriginal 
settlements are in fact now key nodes in ongoing social diversification or diffusion, to 
repeat both Austin-Broos’ and Bemdt’s terms. That is, despite the balance in the 
Aboriginal autonomy-relatedness dynamic shifting towards autonomy, settlements are 
nodes in continuing dynamic, extended social networks, the ‘beats’, Tines’ and ‘runs’ of 
Basil Sansom (1982: 125-127), Beckett (1988) and Chris Birdsall (1988) that inform 
contemporary Aboriginal social identity. Yasmine Musharbash (2008: 140,141) has more 
recently described Yuendumu, northwest of Alice Springs, as one such Central Australian 
node now. Before contact, conception beliefs were critical in what Austin-Broos’ calls 
diversification when combined with a regional pedestrian mobility. She says conception, 
now commonly conflated with birth to become ‘homing’, “came out of a place where the 
mother walked around” (Austin-Broos 2009: 112). Association with and knowledge of 
one’s conception site, as opposed to sites within one’s patrilineal estate, was a central 
way to diversify knowledge and thus diversify links to land and the identity that 
continues to come from land (ibid: 114,117). John Morton suggests this once could in 
fact have triggered changes -  succession -  to the traditional ownership of Arremte land, 
saying estate boundaries could be extended through knowledge of conception sites 
hitherto deemed the primary responsibility of other groups (Morton 1997a: 119). Morton
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concludes that the influence of identity determined in patrilineal estates has been 
overemphasised such that the similarities between semi-desert social systems, like that of 
the Arremte, and Western Desert systems are now ignored (ibid: 121). Myers’ work on 
the Pintupi above is commonly held up as the definitive description of Western Desert 
systems. Like Morton, Ian Keen suggests “the contrast between the flexible, individualist 
relations to land in the Western Desert, and descent-based land tenure elsewhere, needs to 
be recast” (Keen 1997a: 67). This serves partly to reinforce that in fundamental ways the 
Arremte experience of key changes, Austin-Broos’ two key historical moments, is not 
unique in the NT, despite the particularities of the Arrernte mission experience.
According to Austin-Broos, Arremte conception totemism was once “integral to a lived 
dynamic in which the balance between diverse relations and consolidation shifted over 
time” (Austin-Broos 2009: 109). She refers here to the ordinary pre-contact ebb and flow 
in the autonomy-relatedness dynamic. Settlement, and less “walkin’ round” (ibid: 111), 
did originally help tip the balance to consolidation, local autonomy. But her second key 
moment of change, Aboriginal self-determination, placed the weight firmly here. 
Significant was a change in the mission’s policy toward Aboriginal culture in the 1970s 
(ibid: 193), bringing a greater degree of convergence with self-determination policy. 
Austin-Broos reports the mission’s policy vision came to involve a proliferation of small 
family groups on country each replicating the domestic moral economy of the mission 
(ibid: 189). She says “this aspiration of mission staff, and of Arrernte neotraditionalists, 
influenced attitudes towards land rights” (ibid). Combine this with the influences on self- 
determination policy that I have already outlined, and Austin-Broos says “an unrealistic 
burden of expectation was placed on outstation life” (ibid: 182). In the highly localised 
form of outstations, newly consistent with mission policy, the state sponsored tradition 
for the sake of Arrernte autonomy (ibid: 245,257); though autonomy was not necessarily 
the ultimate goal and the state never expected the bulk of the remote Aboriginal 
population would actually move to outstations. Others saw outstations as a vehicle for 
deinstitutionalising Arremte after their mission experience (ibid: 202), all the while 
continuing to take cues from the mission in support of Arrernte social consolidation. For 
instance, Austin-Broos says the “hegemony” in this articulation of Arremte land
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relationships “continued to ramify into the 1990s” when CLC officers operating under the 
ALRA and its definition of Aboriginal traditional ownership sought records of Arremte 
countries mapped with notoriously rigid boundaries by the Lutherans of the mission, 
T.G.H. Strehlow in particular. These CLC officers “sallied forth, once again, to take 
genealogies” (ibid: 126) of the particular Arremte people these records invariably suggest 
exclusively own these countries. Here we see socio-cultural reification start to converge 
with juridification and entification.
The “intense local politics” of the state institution of land rights (ibid: 129) was further 
manifested in CDEP and the two Aboriginal organisations funded by the state to 
implement this program among the Western Arremte. One of these was funded to use the 
program to support the growing number of outstations around Hermannsburg, also known 
as Ntaria. Austin-Broos notes that “bitter factionalism marked the transition of Ntaria 
from mission station to an outstation system with an anchor in land rights” (ibid: 179). 
Competition between the factions was intensified by local perceptions that one group of 
families or another controlled the two CDEP organisations, Ntaria Council and the 
Tjuwanpa Outstation Resource Centre (ibid: 182). Meanwhile, CDEP, particularly 
applied to outstations, became an important vehicle via which the state sought to 
modernise Arremte people well before the recent CDEP reforms. Austin-Broos writes of 
Arremte and non-Aboriginal “imagineries” thus colliding in the outstations around 
Hermannsburg/Ntaria (ibid: 209). She says:
A state-sponsored return to tradition for the sake of autonomy has coincided for the 
Arremte with the first full incorporation in a cash economy, but often as long-term 
welfare recipients -  included in the cash economy but also marginalized in market 
society. The hope for autonomy within one imagined social order has been undermined 
by dependence in another (ibid: 245).
With the emphasis on localised tradition, this economic marginality has encouraged the 
Western Arremte to remain intensely, if only locally, kin-based despite the simultaneous 
expectation that they eventually leave this way of life in order to become successful 
market individuals. “The distress that this conflict brings makes Arremte life turbulent
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and sometimes violent” (ibid: 153), says Austin-Broos. It is not the bed of outstation 
roses that she suggests an “academic immersion in localism” largely resting on “notions 
of protecting culture” (ibid: 244) makes it out to be.
Separation and the limitation of change
West across the desert from the Arremte, Bob Tonkinson has recently reflected on four 
decades of change among the Mardu people of Western Australia. With its emphasis on 
autonomy, their experience of self-determination is similar to that of the Arrernte and 
others in the NT. Self-determination, says Tonkinson, “has been used by Mardu to 
amplify and sustain their cultural distinctiveness, but at a certain price they are willing to 
continue to pay” (Tonkinson, 2007: 54). For the Mardu, paying the price overcomes that 
“long-standing tension between equality and difference” (Altman 2009: 6) in the 
Indigenous domain internationally. Tonkinson questions whether the general Australian 
public, however, is willing to continue indefinitely to “underwrite the perpetuation of 
such ‘difference’” (Tonkinson 2007: 51) given common cost-benefit analyses in which 
the cost -  the Mardu’s price -  is ongoing severe Aboriginal disadvantage including poor 
conditions in communities.
Regardless, change in this context is culturally problematic for the Mardu, according to 
Tonkinson, because there is a strong denial of human agency at the heart of their world 
view (ibid: 43). Similarly, among the Pintupi Myers notes that human authority does not 
necessarily include the right to create laws that impinge on others’ autonomy as that is 
interpreted via the Dreaming, undermining automatic adherence to community rules and 
the like (Myers 1986: 266,267). Sutton suggests the Dreaming as Aboriginal law in fact 
dictates an irresistible sense of fate, rendering notions of social progress “deeply alien to 
those of a classical Aboriginal persuasion” across remote Aboriginal Australia (Sutton 
2009: 85). Sutton says that “at the deepest cultural level, where people’s world views and 
primary presuppositions lie, for many at least in remote Australia a belief in the 
improvability of life should not be assumed” (ibid: 135), because “the law (ideally at 
least) never changes” (ibid: 138). This is surely a challenge to the very compatibility of
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remote Aboriginal people with the encapsulating society that is assumed in their 
engagement through CD. But it is not necessarily an insurmountable one.
As well as their deep denial of human agency, Tonkinson believes a conscious reluctance 
to apply organising principles that have served the Mardu well in ceremony, for instance, 
to what they have come to see as a separate whitefella domain “has denied them effective 
control over many administrative and development-related matters” (Tonkinson 2007: 
55). Perhaps most significantly, he says “their low level of scholastic attainment imposes 
limitation for their future as relatively autonomous agents managing communities on 
their own lands or engaging successfully in the wider economy” (ibid: 54). He believes 
the Mardu were not offered the skills to make the former at least, self-managing their 
communities, a reality (ibid: 48). Or they did not take them up. Either way, they have 
never been equipped to test the extent of their agency and the degree to which the > 
Dreaming determines their fate. Despite, and in large part because of, self-determination 
policy and its disengagement from Aboriginal people, they will ironically remain 
dependent on outsiders for the foreseeable future.
Austin-Broos believes the state has in fact worked to “prize (sic) apart economy and 
Arremte ideas of place” (Austin-Broos 2009: 236) such that Aboriginal remoteness back 
in the NT, at least, now carries the presumption of market non-viability (ibid). In essence, 
she believes that the Arrernte, like other remote Aboriginal people, have been “held on 
the invading society’s periphery by policies vacillating between ideas of difference and 
assimilation” (ibid: 9), where periphery means more than the mere physical remoteness 
of most outstations. It is in this context that I suggest state sponsored tradition and 
modernity have arrived simultaneously for remote Aboriginal people yet separately. 
They have remained polarised since. This is despite Merlan’s suggestion above that we 
begin in the middle of these two states to better understand change in the contemporary 
remote Aboriginal domain; and as Tonkinson puts it “neither the imposition of 
conformity nor the insistence on uncompromising autonomy seems workable” 
(Tonkinson 2007: 55) on the ground. Emerging, then, is the paradoxical prospect that if 
Aboriginal people want to retain the choice to live on, manage and shape the future of
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remote communities they and their supporters in this endeavour must adopt a 
development agenda that embraces modernity and allows it to merge with tradition. If 
Aboriginal people want genuine autonomy, perhaps this agenda must be accepted as their 
agenda not rejected as foreign. Hence Tonkinson suggests “the need for transcendence of 
what could be termed ‘the domain problem’” (ibid), alluding to fundamental separation in 
the Aboriginal domain. This most obviously includes the separation of Aboriginal people 
from wider society and tradition from modernity, but it extends to the separation of 
economy from ideas of place, to use Austin-Broos terminology.
Taken to its logical conclusion, Sutton’s impassioned paper ‘The politics of suffering: 
Indigenous policy in Australia since the 1970s’ (2001) can be read as arguing that the 
time for the above choice of Aboriginal lifestyles and the cultural relativism implicit in it 
is over; and that the state’s duty of care to remote Aboriginal people obliges it to 
effectively abandon distinctive Aboriginality, at least abandon remote Aboriginal 
communities and Aboriginal community development efforts (Sutton 2001: 125-137). 
Suggesting discrimination if the state does otherwise, Sutton says:
The problem with a relativity argument which ultimately concludes, for example, that 
people are ‘free to go to hell in their own way’, that they ‘have the right to make their 
own mistakes’ and to set their own standards of what constitutes a social problem, is that 
we do not normally apply such an argument to the care or neglect of infants, the elderly, 
the mentally handicapped, and the many other potential victims of abuse (ibid: 146).
More recently Sutton has in fact called for funding to be withdrawn from remote 
communities (The Australian 2008a) and clarified those aspects of Aboriginality 
embedded in tradition that he suggests require urgent “cultural redevelopment” (Sutton 
2009: 64,65,66,85) in order to alleviate Aboriginal suffering. Austin-Broos instead 
prescribes policy to facilitate “loyalty to place and kin with better education and 
employment” (Austin-Broos 2009: 269). Significantly, she concludes this would involve 
compromises on the part of the Arremte if not other language groups, in addition to 
suitable policies and sufficient resources from governments. She says “for most families 
and individuals this will mean both compromise and hardship, the level in part depending
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on resource and policy decisions among governments” (ibid). Across outback Australia, a 
key compromise may need to be on the size and remoteness of communities Aboriginal 
people are willing to live in. More may have to settle for larger and less remote places.
The problem of outstations
The discussion points to and begins to make sense of what is one of the most persistent 
problems in the CLC’s community development work through its CD Unit, if not its 
work in general: how to include outstations in this work in an environment of now 
diminishing government funding for these very small communities against ongoing 
strong constituent interest in them. I have shown how support for outstations was 
originally central to Aboriginal self-determination policy. With responsibility for 
outstations passed from the Commonwealth Government to the NT Government in 2007, 
the latter’s so-called Growth Towns policy commits to continued funding only for 
existing outstations occupied for at least eight months of the year at levels dependent on 
their population and proximity to large communities (Northern Territory Government 
2009). No funding is available for new outstations (ibid), following a Commonwealth 
Government trend since the 1990s. CLC constituents are often willing, indeed keen, to 
spend payments from land use agreements on their outstations. But particularly when 
spread across a number of outstations, this is not necessarily enough money to adequately 
equip and maintain them, especially the most remote places with little or no existing 
infrastructure. Yet this is not just a funding problem. The problem runs deeper because of 
the change self-determination policy has wrought on Aboriginal sociality. As Glaskin 
succinctly says, the outstation movement as a key element of this policy has 
“consolidated intensely localised interests”, notions of the autonomy of Aboriginal 
groups, many of whom “use ‘traditional’ concepts to validate particular positions” in 
support of their autonomy (Glaskin 2007: 211,212,214). Of course they do likewise in 
support of their claims to the limited funds to facilitate autonomy. That is, reified 
tradition as a factor in privileged localism is particularly strong in outstations which can 
be sites too of heightened entification.
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In this light, that the CLC’s AAP Project now tightly accommodates outstations, or more 
fundamentally the autonomy they represent, without being subservient to outstation 
imperatives is critical to this new project, though a wider dilemma emerges. This 
dilemma is to do with identification of participants with the project after years of 
expectation of and familiarity with localism being privileged. That the Rent Project has 
some potential to become little more than an outstation support project in comparison 
raises significant concerns. On the other hand, this helps ensure project participants 
identify strongly with it, critical to their participation and general project progress. Most 
critically, it is helping to keep relatedness and autonomy or localism in balance in what is 
otherwise the CLC CD project strongest on relatedness.
As mentioned, the AAP Project was started in the first instance to assist AAP Project 
Association 1 to comply closely with its rules to avoid the adverse audit of its affairs that 
appeared possible because of a relatively loose interpretation of the rules and their 
application on the ground. The main concern was the number of vehicles bought with the 
association monies, ostensibly for the benefit of outstations but registered in the name of 
and used by individuals. The rules specifically rule out individual benefit from the 
monies (OR1C website). While the individuals concerned received undue benefit in their 
frequent use of the vehicles for their private purposes, such vehicles are essential for the 
individuals and their families to access outstations. That is, they are crucial to 
maintaining the autonomy of small family groups that outstations legitimately provide for 
to some extent in the AAP Project. In CLC’s early project consultations, participants 
quickly suggested that the outstations concerned incorporate in order to own the vehicles 
in the corporations’ names. The project is already obliged to disseminate the monies 
concerned to any number of local entities, incorporated or not, as eligible community 
organisations under the AAP Project Association 1 rules. Provided they can claim 
something of a match with the association’s objective or formal purpose and can make an 
obviously subjective case that they provide as much benefit as the average community 
organisation in the community with which they are associated, outstations can be 
considered eligible organisations in their own right. The suggestion of outstation 
incorporation for the sake of vehicles meant the prospect of more formally adding to the
90
number of such organisations as manifestations of local autonomy without necessarily 
reducing the undue benefit of the vehicles to individuals: more juridification and 
entification to no appreciable advantage. If individuals can more easily than in larger, 
regional organisations commandeer local organisations for their resources like vehicles, 
outstations pose virtually no resistance to this beyond immediate family pressure. Yet as 
corporations outstations are then set up to attract more of such resources. Their own rules, 
or matching another association’s rules, are in fact no match for individuals determined to 
use the much needed and highly prized resource that is funded vehicles. Incorporation is 
not a solution of itself, perhaps why there is no incorporation requirement for AAP 
Project eligible community organisations.
At AAP Project Community A, one of the two largest communities in the project, the 
collective reaction to the prospect of the project limiting vehicles for outstations soon 
seemed one of resignation and/or recognition that there are more pressing needs for the 
project’s money. Many of the outstations across the project area are not “established 
residential” places as is required under the AAP Project Association 1 rules to receive 
association funds (ibid). Those associated with these places visit them, escape to them in 
times of turmoil or when the demands of many kin oppress. Otherwise they live in one of 
the eight communities in the project area where there are services, some jobs, extended 
family and friends but also serious social problems affecting them. At a large community 
meeting to select the eligible community organisations to potentially receive project 
monies in the inaugural year of the project, AAP Project Community A downplayed 
outstations, with little of the argument that otherwise accompanied the meeting. It may be 
that the many people there who have never received individual or any other benefit from 
AAP Project Association 1 took the opportunity to quietly lobby to address the inequities 
they hitherto saw resulting from the association’s support for outstations. The community 
selected a range of organisations as eligible community organisations that have since 
received project funding, for aged care and youth services for instance. In the absence of 
an outstation resource centre in the community, it selected a local Aboriginal business to 
provide infrastructure to one specific outstation. But with a population of just 700 people, 
AAP Project Community A also selected no less than five churches as eligible
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community organisations, after which four churches received funding for a bus, 
ostensibly to provide social services consistent with AAP Project Association l ’s 
objective. The CLC has since provided the association with legal advice to the effect that 
churches are not in fact social service providers per se under these rules. But more to my 
point is that these churches, most with a very small congregation and no church building, 
appear to be a way to acquire vehicles with AAP Project Association 1 money now that it 
is harder to get them for outstations. They are in fact alternative sites of entification.
Churches were not mentioned, however, at a meeting the following year of the AAP 
Project community committee in AAP Project Community A. This meeting was 
convened to revisit a five year community plan completed independently of the project 
and to consider what existing organisations might help achieve the vision in the plan with 
project funding. One influential committee member prpceeded to claim that the existing 
Aboriginal organisations in the community, of which there are already many, are 
generally ineffectual. In a stance reminiscent of Sanders’ exit option mentioned earlier as 
contributing to the proliferation of Aboriginal organisations, this committee member 
proposed a new organisation for AAP Project Community A with funds through the 
project -  a cultural centre. As the primary tasks of such a centre, he listed fixing tyres and 
flying family members interstate so, he said, the community can be “really self- 
determining”.
Vehicles provide autonomy, just as autonomous local organisations can effectively 
provide individuals with vehicles (and just as vehicles in remote Aboriginal communities 
also realise wide relatedness in dynamic, extended social networks, the ‘beats’, Tines’ 
and ‘runs’ mentioned earlier). Faced with increasing restrictions on their access to 
vehicles via AAP Project Association 1 with the advent of the project, participants are 
voicing their frustration with this, though in terms of local autonomy denied, 
Aboriginality overridden, and culture/tradition thus ignored -  three related realms of 
difference. The heady days when AAP Project Association 1 members were assured more 
ready and regular, though not necessarily well planned and implemented, support for 
their outstations generally is compared favourably with the current situation where the
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association’s monies are said, regretfully, to be “all in one bucket”, ie. more transparently 
available to all or almost all organisations working in the communities. Organisations 
working on largely (though by no means wholly) government funded matters like health 
and education, particularly where these are larger organisations not necessarily based in 
the community concerned, are described as kartiya (ie. non-Aboriginal) or whitefella 
projects, even where the organisation is non-govemment with an all Aboriginal board. 
What are said to be the opposite type of projects, including buses for churches, tend to be 
first articulated as culture projects loosely supportive of tradition over the mundane 
modernity of the kartiya projects. Distinguished or separated from the kartiya ones, the 
culture projects are then rendered as Aboriginal projects. In the first year of the AAP 
Project in AAP Project Community A at least, the kartiya projects were left to be 
allocated any remainder of AAP Project Association 1 monies available after the 
culture/Aboriginal projects had got what they needed, lest, it was intimated, Aboriginality 
is neglected. Always well looked after is ceremony, known in one community as ‘men’s 
tribal’ and ‘women’s tribal’. Funds for ceremonial activities are authorised each year in 
the project’s eight communities via nominated elder signatories to an account held at the 
CLC’s Aboriginal Associations Management Corporation. They are funds that a cultural 
centre, as proposed in AAP Project Community A above, would presumably seek to 
manage instead.
Qualifying in the AAP Project as culture/Aboriginal initiatives supportive of tradition are 
generally those that facilitate mobility, often expressed as ‘country visits’, involving as 
they often do hunting, visits to sacred sites and visits to remote outstations. Gone are the 
days when outstations were imaginary sites of modernity, after Austin-Broos, or 
modernity’s half-way houses at least. Many now have little more than a track leading to 
them and a bore and water tank. Fixing the water supply and grading the track are 
attractive to AAP Project participants as culture/Aboriginal projects to help them visit 
what, ever since land rights, is .considered the heart of their culture: their land. But they 
are useless initiatives without a vehicle. Country visits are given as among the reasons 
why churches in AAP Project Community A need vehicles. As the advocate for a bus for 
one church in this community put it, “we got a lot of trips (planned)”. Football and
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softball team buses there are not so justified while still rendered as Aboriginal projects 
and prioritised over kartiya projects.
My main point here is that the AAP Project has alienated AAP Project Association 1 
from its members, the project participants, while trying to have them comply with the 
association rules towards more sustainable and equitably spread benefits. This is the 
wider dilemma for the project mentioned above. It is not simply a matter of remote 
Aboriginal people now finding it harder to get vehicles. The dilemma in this case seems 
to come from confusion, and the pace of change, as the project participants negotiate the 
project in its first years amid major government policy changes: the intervention, the 
shires, Growth Towns policy. After long seeming to encourage the localism of outstations 
and their vehicles, project participants were told the AAP Project Association 1 rules 
require wider community benefit almost overnight; yet the rules continue to encourage 
entification and all the localism entailed in it, indeed to a degree the rules require this too. 
The participants don’t necessarily identify with many of the outcomes even while they or 
their immediate family may benefit directly, in better health services for instance. Many 
have accused the CLC of secretly changing the rules. It will be interesting to watch how 
they react to a plan soon to come before them to part fund a regional secondary college, a 
test of their relatedness among other challenges. But the AAP Project participants’ 
dilemma is not an identity crisis such as the Royalty Project has had: it is early days for 
the AAP Project and its participants, notoriously resourceful, are still trying to work the 
project in ways that suit their sociality within the relevant rules, still searching the project 
for a balance between autonomy and relatedness.
Turning now to the Rent Project and outstations, every year Rent Project Community A 
receives a set portion of the rent and the relevant traditional owners choose three other 
communities to share in the rest. This sharing of the monies around the region, wherever 
the traditional owners live or have relations in the broadest sense, is an important factor 
in their strong identification with the project. Equally important is that this governance 
arrangement allows the traditional owners to target different outstations every year with 
the monies. They can and do also target larger communities. In these ways the Rent
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Project governance provides for a process that accommodates Indigenous social 
processes in the autonomy-relatedness dynamic, which is comparatively well balanced. 
This and the resulting strong identification of the traditional owners with the project will 
be further elaborated later. Meanwhile, by their tacit agreement, the project does not fund 
vehicles. This is not challenged largely because the traditional owners routinely buy 
vehicles with that not insignificant part of the rent that goes to family heads via Rent 
Association 1 (see Figures 1 and 2). Targeting certain outstations for funding, then, is not 
a strategy for obtaining vehicles as it once was within AAP Project Association 1, as 
above. Yet there is sufficient reward for the targeting of outstations -  usually in the form 
of improved water supply, a shelter, perhaps a generator and the track there graded -  for 
outstations to feature in the traditional owners’ discussion of which three communities to 
target annually in addition to Rent Project Community A. Indeed the Rent Project may 
accommodate the Aboriginal', autonomy-relatedness dynamic in its governance 
arrangements in a comparatively balanced way; but in practice the primary participant 
group, the relevant traditional owners, have begun to tip the project far enough towards 
support for autonomy for outstations that without sufficient attention it could become 
little more than an outstation support project. This accommodation, providing strong 
potential in the governance arrangements, against the practice sees the primary 
participants identifying quite strongly with the Rent Project from meeting to meeting 
while the project risks diminishing practical benefit. The rent can go in any given year to 
three outstations, all without permanent residents, while many more potential 
beneficiaries in the larger communities go without this support. As one member of the 
traditional owner group said recently while promoting the idea of a regional education 
project using the rent (and implicitly the prospect of government engagement with and 
even partnership in the idea): “we gotta show government we don’t just support 
outstations where there’s no-one but animals.”
Within the Rent Project traditional owner/primary participant group there is some 
resonance in the argument, often enough made, that in fact many families will benefit 
from better outstations, however temporarily, because properly equipped they provide 
something of a way station as family members travel widely across the project area.
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Articulated this way, the Rent Project is seen to facilitate mobility and with it the 
interconnectedness of kin across a large and remote region -  wide relatedness in 
dynamic, extended social networks -  even if it cannot pay for vehicles. Many project 
participants also argue that the Rent Project must help outstations because these very 
small, highly localised communities receive so little government support now compared 
to large communities, compared to the support they once attracted. So, the need for 
government engagement may be acknowledged; but rather than harmonising with current 
government policy and helping to leverage more funding for larger communities with 
acknowledged larger problems, the project is used here as a form of resistance to policy 
that appears designed to force the NT Aboriginal population together to live in the larger 
places, the so-called Growth Towns.
Tellingly, the man most closely associated with one of two usually uninhabited 
outstations chosen to receive rent monies one year publicly reminded the traditional 
owner group and the CLC CD Unit staff that ‘his’ outstation was set up in 1970s. This 
was of course the heyday of Aboriginal self-determination, when self-determination 
included outstation support as a key policy plank. It was when the localism epitomised by 
outstations became privileged in Aboriginal affairs and Aboriginal sociality. In short, the 
70s were when remote Aboriginal people began to experience this important change, 
their most important change since contact if we accept Austin-Broos’ analysis from 
earlier in this chapter. Significantly, self-detennination policy support was not enough to 
keep this man’s outstation more regularly occupied. Yet he seemed to be now saying that 
Rent Project support for his outstation was also support for Aboriginal self-determination 
at a time when instead large scale intervention lingers as the dominant government 
modus operandi in the NT. As a kidney dialysis patient who will never live at this 
outstation, and sadly may not live to see Rent Project benefits there, this man may also be 
simply re-stamping his name and that of his descendents on the landscape, having the 
outstation publicly endorsed by countrymen as his place and implicitly his exclusively 
even if it were to be used as a way station for others. With payments now frequent in one 
form or another to NT Aboriginal people from the use of their land, courtesy of the 
ALRA, the incentive to gain such an endorsement is high. The endorsement commonly
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extends beyond the outstation itself to surrounding lands. Where this endorsement is 
elusive or contested, the ALRA legitimates exclusive traditional ownership, legitimates 
the local. Juridification becomes a critical factor, as I will demonstrate.
First, to help emphasise the fundamental nature of the change, I want to view such factors 
contributing to privileged localism in the light of similar profound change in Melanesia. 
The change there occurs in the context of resource extraction investments like those that 
have given rise to the Royalty and AAP projects in particular in the NT and that form the 
backdrop to much remote Aboriginal development generally, as explained. In Melanesia, 
the change privileging localism is mediated by custom or kastom, much as it is in the NT 
by tradition. The following sections referring to Melanesia, then, also serve as something 
of a preamble to the subsequent chapters on cultural match and certainty, in which 
investment certainty is central.
Kastom
Among Melanesians involved with resource extraction there is a close association of 
kastom and the local, specifically local land. As with Aboriginal Australian tradition, the 
close association of kastom with local land is by no means confined to resource 
extraction zones. And it is by no means without pre-colonial precedent. But there is a 
strong post-colonial tendency here with or without large scale investment in resource 
extraction, a tendency or privilege I will show is heightened with such investment.
Roger Keesing sees an elevated significance of land as a general characteristic of Pacific 
countries as former colonies. Across the Pacific, he says, “an ideology of attachment to 
and spiritual significance of the land could achieve such prominence only in a historical 
context of invasion and colonization” (Keesing 1989: 29). And post colonisation -  self- 
determination -  he might have added. This is not necessarily to do with the strictly 
limited land availability on Pacific islands. The ideology, according to Keesing, has the 
Pacific now being repopulated with “imagined ancestors” (ibid) living in harmony with 
each other, cosmic forces and the environment (ibid), ie. living by kastom. Closer to the
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ground, land as kastom has become both “a powerful symbol of identity and a site of 
contestation”, says Keesing. As a set o f  symbols of identity, kastom is invariably vague to 
allow wide application and interpretation (ibid: 19; see also Keesing 1982: 297,299). But 
as a site of contestation, kastom is just the opposite: it is reified. It is finite and 
predictable and thus local and fixed, or timeless, precisely because the contestation is 
frequently about land as property in the Western sense. And rarely in Melanesia, as in 
expanses of remote Aboriginal Australia, are the stakes in this property higher than where 
resource extraction is concerned.
Recently examining this with respect to mining on Lihir island in Papua New Guinea, 
Nick Bainton notes that claims through Western property law “usually require people to 
shorten or ‘cut the network’ in order to establish ownership” (Bainton 2009: 18). In other 
words, property ownership in Western law is inherently exclusive, even where the 
ownership is not private per se and not alienable. ‘The network’ on Lihir is a web of long 
standing relationships extending beyond the island, relationships Lihirians are now busily 
severing to concentrate benefits from the mining. There the term ‘wasier’ loosely 
translates as visitor, ‘weira’ as stranger. Says Bainton:
The terminological shift from wasier to weira -  from visitor to stranger -  to describe non- 
Lihirians reflects the process in which identities are socially constructed to serve new 
requirements. As people from the neighbouring district continued to make their way in 
greater numbers to Lihir to call up previously established relationships, coupled with 
larger numbers of people from around the country migrating in search of work, to sell 
produce at the market, or simply to raun tasol (just travel around), drawn by imagined 
possibilities of a new centre, many Lihirians were growing somewhat wary, if not 
altogether xenophobic. In a conceptual sleight of hand, Lihirians began labeling these 
people weira, thus realigning their sense of obligation and reformulating Lihirian identity 
(ibid: 23).
Lihirian identity became bureaucratised as well as localised and “based on undiluted 
traditions” (ibid: 27). The localisation of state functions is, says Bainton, “a crucial 
component in the construction of Lihirian identity” (ibid: 25). Significant here, as in
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Australian Aboriginal self-determination, is the position of local organisations. 
According to the Lihir Law and Order Committee, containing members of the local level 
government and the Lihir Mine Area Landowners Association, the influx of outsiders is 
blamed for the “rapid deterioration of the high moral integrity of the original Lihir 
society” (Landowners Association document cited in ibid). Wasier can be and have been 
incorporated into Lihirian lineages (ibid: 22), just as the progeny of so-called historical 
people have become traditional land owners in Aboriginal Australia. But now those 
without sufficient Lihirian ‘blood’ must compensate for this “through fulfillment of 
customary obligation”, says Bainton of a Landowners Association document defining and 
further reifying what it is to be Lihirian (ibid: 27).
In echoes of Keesing, Colin Filer believes “large-scale resource development in PNG has 
fostered an ‘ideology of landownership’ which portrays the ‘customary landowner’ as the 
very model of what it means to be an ‘automatic’ (or indigenous) citizen of that country” 
(Filer 2006: 68). But this ideology is not necessarily sufficient to secure benefits from the 
resource development. Bainton notes Papua New Guineans have been adapting to this 
ideology for some time now (Bainton 2009: 30). He says, like those on Lihir, “many have 
readjusted their relationships accordingly, masking (or in some cases denying) the 
complex social networks that originally gave them access to ground, supported their 
existence, and provided their identity” (ibid). Here the ideology of landownership and 
that of descent meet, again with the effect of emphasising the local. At the intersection, 
ideology is institutionalised through state laws and/or regulations arising from these laws, 
regulations to do with the registration or incorporation of formal landowners’ 
associations for instance. There is juridification.
Pre-colonial group identity in the Pacific generally privileged context, “situational 
flexibility”, behaviour and performance over innate characteristics and “unchanging 
boundaries”; and colonisation introduced a competing theory of group identity largely 
based on common descent, according to Jocelyn Linnekin and Lin Poyer (1990: 6,8,11). 
Resource extraction and/or exploration have seen the theory widely applied in PNG. In 
the Kutubu oil project area among the Foi people, for instance, the land-holding clan as
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the common articulation of this identity is historically “neither solidary, corporate, nor 
bound by collective sentiment” says James Weiner (2001: 25). But the company 
concerned, through incorporated land groups or ILGs receiving royalties under post­
colonial PNG legislation, has changed that. Says Weiner:
Through their own attempts at educating landowners as to the relevant PNG legislation, 
their own acts on behalf of the state in registering the ILGs in the first place, and their 
commitment to monitoring, evaluating and maintaining in ‘good repair’ the ILG system, 
the Company is a critical force in the transformation of group dynamics in the oil project 
area (ibid: 30).
Importantly, Ernst describes entification proceeding among the Onabasulu of PNG: the 
making of quite permanent, exclusive entities from what were previously contingent 
social categories formed and refonned from Onabasulu activity (Ernst 2004: 126). With 
royalties flowing in the region associated with the Onabasulu too, Onabasulu clans are 
now well and truly entified, when to Ernst “the ‘clan’ is not an exclusive descent group, 
or any other kind of exclusive group in Onabasulu: conceptually people can belong to a 
number of them” (ibid: 140).
Such change is as rapid as it is common in PNG. Like that too of the Ilpili associated with 
PNG’s Porgera gold mine (Golub 2007: 80,81), identity among PNG’s Telefolmin was, 
according to Dan Jorgensen, once part of a regional system (Jorgensen 2004: 72) in 
which kinship only indirectly accounted for land ownership. Jorgensen became 
associated with Telefolmin change in the mid 1990s when prospects of a copper mine 
first held out the hope of relative riches for the Telefolmin. Traditional land tenure and 
identity shifted from a regional system characterised by linguistic and cultural continuity 
with neighbouring peoples (ibid), to one where claims to land became more exclusive, 
based on myth and descent. By 1995, a landowners association formed several years 
before had invited Jorgensen to conduct a genealogical study under the auspices of the 
mining company then involved (ibid: 75). He says those Telefolmin familiar with 
“government notions of landholding” began “talking of traditional cognatic descent 
categories (tenum miit) as ‘clans’, complete with patrilineal descent” (ibid: 83) and
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elevating what he refers to as the “register of the myth” (ibid). Through a strategy of 
“mythic encompassmenfdescent came to dominate other land rights based on “land use 
histories” (ibid: 83,89).
With the convergence of reification, juridification and entification, development is 
delimited in Melanesia. Vanuatu’s formative first decade, for instance, was one where 
any action, especially innovative action, was held up to the yardstick of kastom in this 
context and in this way judged acceptable or not, according to Lamont Lindstrom 
(Lindstrom 1982: 318). In PNG, Ralph Premdas points to serious development 
inefficiencies, largely courtesy of kastom, its local emplacement and the resulting 
ethnicities, saying:
The colonially created ethnic map throws an immense distortion into the allocative 
process and it often must come to dominate it. Vital time and resources are lost to feed 
and appease the appetite of the ethnic monster, whose size continues to grow and whose 
needs have come to define much of PNG’s political and social reality (Premdas 1989: 
251).
Revisiting the case studies’ governance, ‘keeping the network in view’
There are echoes of the plight of Gagudju A-Ssocation in this brief account of Melanesia. 
But what are the significant parallels, the problems seen from this perspective and the 
alternative prospects in Aboriginal Australia at this point in my thesis, specifically in my 
case studies? I return to the governance arrangements in the case studies as outlined in 
chapter 4. Here the Royalty Project is juridified: governance arrangements are largely 
detennined in rules and regulations. The AAP Project arrangements meanwhile can be 
characterised as entified: regardless of legal requirement, as there isn’t any, quite 
permanent, relatively exclusive entities tend to be made from what were previously 
contingent social categories formed and reformed from activity. And they are made in 
numbers. The five churches in AAP Project Community A, as above, are examples. But 
in both projects the resulting localisation is mediated by Indigenous tradition, as kastom 
mediates such change in Melanesia.
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Royalty Project Association 1, made up of the relevant traditional owners essentially as 
defined in the ALRA, ultimately approves all funding for initiatives in that project; as the 
project’s primary participant group, it is a formally incorporated association and the 
trustee of a trust holding the funds. This is just the start of the juridification outlined in 
chapter 4. There are in fact layers of juridification. At the top layer, that of the primary 
participant group in the form of the association, identity is localised by virtue of the 
ALRA and its definition of traditional ownership. Yet the Royalty Project is a regional 
one, albeit in the form of a fairly fixed and bounded ethnicity, that of a particular 
language group. There is little or no sense of autonomy-relatedness balance. The Royalty 
Project struggles for legitimacy according to the participants; they struggle to identify 
with it. Indeed it has experienced something of an identity crisis such that the association 
has seen itself as so separate from project arrangements and other participants that it has 
considered relinquishing its role as trustee and dispenser of the project funds. Key 
association members have expressed strong alienation from the project, saying it has 
nothing to do with them. Some of them have voiced bemusement as to why they were 
ever given the trusteeship, though they know they are recognised traditional owners of 
the relevant land. Here was a local group that felt genuinely, literally out of place. The 
disaffected have since reconsidered and the group has retained the trusteeship. Without 
this change of heart, the Royalty Project might have spent many millions of dollars over 
time without any reference to the owners of the land from whence the money came.
Others of their language group -  all potential beneficiaries of the project -  express 
alienation clearly arising from what they perceive as the inaccessibility of the project’s 
juridified arrangements, an indeed formidable array of legal supports and protections. 
That is, the effect of juridification is not confined to the primary participant group. That 
the Royalty Project is from time to time made out to be a ‘government project’ in which 
the real decisions are made in Alice Springs, ie. at the usual meeting place of its advisory 
committee, is a common enough articulation of the wider alienation. And in another 
sense it is a government project, reflecting strongly as it does state sponsorship of 
tradition through land law, as is common in Melanesia. To merely cap off these
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problems, some men of the language group see the Royalty Project as ‘women’s 
business’, with its Early Childhood program probably contributing to this perception.
Juridification characterises the AAP Project, though less so than it does the Royalty 
Project. It is in its entification that there exists the closest parallels with Melanesia, PNG 
in particular, though the entification is not based on land ownership per se in the AAP 
Project. It is in Aboriginal organisations eligible for funding in the project in each of 
eight remote communities according to AAP Project Association l ’s rules. Their 
memberships, formal or otherwise, are not necessarily technically exclusive, a feature of 
entification. But they are often enough cases, or potential cases, of the institutionalised 
individualism von Sturmer described in my chapter on self-determination, where 
Aboriginal people seek their “own” organisation (1982: 98). The effect tends strongly 
towards exclusivity, of course; and this rather than the literal meaning is what von 
Sturmer meant by individualism. The tendency to entification is compounded in the 
project participants privileging those organisations perceived to be more Aboriginal than 
others, proposing projects supposedly more cultural. However, here, paradoxically, the 
frequent focus of these projects -  vehicles and the mobility they provide -  can activate 
relatedness and thus counteract the entification to an extent. Readers will recall my 
discussion of the AAP Project and outstations in which a prominent project participant 
proposed a cultural centre with project funds, to fix tyres and fly family members 
interstate as primary tasks. In the circumstances, it can legitimately be assumed that 
family means this man’s close family, that the cultural centre would become principally 
‘his’ organisation.
As the participants negotiate relatedness and autonomy in the AAP Project in this way, 
entification encouraged in AAP Project Association l ’s rules poses immediate practical 
problems in the project roll-out. There are consequently so many localised sites of the 
project that monitoring, part of most development project cycles to determine outcomes, 
is almost impossible to do thoroughly consistently. In any case, the funds available are 
spread so thin that the effectiveness of the project at each site is almost inevitably limited. 
There is something like the immense distortion in the allocative process Premdas sees in
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development in PNG. Each site -  each organisation quite autonomous from others -  has 
the potential with the support of the project’s albeit thinly spread funds to become and 
remain the exclusive patch of particular people and their immediate family.
On the other hand, the Rent Project, interestingly using monies not derived from resource 
extraction, avoids juridification and entification. The traditional owner group concerned 
is not incorporated. Neither is the working group through which the project operates in 
Rent Project Community A, though one member of that community, seemingly schooled 
in juridification, frequently demands the working group and its meetings prove they are 
properly “constituted” before he will accept their legitimacy. With initial advice from a 
CLC anthropologist on the composition of the traditional owner group, ie. the primary 
participant group, its membership is thereafter adjusted informally by the group itself. 
Membership has not been the subject of prolonged disputation in the context  ^ o f the 
project over the six years of the project’s operation. The group has developed with the 
CLC CD Unit some project principles and project funding criteria, but it is otherwise 
without fonnal rules. Project funds are targeted annually to three different communities, 
in addition to Rent Project Community A. The project is not obliged to apply the funds 
through incorporated community entities -  Aboriginal community councils and 
organisations -  or through legislated local governments, ie. shires. Consultations are held 
directly with the wider community at the three targeted communities in order to 
determine priority initiatives. Checks and balances exist in the form of final funding 
approval for initiatives from the CLC executive or council, a regional body, then legal 
funding agreements or the exchange of letters between the CLC and project managers. 
Notwithstanding a problem arising, namely what is tending to become an inefficient 
emphasis on outstations as explained above, the Rent Project favours relatively informal 
and flexible “relational autonomy” (Hunt and Smith 2007: 15) over juridification and 
entification. Through this, relatedness and autonomy are in relative balance in the 
project’s governance arrangements. All of which helps participants to identify with the 
project. It is thus both collectively comprehensible and accessible to them, essential for 
their meaningful participation in the community development involved. There is a 
foundation for a relatively strong Indigenous civil society across the project area.
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The IGCP defines relational autonomy as:
A principle that Indigenous people strive for in the way they organise themselves, where 
they try to achieve a balance between maintaining the autonomy of a small group of 
people (eg. an extended family, small group or local organisation) at the same time as 
maintaining their connections into a wider set of relationships (ibid: viii).
The principle informs “networked” or “federalised” forms of governance (ibid) that are 
not “bounded and unitary” (ibid: 14), characteristics of entification, but based on “the 
negotiation of roles, powers and responsibilities between the constituent parts” (ibid: vii). 
Fluidity of process rather than fixity of relationships between these parts -  groups and 
communities -  is emphasised because “Indigenous systems of social and political 
organisation are complex, fluid and negotiable” (ibid: xv). Coherence comes in 
“subsidiarity” (ibid: viii and 15) whereby:
Indigenous people are allocating different functions to different layers of their 
organisational structures, keeping certain areas of decision making at the most local level 
they can, while recognising that some decisions and services are better carried out by a 
body with broader representative and functional responsibilities (ibid: 14).
Subsidiarity is stark in the Rent Project governance at its local level, at the communities 
where initiatives are prioritised and implemented, vis-a-vis the broader level of the 
traditional owner/primary participant group, a relatively informal and inclusive body that 
targets three communities for funding each year and later endorses their initiatives. An 
instance of the project in operation is illustrative.
In a routine CLC update with the traditional owner group on the progress of project 
consultations in Rent Project Community B, a senior group member -  a lay preacher -  
was dismayed to hear the community did not elect to establish a church with its funding. 
Not a resident of this community, he had argued on its behalf to be chosen for project 
funding because he believed it needed a church. At the subsequent community
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consultations, a church was discussed but rejected because the only place for it -  a vacant 
shed -  was wanted instead for a workshop with project funding, in addition to communal 
washing machines. Back at the CLC/traditional owner group meeting updating on the 
project, another senior man forcefully reminded the preacher that, consistent with the 
project’s governance arrangements and the principle of subsidiarity, it was entirely 
appropriate the community chose workshop over church, or words to that effect. The 
choice was Rent Project Community B’s, he said. Yet had the community insisted on 
buying each household a washing machine with project funds, the traditional owner 
group’s position within the Rent Project governance arrangements, and the project 
principles the group has adopted, would have allowed the group to rule out use of the 
funds in this way on the grounds they are for community, not individual, benefit.
Smith says that, despite the continuing inclination to see Aboriginal self-determination as 
most appropriately based on small-scale local groups (Smith 2005a: 4), “alongside the 
pull of autonomy, there has always been a persistent and strong assertion by Indigenous 
groups of their interests via larger-scale systems and structures” (ibid). To borrow from 
Bainton’s recent writings on Melanesia above, they have always kept the network in 
view. Accordingly, regional governance arrangements, or at least those like the Rent 
Project that balance autonomy and relatedness, are emerging voluntarily across 
Aboriginal Australia, Janet Hunt and Smith suggest (Hunt and Smith 2007: 18,19). They 
say a significant benefit is flexibility and accommodation of those who might otherwise 
have Heen considered outsiders (ibid: 19). I will return to this accommodation in chapters 
to follow. Meanwhile, Smith points to the importance of flexibility to allow for changes 
internal to the group and sub-groups concerned; but also to respond to changes 
“externally instigated” (Smith 2005a: 8,9), in rapidly shifting policy settings, for instance, 
such as Aboriginal Australia is currently experiencing.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have examined in some detail the profound change in the Indigenous 
domain wrought by self-determination policy. I did not, and do not, question that the
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policy brought advances for Aboriginal people. But with the advances the policy also 
privileged local autonomy over relatedness. Socio-cultural reification, juridification and 
entification are key factors in this, arguably the most significant change in the Indigenous 
domain since colonisation. This change, and the associated disengagement from and 
separation within the Aboriginal domain, has not helped community development to 
improve conditions in Aboriginal communities. Privileged localism is perhaps best 
illustrated by the outstations encouraged under self-determination. I examined the 
problem of outstations as managed in my three case studies. I then made comparisons 
with Melanesia and from this emerged some intellectual tools towards the better 
balancing of autonomy and relatedness, tools like subsidiarity. These hold out the 
prospect of greater cultural match in development, the subject of my next chapter, and 
thus greater project legitimacy and participant identification with projects. Process, 
particularly among widely related people, becomes quite critical whereas it is de- 
emphasised, or in fact reversed, in reification, juridification and entification.
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Chapter 6
Cultural match
In this chapter I begin by elaborating the concept of cultural match according to the major 
American research project that has paid the concept most attention as a foundation for 
governance in development. This leads to a closer examination of contemporary 
Australian Aboriginal sociality and culture. No cultural match can be contemplated 
without a depth of understanding here. Participants in my case study projects, and like 
projects, cannot identify with and adequately participate in the projects unless there is 
adequate cultural match. The subtleties of process, namely key processes within the 
Aboriginal kinship economy, essentially those of relatedness, are revealed in this chapter 
against the cultural forms and the associated Aboriginal identity arising from self- 
determination. Again, the latter forms and identity are localised and reification, 
juridification and entification are key factors. These factors are effectively the opposite of 
socio-cultural process. I sharpen my focus on juridification and the role of the ALRA and 
its definition of traditional Aboriginal land owner. The legislated land tenure arising is 
integral to what I have called a cultural half-match across the NT Aboriginal domain and 
arguably beyond, meaning the project of Aboriginal development in the broadest sense 
emphasises the autonomy side and not the relatedness side of the autonomy-relatedness 
dynamic. Local autonomy is privileged. CD is restricted. The extent of cultural match 
among my case studies is examined, with a better understanding beginning to emerge of 
the capacity for improvements in Aboriginal communities.
Legitimacy, identity and process
Implicit in the second and third traditions, at least, of CD outlined in chapter 2 is an 
expectation that CD projects with Indigenous peoples will seek to accord or match as best 
as possible with the people’s cultures. This is to facilitate voluntary participation in the 
projects, assuming this as opposed to forced participation to be critical to their 
sustainability. With this willing participation, a cultural match is to bring as much
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Indigenous knowledge as possible to bear towards project success. The Harvard 
University Project on American Indian Economic Development in the United States is 
widely seen as responsible for much of the concern for and research into cultural match. 
Chief researchers are clear: cultural match “is not an appeal to tradition; it is an appeal for 
legitimacy” in development (Cornell and Begay 2003), as stated in my introductory 
chapter. Accordingly, it is critical to participants’ identification with CD projects. The 
Harvard Project researchers conclude that “what matters is not that things be done in the 
old ways. It is that things be done in ways -  old and new -  that win the support, 
participation, and trust of the people, and that can get things done (ibid. Italics in 
original). The 1CGP findings echo this in Australia, finding “‘legitimacy’ for Indigenous 
people not only includes cultural factors, but also the practical ability to get the job done” 
(Hunt and Smith 2007: xvii). Yet my discussion should show that what mattered most in 
cultural match through much of the self-determination era was indeed tradition; and that 
insufficient thought was given to how the many Aboriginal organisations created with 
this tradition front and centre would then successfully tackle the enormity of the tasks in 
front of them, how residents of the outstations similarly created would ultimately fare. 
The legitimacy of the organisations and outstations effectively rested on tradition alone. 
Significantly, the version of tradition with which cultural match was sought was a locally 
emplaced, reified, juridified and entified version, with the region-wide dynamics of 
contemporary Aboriginal society and culture all but dismissed.
It seems the point of cultural match in development project governance in Aboriginal 
Australia has largely been missed (Sullivan 2006: 11,12). Hunt and Smith stress that 
“legitimate governance will not be created by importing romanticised or essentialised 
views of either traditional Indigenous or western democratic systems into organisational 
governance arrangements” (Hunt and Smith 2006: 20); and that research reveals 
“different systems of governance are not independent and neatly ‘bounded’, but instead 
create an ‘intercultural’ milieu” (ibid: 13). They report that “cultural match is a process” 
(ibid: 68) in Aboriginal communities. Just as important is acknowledgment that beneath 
its relatively recent reification and generally quite bounded local emplacement there 
remains in Aboriginal culture itself widely extended process.
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Myers’ (1986, 1987) work with the Pintupi advances understanding here, in particular the 
place of Aboriginal land and land tenure in cultural processes and thus identity. As above, 
Myers has shown us that central to the Pintupi process of ownership of and thus 
identification with land is the right to be asked to use culturally significant sites. 
Underpinning the discourse, indeed the negotiation, inherent in this is the desire to 
maintain autonomy among widely related people. It is very much a part of the autonomy- 
relatedness dynamic. Residence facilitating visits to sites with those more familiar with 
them is important to activate more exclusive rights that are not, then, sealed in local 
descent groups or clans. Relatedness is realised through exchanges that demonstrate care 
and trust, and it is in such activity that the Pintupi know themselves, according to Myers. 
He suggests their quite widely shared identity reflects the necessity of resource sharing in 
the desert, in a cultural appropriation of this age-old, basic survival strategy.
The cultural appropriation is nowadays extended. As links to and ritual knowledge of 
land attenuates, even among remote Aboriginal people with land rights and thus large 
areas of land with which they have long been associated, “objectifications of self and 
relatedness are sustained to a greater degree in the exchange of services and things,” 
according to Austin-Broos (2003: 124). She says for the Western Arremte, looking after 
kin, in fact what she distinguishes as “working for” them as opposed to working in the 
economic development sense, produces and reproduces social groups and the places 
groups are associated with (Austin-Broos 2006: 6). In the so-called hinterland Aboriginal 
community context, Sansom writes similarly of “performative kinship” (Sansom 1988: 
170) involving service and indebtedness for service provided. Here a test of relatedness 
and its intensity “is, in the end, the extent of one’s ability to cause a close-up countryman 
to render service” (ibid: 166). And in an urban setting, R.G. (Jerry) Schwab describes 
how strategic sharing -  “the calculus of reciprocity” -  is integral to identity (Schwab 
1995: 12). Other anthropologists, like Smith (2001a: 18,19), have written similarly of the 
restoration of Aboriginal social balance in the repayment of debts or compensation of one 
sort of another. This is part of what David Martin calls “assertive equalitarianism” among 
Aboriginal kin: the “forceful assertion of equality between individuals through social
110
transactions being represented as equivalent, even in fact when objectively they are not” 
(Martin, D. 1995: 8). The ever present autonomy-relatedness dynamic is of course at play 
here too. Sutton has written recently of how the forceful assertion can extend to violence 
to restore social balance (Sutton 2009: 103,152,199), though the violence may appear to 
be excessive repayment or payback.
To Keen, Aboriginal identity generally “is not framed through the objective existence of 
social cells with territorial correlates; on the contrary it is constituted in discourse” (Keen 
1997b: 271). The discourse, with or without violence, occurs across what is too often 
portrayed as a remote-urban Aboriginal divide. The divide falls away in Sansom’s work. 
Sansom says ‘The Camp at Wallaby Cross’ (1980), his account of an Aboriginal 
community in the Darwin hinterland from early in the self-determination era, “is about 
happenings, about ‘the word’ and about Aboriginal valuations of experience shared with 
others” (ibid: 4). The word is creole or at least Aboriginal English that helps create social 
forms across communities (ibid). He emphasises a regional form where prior linguistic 
differences are sunk beneath the word (ibid: 11) and where “histories of consociate 
experience” (ibid: 14) are significant. Land remains important but associated identity is 
regional and fluid not local and fixed. Changes wrought with the opposite effect largely 
through the ALRA had clearly not yet taken hold, perhaps because of the sometimes semi 
urban setting. Recalling Bemdf s comments on diffusion above, Sansom says:
In effect, peoples once more closely confined in their use of territory have become the 
people of a region. Those who belong to the total set made up of ethnic subsets call one 
another ‘countrymen’ by which they mean people who have access to one another as 
natural associates. The countrymen are, in short, those people who have in their careers 
worked on and moved between the Darwin-centred cattle stations of the Northern 
Territory (ibid: 5).
Process in the kinship economy
A complex Aboriginal kinship economy is central to the discussion as it applies around 
Darwin and beyond in Aboriginal Australia. It is an economy where in the Darwin fringe
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at least the product, so to speak, is “happenings”, and where descent is by no means the 
sole determinant of relatedness -  perhaps why Sansom calls it simply the Aboriginal 
economy or “blackfella business” (ibid: 4,7,8). To attract this business -  to attract 
countrymen and their wage and welfare dollars -  senior men “work to turn Darwin camps 
into regional centres. To do this, all possible means are used to ensure that a permanent 
fringe camp will be a place of continuing activity” (ibid: 9). Ceremonies are among the 
happenings, but less traditional, less formal events are similarly significant. Most 
significant is the shared experience of this business along with time together on the 
surrounding stations, and a common articulation of this experience to define identities of 
“mobs” of people in this milieu. This manifests itself in a “style” (ibid: 11). Says 
Sansom: “A mob’s style stands for that mob’s accepted and particular ways of doing 
business” (ibid).
On Cape York, von Sturmer found “individual entrepreneurs” militating against the 
growth and stability of “unilineal corporations”, and regional land links providing 
arguably stronger bases for group identity and rights than do local links, according to 
Hiatt (1984: 16-18). Hiatt himself suggests the critical Indigenous process at the 
individual level is competition between agnates. This, he says, “tends towards fission or 
dispersal of agnatic cores, giving rise in the extreme case to individual ownership” of 
land (ibid: 21). But Hiatt points too to how competition is coupled with sharing. He says:
The concept of solidary, inward-looking cohorts of male agnates at most signifies a 
tendency maintained in a state of subordination by the prevalent and presumably more 
successful strategy manifest in ramifying, outward-looking, ego-centred networks of 
reciprocity and mutual aid. Within a finite cognatic and affinal framework, corporate 
agnatic rights to exclude (supposing they exist) are regularly neutralised by individual 
obligations to share (ibid).
Across remote Aboriginal Australia such obligations are frequently fulfilled in almost 
irresistible demands from relatives, broadly defined, to share. Demand sharing is one of 
the main drivers of the Aboriginal kinship economy. Demands are particularly frequent 
and strong when Aboriginal people from the hinterland meet kin in town surrounded by a
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relative abundance of goods. Fulfilling or more rarely denying or deferring the demands 
establishes or negates kinship respectively. Memberships of groups shift accordingly. 
First demands test kinship, relatedness, identity, as do demands for the original sharing to 
be repaid in some roughly equivalent way, and so on. Here demand sharing is linked to 
David Martin’s notion of assertive equalitarianism. And there is always, to repeat 
Schwab, a calculus of reciprocity: if I don’t share now, who will I turn to in my time of 
need? Nicolas Peterson believes demand sharing’s potential as an “index” of social 
relations is “powerfully inculcated” (Peterson 1993: 863) at a very early age in 
Aboriginal society. The flow of royalties is significant now in the activation of this 
potential (ibid: 868).
Another key driver of the Aboriginal kinship economy is allocative power. Gerritsen has 
studied this \ closely in communities in the Katherine region of the NT where he 
distinguishes between dominant men and prominent men. Both are individual 
entrepreneurs in networks of kin. “For the sake of their prestige and power the dominant 
men have to keep up the flow of benefits to their families and retinues”, says Gerritsen 
(1982: 18). Much of the political power of the dominant men is based on their “allocative 
control” of vehicles (ibid: 24). Here it helped that they often controlled community 
councils before the advent of region-wide shires in the NT. ‘Owning’ an outstation 
provided prominent men, meanwhile, with their own access to government funding, 
“thereby circumventing the dominant men-controlled council” (ibid: 26). Gerritsen 
suggests Commonwealth and Territory government disengagement from the communities 
concerned, without a diminution of government funding to them, led to largely 
unchecked allocative power there (ibid: 20,25,31). Only adding to this power, in part of 
his research area at least, has been the effect of large volumes of royalty and affected area 
payments over time.
The undiminished flow of funds here is significant. But so is the fact that the flow 
nevertheless remains intermittent, as with royalty and affected area payments, and/or 
insufficient alone, like individual welfare payments, to cater for the needs of growing 
Aboriginal communities. That is, the Aboriginal kinship economy, with its demand
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sharing and allocative power machinations, would not be as strong if such funds that 
lubricate it always met all needs or these funds were supplemented by wages for many 
more community members. Raising welfare payments (or increasing the frequency of 
royalty and like payments) would, however, further diminish the incentive to earn a wage 
in the few available jobs in communities. Thus, through the Indigenous right to demand 
and the obligation and power to allocate services and things as still relatively scarce 
resources drawn from the wider welfare economy in which many Aboriginal people 
subsist, kin relations are formed, reformed and confirmed. Collective identity is in this 
way shaped according to the kinship economy. Now more than ever Aboriginal groups 
should be seen as a “social accomplishment” (Myers 1986: 72) in Myers’ words.
The process of cultural match in the case studies
\
Just as royalties from land usage are now part of the above machinations, so too, of 
course, are rents to Aboriginal groups from land. And not just when the group simply 
divides the rent between members for their individual benefit. Aspects of contemporary 
cultural process are apparent in the CLC’s Rent Project’s CD processes, in particular its 
distribution of much of the rent to three different communities each year. Here we see 
negotiated if not demanded sharing and the use of allocative power to finalise the annual 
choice of three from what is always a longer list communities in contention. And in this, 
in turn, we see some balance in the autonomy-relatedness dynamic, where autonomy is 
represented by the communities and relatedness is represented in the primary participant 
group.
One middle-aged man is perhaps most powerful within the Rent Project’s traditional 
owner/primary participant group because of his ability to operate effectively in quite high 
stakes intercultural fora. Liaising with government departments at an unusually high level 
is just part of this. His traditional ownership credentials in terms of the ALRA are 
meanwhile not universally accepted. This did not restrict his success in winning support 
from the group to choose his community for project funding to establish a small store 
there one year. At the year’s first traditional owner meeting for the project he
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ambiguously suggested withdrawal of his community from consideration as one of those 
to receive funding. He then claimed this was carelessly misinterpreted by the meeting’s 
conveners, ie. CLC CD Unit staff, and thus his community would unfairly miss out on 
funding. While collecting a sympathy vote from the group here, the man proceeded to 
remind the group how often he supported other communities with which they are 
associated, and not just within the project’s auspices, a clear allusion to his allocative 
power. In Sansom’s terms, this was performative kinship laid bare, involving service and 
indebtedness for service provided. The store is nearing completion.
Two women, here called Barbara and Joanie, are undisputed members of the traditional 
owner/primary participant group in the Rent Project and leaders in their respective small 
communities hundreds of kilometers apart. The following year, these two communities 
V were among those shortlisted for project funding, though neither was certain to be among 
the three chosen at the relevant traditional owner meeting. The older woman, Barbara, 
suddenly withdrew her community, at which point Joanie insisted instead her community 
withdraw, crossing it out on the whiteboard at the front of the meeting and thereby 
implicitly reinstating Barbara’s community. The group was apparently suitably 
impressed, clearly now sympathetic to both women and their communities. The group 
chose Barbara’s community for Rent Project funding that year and put Joanie’s 
community on the top of the list for the year after, in the process confirming the women’s 
place in the group along with the man mentioned above. Here was both performative 
kinship and strategic sharing or the calculus of reciprocity in the project, as Schwab 
might call it.
But what has come of it? What of the legitimacy of the Rent Project derived from 
progressing it this way?
“Things are happening. I want to keep seeing it like this,” says one member of the 
traditional owner/primary participant group in the Rent Project. “I reckon that’s a really 
good idea using rent money,” says another in specific reference to rent used to help build 
a store in her community while facilitating store management focused on healthy food.
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Yet the rent spent at Barbara’s community -  an outstation -  may ultimately be wasted. 
Barbara has since suffered a stroke and cannot live at her outstation. Relatives who were 
inclined to live there are not so keen if she is not there. Besides, they are required to help 
look after her in a larger community nearby. With her outstation now vacant more often 
than not, an airconditioning unit installed as part of the Rent Project has been stolen. NT­
wide, most of those still interested in living the outstation movement are now often 
elderly and frail like Barbara. Her predicament throws into shaqi relief the sustainability 
or otherwise of the movement, with or without rent, royalty and affected area payment 
support, in the CLC’s work in general.
The Royalty Project has also got things done. Less tangible but no less significant than 
the examples in chapter 4 is the project’s role in steadily building the capacity of key 
members of the Indigenous education organisation on the project’s advisory committee. 
Too frequently, however, project deliberations have become snared on a concept I will 
simply call Tjukurpa. If the continuing dynamic Aboriginal cultural processes I have 
been at pains to foreground might be called low culture with reference again to Stanner’s 
residuum, Tjukurpa is high culture in comparison, albeit decontextualised and rendered 
somewhat intercultural in its collaboration with an urban based dance company. 
Tjurkurpa is essentially concerned with transmitting publicly known and accessible 
aspects of Aboriginal law from elders to children and youth via dance festivals around 
Dreaming themes in Royalty Project Community A, one of the four large communities in 
which the Royalty Project is active. It is credited with increasing school attendance there 
at certain times of the year, though Tjukurpa is actually articulated as traditional 
Aboriginal education ultimately towards essentialised Aboriginal adults. Indeed, an 
organiser has suggested other forms of education only raise pseudo Aborigines in Royalty 
Project Community A, while Tjukurpa is implicitly part of their ancient identity. 
Strategically, it is a chance to show governments that “we are still a tribal people”, 
according to a community leader. According to the Tjukurpa business plan 2008-2011, 
the concept is said to reflect the “peculiarity” of the culture of the relevant language 
group, what makes them “who they are, and who they have been for thousands of years”. 
Central here are what are expressed in the business plan as the five elements of the
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culture: “Land, Law, Language, Ceremony and Kinship (Skin)”. As so expressed, they 
are typical of socio-cultural reification in the Aboriginal domain. Expressed through what 
Mantziaris and David Martin call positive law, the elements of Indigenous land, law and 
kinship in particular come together in juridification, as they do in Melanesia. All five 
elements resonate across the relevant language group and with those working with the 
group on the Royalty Project and on other projects. But the resonance seems strongest in 
Royalty Project Community A, home of Tjukurpa.
The Royalty Project’s traditional owner/primary participant group comes together as the 
trustee for the project in the form of Royalty Project Association 1. At one trustee 
meeting to approve project initiatives, the most vocal proponent of Tjukurpa attending 
held the initiatives up to this yardstick, as readers will recall kastom is said to be used to 
judge innovation in Vanuatu. He betrayed what Merlan considers is a common tendency 
to consider the Dreaming the sole Aboriginal resource available to meet change (Merlan 
1998: 233), despite the contradictions in this. Why isn’t the Royalty Project prioritising 
funding for Tjukurpa? he wanted to know. Also showing the common tendency, the large 
NGO now managing the Royalty Project Early Childhood Health and Education program 
warned in its program assessment report that the program will be adversely affected if 
Culture (written with a capital c) is not prioritised. This is because early childhood 
development in the project area is, the report said, founded on and led by this culture. 
Enhancing children’s participation in what it called Culture activities will be an important 
contribution to the early childhood program, the report claimed in a way that recalls 
Brady’s analysis of Aboriginal health policy in chapter 3. Tjukurpa would no doubt count 
as such a culture activity. So too a ‘skin groups landscaping and environment program’ 
planned at the school in Royalty Project Community A, what may turn out to be training 
in land related conflict later in life: the program is planned to include a garden plot for 
each skin or subsection group of kin, paired couples of which are locally associated with 
certain Dreamings, and a competition between them for the best plot. That is, the 
tendency towards the traditional in the community strongly converges with that towards 
the local. In fact, work now planned on the governance structure of Tjukurpa reflects 
some concern within the relevant language group that Tjukurpa is controlled by one
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family in Royalty Project Community A. Approval was ultimately granted for all the 
Royalty Project initiatives presented at the trustee meeting mentioned here. One initiative 
was ultimately presented as providing for the infonnal incorporation of Tjukurpa. Failure 
to do so clearly put the Royalty Project at some risk. Resolution had been reached, but 
cultural match hardly so.
Compared, the CLC’s Rent Project can be said to approximate good cultural match 
because of a degree of accord with contemporary Aboriginal socio-cultural processes 
along with the legitimacy that comes with getting things done, as the Harvard Project 
puts it. In its processes, the Rent Project generally avoids the factors of socio-cultural 
reification, juridification and entification that contribute to localism at the expense of 
relatedness. There is more autonomy-relatedness balance. The Dreaming is rarely, if ever,
mentioned in Rent Project deliberations of the traditional owners concerned. There is no
V
sense that this law is the sole Aboriginal resource available to meet change. Writing on 
compensation for impaired or extinguished native title rights, Smith says “the eternal law 
of the Dreaming” should be seen as a theory of existence that assists Aboriginal groups to 
negotiate change as continuity (Smith 2001a: 7). Smith says that “within a spiritually 
sanctioned view of the law as unchanging, in everyday life there is a fluid ‘here and now’ 
quality in which behaviour and events are actively interpreted, negotiated and 
manipulated in the shadow of the law” (ibid). It is in the shadow of the Dreaming rather 
than following the letter of this law that the CLC’s Rent Project might be said to operate. 
The Royalty Project’s now tentative support for Tjukurpa, as a conduit of 
intergenerational knowledge, might be further compared with the Rent Project’s 
wholehearted support for the above-mentioned social history database, one of the things 
the latter project has done since starting in 2005. The Rent Project’s traditional owner 
group keenly approved the roll-out of the database with rent money in four far-flung NT 
communities, one where these traditional owners are not even the majority of the 
residents. Over computer monitors in each of these communities, the young now help the 
old with modem technology and the old pass on social history via this technology. There 
is a sense of defiance in this of the very legislation that facilitates the rent, defines 
traditional owner and thus largely defines NT Aboriginal identity, the ALRA. This
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legislation, particularly in its significant contribution to juridification, provides for a 
cultural half-match at best within the Aboriginal domain.
Traditional Aboriginal owner
The ALRA defines “traditional Aboriginal owners” in relation to land as:
a local descent group of Aboriginals who (a) have common spiritual affiliations to a site 
on the land, being affiliations that place the group under a primary spiritual responsibility 
for that site and for the land; and (b) are entitled by Aboriginal tradition to forage as of 
right over that land (ALRA: Section 3(1)).
As early as 1984 Keen suggested this is “at best inadequate to describe the system of land 
tenure o f any region, and at worst, false” (Keen 1984: 26); and Smith was advocating a 
“comprehensive reassessment” of the adequacy of the definition (Smith 1984: 86). It, she 
said, “helps create closed, entrenched networks of traditional owners through time; and, 
correspondingly, continued dependency and disadvantage among those on the economic 
and political periphery” (ibid: 96), ie. those Aboriginal people who do not fit the 
definition. Smith’s subtext refers to the restriction of the socio-cultural processes that 
constitute networks of wider relatedness. The clear implication is the development 
restriction that is placed on those excluded when the networks are cut, to again borrow 
from Bainton on Melanesia.
NT Aboriginal people have arrived at this development predicament because of a cultural 
half-match at best. Kenneth Maddock observes the irony that:
the land rights agitation, litigation and inquiries of the 1960s and 1970s, which 
culminated in the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976, raise a question 
of the extent to which justice can be or has been done to the traditional ideas and relations 
and the denial or neglect of which gave rise to the agitation, litigation, and inquiries 
(Maddock 1982: 56).
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The litigation Maddock refers to is the Gove case as a test of the extent to which 
Aboriginal law, particularly as it relates directly to land, matches western property law. 
The Yolngu plaintiffs lost the case. Of the inquiries Maddock refers to, the Woodward 
Commission that led to the ALRA is the most significant. Maddock notes that ultimately 
the ALRA had to establish for NT land a legal and administrative framework responsive 
to both government and NT Aboriginal people, “within which title to land can be held 
and powers of decision over land exercised” (ibid: 73). It had to be acceptable to other 
stakeholders, or potential stakeholders, in the land and the wider electorate as well as the 
Aboriginal people. For this it had to be intelligible. In land rights and native title claims, 
Merlan points to the “paucity of anthropological terms available to interpret the character 
of contemporary Aboriginal socio-political formations” in a way that is sufficiently 
intelligible and persuasive to all parties to secure success for the Aboriginal applicants or 
claimants (Merlan 1998: 173). Mantziaris and David Martin identify a “jural paradigm” 
in anthropology in which it is assumed that Aboriginal traditional laws and customs 
constitute an Indigenous legal system, in turn producing an expectation that the system 
can be expressed in terms and concepts recognised by lawyers at large (Mantziaris and 
Martin, D. 2000: 39). This certainly produces vast amounts of documentation, 
particularly in land/native title claims, itself contributing to changes in Aboriginal 
practices still otherwise largely learnt orally (ibid: 41-43).
To an extent the jural paradigm is unavoidable. As Smith observes, “in order for native 
title to be recognised by the common law, the facts of native title have to be determined 
through translation from one cultural domain (Aboriginal law and custom) to another 
(Australian common law)” (Smith 2001a: 31). And here much has been said of the so- 
called recognition space in native title (ibid). Fundamentally, however, the ALRA in fact 
established rights that did not exist traditionally precisely because the circumstances 
requiring them did not arise before contact (Maddock 1983: 219). Maddock suggests 
much of the problem in this legislation stems from its use of the terms ‘owner’ and 
‘rights’ where ‘interests’ in land may have been preferable (ibid: 212-214). He says the 
ALRA “appears in the nature of a quest for the proprietor of an estate in fee simple in 
English land law and is accordingly unable to accept that traditionally there is a plurality
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of ‘rights’” (Maddock 1982: 71). The problem may have been avoided by removing 
reference to tradition. As discussed, Woodward in the Woodward Commission 
entertained the idea of Aboriginal residential communities holding title to land granted 
under the ALRA. Maddock says the problem then would have been reduced to 
reconciling the interests of people native to land with the interests of settlers where settler 
and native alike are Aboriginal (ibid: 75). Residential communities of course include 
both. In the end reconciliation came in the ALRA requirement that NT land councils 
protect the interests of and consult with Aboriginal communities or groups affected by 
land use proposals -  so-called affected communities like the eight in the CLC’s AAP 
Project -  in addition to the local descent group or clan said to own the land (ALRA: 
Section 23). Yet in isolating the local descent group as the only owners, Woodward’s 
efforts to make Aboriginal land tenure and Western property law compatible ultimately 
infused the former with essential elements of the latter, namely exclusivity. As Sylvie 
Poirier observes in both the Canadian and Australian contexts, the judicial structures that 
circumscribe Indigenous rights and titles generally reflect Western fundamentals of land 
property, and exclusive occupation is one of these (Poirier 2010: 43). Genealogical 
descent is another, she says (ibid). Juridification easily becomes entification through the 
notion of exclusivity.
That the ALRA, through Woodward, ultimately privileged the local descent group in 
Aboriginal land ownership and with this Aboriginal localism more generally is an 
outcome Maddock largely puts down to the weight of anthropological opinion at the time 
(Maddock 1982: 73 and Maddock 1983: 215). That this opinion remained fundamentally 
loyal to Radcliffe-Brown’s structural functionalist model of Aboriginal land tenure is 
clear in the above definition of traditional Aboriginal land ownership in the ALRA and 
has been widely commented on, by Hiatt for example (1984: 12). Maddock suggests the 
other major influence on this outcome was the “political calculation that a definitive 
assertion of Aboriginal ownership was needed if land rights were to be accepted in the 
wider community” (Maddock 1983: 223). Tradition, in terms of religious responsibilities 
passed on by descent, could provide this definitive assertion and simultaneously limit 
those who could make the assertion in land claims in a way that mere residence on or
121
even historical links with the land could not. Reference to ‘group’ ensured no one 
Aboriginal person alone can aspire to own land under the ALRA. On the other hand, 
reference to the local signalled that not only are those equipped with quite discrete 
traditions at an advantage over those without in the ALRA, but a narrow, localised, 
interpretation of descent vis-a-vis land means traditional owners are “better off the fewer 
they are”, especially if the land generates some revenue (Maddock 1982: 69). The 
message sent back to potential investors in the land was equally, if not more, important, 
as 1 explain in the next chapter.
Statutory and vernacular traditional owners
Maddock makes a useful distinction between legal or statutory, anthropological and 
“vernacular” traditional Aboriginal owners of land. He says in this distinction “the 
‘owners’ (or ‘bosses’) of Aboriginal usage could be described as vernacular owners. The 
‘traditional Aboriginal owners’ of the Act could be described as statutory traditional 
owners. The ‘owners’ of anthropological usage would be owners anthropologically 
conceived” (Maddock 1983: 216). Whereas Keen recommends in future law writing we 
“leave anthropological language out altogether” (Keen 1984: 43), Peterson notes that 
“anthropologists are calling on phenomenology (ie. a focus on lived experience) to 
combat the narrow legal discourse” (Peterson 2008: 194) within which the notion of 
Aboriginal land owner has hitherto been anthropologically conceived. Musharbash 
(2008) is a recent example of the call. In this, the owner of anthropological usage 
converges with Maddock’s vernacular owners, in the consequently minimally distorted 
“emic Aboriginal systems” Paul Memmott and his co-authors discuss in the context of a 
regional approach to managing Aboriginal land title on Cape York, for instance 
(Memmott et al 2007: 275).
We can summarise and generalise such systems as a social sphere characterised by the 
now well-known autonomy-relatedness dynamic, where relatedness is region-wide; by 
sharing, including demand sharing; by high mobility to maintain relatedness or escape its 
demands to places of relative autonomy; and by “struggles to gain allocative power over
122
invariably scarce resources” (Tonkinson 2007: 49). It is a sphere in which ownership of 
land and the collective Aboriginal identity that comes of it is shaped in discourse, 
negotiation and action; in short, in process. It is half a world away from the one 
privileged in the institutions and imperatives of self-determination policy, including land 
rights -  the statutory traditional owner sphere. Some vernacular/anthropological 
traditional owners also occupy the sphere of statutory traditional owners with an identity' 
matched to the self-determination imperatives and institutions -  the ALRA, incorporated 
Aboriginal entities, outstations. Directly associated with land rights and thus entitlements, 
or at least funded opportunities through the entities (and to a lesser extent now the 
outstations), it is inevitably this identity that NT Aboriginal people are most self- 
conscious of. Among layers of identity, it is now their primary one, fixed and finite in 
thousands of locally emplaced versions continuing to proliferate across the NT and 
beyond.
One version -  one such entity -  intersects with the CLC’s Rent Project. The traditional 
owners who are the primary participant group in this project also come together outside 
the project as what I have called Rent Association 1. Beyond the intersection these are 
quite separate spheres, except perhaps when it comes to outstations in the Rent Project. 
The association distributes approximately $lm  of the rent annually to traditional owner 
family heads as per Figures 1 and 2. In this guise, the group is part of the statutory 
traditional ownership sphere in which identity -  of the right people to receive this money 
-  is matched to self-determination institutions and imperatives. For instance, it has been 
the subject of reviews, or quite frequent calls from within or from CLC staff for reviews, 
of the traditional ownership credentials of its members according to the definition of 
traditional Aboriginal owners in the ALRA and its emphasis on the local descent group. 
Members of Rent Association 1 are fairly frequently accused of being the wrong people 
by those seeking a more exclusive membership. Murmurings of such accusations are 
sometimes heard when this same group meets more as vernacular owners, to maintain 
Maddock’s distinction, in order to make key decisions in the Rent Project. But here the 
murmurings are short lived and the meetings move on.
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Before the meetings had moved the project very far, the group tried to move the project 
under the control of Rent Association 1, into its sphere. This initially seemed sensible to 
the CLC. The idea seemed an efficient one and conducive to building the capacity of the 
association if association meetings could distribute rent to family heads and make 
decisions about community development with the remainder of the money 
simultaneously at the same meetings. Perhaps most importantly, it was thought this might 
further self-determination of this entity: the association would more completely control 
significant funds for the benefit of its members in the form of the combined rent, as 
opposed to the CLC effectively co-managing much of it, namely that portion for 
community development.
While these considerations remained unresolved, the CLC’s CD Unit continued to co­
manage this CD portion of the rent with the relevant traditional owners under the Rent 
Project, arguing that here the traditional owners would remain consistently and 
productively in control of key decisions through the project’s governance arrangements. 
In this co-management, the CD Unit was able to bring its expertise to bear to achieve 
relatively quick and tangible outcomes in the project -  to get things done, in the language 
of the Harvard Project research into cultural match. This had the significant result of 
building the traditional owners’ confidence in the Rent Project and their willingness to 
continue to participate through the governance arrangements. Here they see legitimacy in 
the governance because it can deliver. The traditional owners then seemed to compare the 
project governance arrangements and results with those involved in the annual 
distribution of $lm  in rent to their family heads via Rent Association 1. This money 
generally goes to buy used cars that most acknowledge may be even more quickly 
obtained and more tangible but do not last long. The traditional owners evidently now 
want to keep these arrangements separate, as talk of Rent Association 1 controlling the 
Rent Project has ceased. Rent Association 1 has no involvement in the Rent Project. 
Conversely, Royalty Project Association 1, the trustee in the Royalty Project, retains a 
high level of control there, providing final funding approval for project initiatives as the 
primary participant group (see Figure 4). With Royalty Association l ’s membership 
closely wedded through its rules to the definition of traditional Aboriginal land owner in
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the ALRA, this project remains in significant ways confined, or at least matched, to the 
statutory traditional ownership sphere and its strong tendency towards the local. Because 
this tendency is at the expense of relatedness, there is what I have called a cultural half­
match at best. Juridification is the key factor in this case.
In chapter 1 I flagged separation as an underlying theme in my thesis. I said that 
overcoming profound separations is critical to improvements in Aboriginal communities 
through community development, eg. the separation of some Aboriginal people from 
other Aboriginal people, tradition from modernity, the very disengagement of Aboriginal 
people generally from wider society. The CLC’s Rent Project meanwhile highlights the 
isolated instance in the research where strong separation appears beneficial for the CLC’s 
CD work: the separation of such projects themselves from the distribution of rent and like 
monies to traditional owner individuals or family heads as per Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4. 
Having this distribution separate from the projects seems to quarantine excesses in key 
aspects of contemporary Aboriginal culture, sociality and identity, specifically demand 
sharing and allocative power. The excesses are confined to the distribution to 
individuals/family heads. This leaves the funds in the projects for more sustainable use, 
free of the excessive influence of these aspects. By excessive I mean the sort of 
unrestrained demanding of money, largely installments of rent from nearby Uluru-Kata 
Tjuta National Park, that Smith observed along with some consequences at Mutitjulu 
community, southwest of Alice Springs (Smith 2001b: 17). But I also mean the 
corruption that can come from allocative power. The Rent Project is not entirely free of 
such aspects of contemporary Aboriginal culture, sociality and identity in their more 
benign form; and a complete purge from the project would ultimately be detrimental, 
given the importance of these aspects for remote Aboriginal participants to identify with 
development projects. But the separate rent distribution of $lm annually to family heads 
seems to satisfy most demand sharing and allocative power imperatives such that these 
become manageable in the comparable amount through the Rent Project. In fact, the 
ongoing distribution to family heads at its current amount appears crucial for the success 
of the project. As one member of Rent Association 1, through which the family head 
distribution occurs, put it: the association’s executive supports the project provided the
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family heads continue to receive the same amount between them. Were this support to 
switch to opposition, the project would struggle -  the association’s executive comprises 
key people in the project’s primary participant group, albeit in a quite separate sphere.
Conclusion
As a process that draws on a range of cultural resources to create the legitimacy that 
ultimately comes from project success in the eyes of the participants, cultural match is 
important for sound CD project governance. In this there is necessarily convergence with 
contemporary Aboriginal socio-cultural process, which might then be seen as a key 
resource along with and in relation with those governance resources brought from 
‘outside’. A depth of knowledge of Aboriginal socio-cultural process is, then, critical to 
comprehend and/or facilitate this. In this chapter I have closely examined specific 
processes within the Aboriginal kinship economy against the localised and comparatively 
rigid socio-cultural forms and associated identity arising from Aboriginal self- 
determination policy. Of the key factors in the privileged localism under the policy, I 
focused on juridification and the role of the ALRA in what I have called a cultural half­
match ultimately restricting CD in the NT Aboriginal domain. I introduced the notion of 
the statutory traditional owner sphere through which one might view this half-match. I 
looked at the extent of cultural match among my case studies, with better understanding 
beginning to emerge of their capacity, and thus the capacity of projects like them, to 
improve Aboriginal community conditions. But before I elaborate further on this 
capacity, it is necessary to better understand the extent of the impediments. How exactly 
has the privilege of localism become so widespread? What exactly is it here that projects 
like my case studies are up against across the NT?
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Chapter 7
Certainty
Sociocultural reification, juridification and entification are key factors in local autonomy 
that was privileged during the Aboriginal self-determination era at the expense of the 
relatedness in Aboriginal groups. These factors are contrary to the fluid process implicit 
in the autonomy-relatedness dynamic central to Aboriginal sociality and thus identity. In 
this chapter I examine how the resulting change in groups critical to community 
development has spread to become the norm across the NT Aboriginal domain if not 
beyond, posing a strong and far-reaching impediment to improvements through CD to 
Aboriginal communities. I look first at fundamental workings of the wider capitalist
economy at its intersection with the Aboriginal domain. Here, certainty of land ownership
V
provided by legislated Aboriginal land tenure like that under the ALRA is a key 
consideration ahead of investment in the land. I then move to the realms of the collective 
imagination. I consider mimesis in this context and further state, ideological and 
international influences on identity, leading to an examination of conflict as an important 
example of the impact on CD and on prospects for better Aboriginal community 
conditions.
Investment certainty
In a report towards development reform in the context of land rights in remote Australia, 
Altman, Craig Linkhom and Jennifer Clarke concede that the complexity of Aboriginal 
communal ownership “is likely to reduce the number of people willing to undertake 
major investments on ALRA land” (Altman, Linkhorn and Clarke 2005: 20). As Altman 
observes, obligation between Aboriginal people arguably hampers economic 
development more generally in the Indigenous domain (Altman 2001: 129). As part of 
the kinship economy, it entails the allocation of resources primarily to produce social 
relationships at the expense of profit (Peterson and Taylor 2003: 106). One response 
might be to try to facilitate private ownership in Aboriginal communities, an effort the
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Commonwealth intervention into NT Aboriginal affairs seizure of community land 
appears to precede. Another is the response Smith predicted early in the self- 
determination era: that land councils’ research to determine the traditional owners to 
negotiate with potential investors would become increasingly influenced by such 
commercial interests in the land (Smith 1984: 89) towards certainty above and beyond 
that already built into the ALRA definition of traditional Aboriginal ownership. Says 
Smith: “the fact of the matter is that developers do not like fluid situations and exert 
constant pressure on Land Councils to have lists of owners fixed and therefore finite, and 
to have the same individuals present from one meeting to the next” (ibid: 93) in the 
negotiations. That pressure to curtail Aboriginal socio-cultural process is transferred to 
land council staff anthropologists from those staff liaising most closely with the 
developers. It can remain long after negotiations are complete, when the development 
context has significantly changed from a commercial development proposal, phase to a 
community development phase.
In this way, recent CLC staff anthropologist advice that the traditional owners in the 
Royalty Project in fact constitute a relatively inclusive group, as expressed by the group 
itself, has been questioned by other staff who have suggested that a more experienced 
consultant anthropologist be hired to canvass the exclusion of certain ‘managers’. 
Managers, often known by other Aboriginal English terms too, are typically those who 
trace their links to the relevant land through females of the descent group, though the 
terms are frequently extended by the group to certain other individuals. Maddock had 
managers in mind when he rued the lack of recognition in the ALRA of a plurality of 
rights, as above (Maddock 1983: 221). And some ALRA land claims have now 
succeeded with managers, as well as those tracing patrilineal descent, in the claimant 
group, ie. the group asserted and accepted as the local descent group of traditional 
owners. The managers in question with respect to the Royalty Project traditional owner 
group happen to be people with limited knowledge necessary to prove common spiritual 
affiliations to a site on the relevant land as required of traditional owners in the ALRA 
definition. They are relatively urbanised. Limited site knowledge, however, is not 
necessarily a handicap in their contribution to the Royalty Project. Nor, as the project
128
governance arrangements outlined in chapter 4 show, does it necessarily preclude their 
membership of Royalty Project Association 1. They wish to remain association members, 
and thus part of the project’s primary participant group. It remains to be seen whether or 
not on more experienced anthropological advice they will be removed from the 
membership, and the implications for the association and the project. But the scenario is 
again reminiscent of the declining fortunes of Gagudgu Association as described in 
chapter 3, an organisation once comprising a relatively wide community of interest well 
placed to facilitate sustainable development using monies from mining.
Over ten years ago, Merlan was sure the majority of the then recent works providing any 
insight into Aboriginal social organisation showed “the inappropriateness of identifying 
any single, definitively bounded group associated with a particular tract of land in a 
single way that is relevant for all purposes” (Merlan 1996: 166). Yet the local descent 
group or clan model captured in the ALRA is nevertheless now quite liberally applied 
even where it might not be mandatory. Put simply, as Merlan puts it, “the clan model 
makes it possible to project who will be in and who will be out” (ibid: 168) of 
negotiations towards land use agreements and in or out of the group of Indigenous 
beneficiaries of these agreements. That is, after helping to resolve land claims the clan 
model provides certainty of group membership into the future. It is predictable, which is 
attractive for long term investments and to the beneficiaries where the benefits are 
provided over successive years or indeed are intergenerational. Descent of course enables 
this predictability in a way that land links like residence cannot, especially given the high 
mobility of the people concerned or their permanent residence often now well away from 
the land. And predictability is further improved when descent is associated with reified 
tradition among the shifting mix of socio-cultural beliefs, values and practices. Says 
Merlan, invoking monetary predictability and particularly the hard, set nature of metal 
money:
In order to qualify for consideration or restorative measures under the terms of 
indigenous disadvantage, one must be able to imagine a domain of the indigenous.
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Around this is formulated and contested a currency of indigeneity, and ‘tradition’ is its 
coin” (Merlan 2006: 101).
Developers’ demand for such certainty going forward is by no means confined to 
commercial development in the resources sector. As Merlan suggests above, to an extent 
it underlies all development in the broadest sense to address Indigenous disadvantage. 
Development providers in this endeavour will always want some certainty as to who 
qualifies for the provision, whether in collective land rights or in some other form, lest 
they are expected to provide for all forever. And as Keir Martin found in PNG, 
sometimes the disadvantaged will of course seek such certainty themselves individually, 
in property transactions for instance (Martin, K. 2007: 52-54).
But rarely is the intensity, impact and perceived immediate potential of development as 
great, the risk to the investment as great, as with large scale resource extraction. In much 
of the developing world, and on communally owned Aboriginal Freehold land or land 
where there are native title rights and interests in remote Australia, just who resource 
extraction companies strike agreements with must be certain in order to “generate 
workable consent” (Merlan 2006: 99), ie. group cohesion and consensus about this 
development proceeding. Weiner and Glaskin believe arrangements towards certainty of 
communal land ownership in both PNG and Australia are in this way “inexorably slanted 
towards the requirements of the resource industry to deliver the financial benefits of 
extractive projects” (Weiner and Glaskin 2007: 5). Unrest around such development is 
inimical to certainty, as dramatically demonstrated around mines in PNG from time to 
time. Where there are the means of redress for the recipients in one form or another, 
companies must be certain who to pay to extract or redress will delay and/or further cost 
the company. They must be as certain as possible there will be no additional, 
unpredictable claims for payment in the future in order to maintain a profit margin. In the 
company board room, the so-called social contract involved here is very much about risk 
management.
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The commercial quest for certainty, especially in the again booming resources sector, 
goes far to properly explaining widespread identity associated with privileged localism in 
Aboriginal sociality. But there is yet more to this than commercial certainty. Rowse 
observes that, “while the apportioning of real property is open to (indeed, depends upon) 
precise delimiting of boundaries, the demarcation of jurisdictions within a nation-state is 
not straightforward” (Rowse 2007: 53). There are other significant sources of separation 
or demarcation in the Indigenous domain. These also influence the widespread 
impediment to CD posed by privileged localism, and I turn to them now.
Imagination and mimesis
At a community meeting to establish the AAP Project in AAP Project Community A, 
discussion inevitably turned to outstations. One community member responded to the 
crowd that now “outstations are in your dreams”, suggesting the project would limit 
support for outstations. The project has indeed narrowed the scope for such support 
because the support had been used for individual benefit contrary to the rules of AAP 
Project Association 1 through which the project funds are paid. Another community 
member spoke of the need for the project to respect Dreamings. He was reminded that 
AAP Project Association 1 is not about these ancient traditions but about contemporary 
residential communities affected by mining, as per chapter 4. That is, the interests of 
people associated with the tracks of Dreaming beings do not prevail in the association 
over wide benefit to all community residents, somewhat contrary to the self- 
determination model of Aboriginal civil society. These exchanges, snippets of a long and 
difficult meeting, reflect Austin-Broos’ comments above on Aboriginal and non- 
Aboriginal “imagineries” colliding in remote Aboriginal Central Australia and those of 
Keesing and Bainton in the South Pacific context.
After the self-determination decades, it is difficult for the CLC’s constituents to shift 
from an articulation of their identity based on ancient traditions, particularly locally 
emplaced traditions, to a more contemporary and inclusive articulation. The difficulty 
ensures life is turbulent, as Austin-Broos said of Arremte life above. Via socio-cultural
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reification, juridification and entification, the CLC’s constituents are subjects of localism 
privileged during the self-determination era. And while the prize of significantly 
improved living conditions has proved elusive, many Aboriginal people have been 
rewarded, in funding for a proliferation of autonomous, locally-focused incorporated 
entities for instance. Rowse reminds that:
because ‘self-determination’ postulates ‘cultural difference’ as something to be respected 
in public policy as much as possible, it has been pertinent to ask whether or not 
Indigenous Australians, when they incorporate, are being forced into adopting certain 
social conventions characteristic of European Australians (Rowse 2005: 213).
This echoes the enforcement central to the definition I have used of juridification, but
inducement might actually be closer to the mark.
\
Reward for localism has come too in the way of successful land claims which rely on an 
articulation of Aboriginal land tenure based on locally emplaced traditions consistent 
with the ALRA definition of traditional Aboriginal land owner. Merlan sees Aboriginal 
land rights as “instantiation of an increasingly imitative rather than overtly coercive 
relationship between Aborigines and the nation-state” (Merlan 1998: 151). Aboriginal 
identity has in this relationship become profoundly mimetic, she believes. Through 
mimesis, articulations of Aboriginality “as made most powerfully by others” profoundly 
affect “who and what Aborigines consider themselves to be” (Merlan 1998: 150). To 
Merlan, land rights, for all the benefits, is an example of mimesis as a “social 
technology” in self-determination’s disengaged management of Aboriginal people, 
generating new conceptions of Aboriginal self-hood in relation to the Australian nation 
(ibid: 175,180,235). Similarly, Rowse believes “the local Indigenous group” has become 
important to the very process of government, involving “the formation of new ‘selves’ 
who can practice ‘self-determination’” (Rowse 1998a: 217). But to Merlan, the 
management of Aboriginal people is via what is expressed as Indigenous social 
organisation. In this, she notes, there are parallels between Aboriginal self-determination 
and the indirect rule once practiced in other colonies, by Britain in colonial India for 
instance (Merlan 1998: 152). Yet again the parallels are plain in Melanesia now,
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especially in relation to mining, where Jorgensen notes that “official preferences for 
defining land rights through clanship show a remarkable ability to elicit local responses 
that produce landowning clans on demand” (Jorgensen 2007: 66). Such responses are 
frequently “far removed from traditional ideas about the relation between land rights and 
collective identities” (ibid). Socio-cultural reification, juridification and entification are 
key factors but mimesis is clearly at play too.
Then NT Government minister John Ah Kit dug up the colonial roots of this mimesis in 
the Aboriginal domain when he addressed the NT Local Government Association in 2003 
on his government’s Building Stronger Regions strategy which ushered in shires in place 
of local councils in the NT. An Aboriginal man, Ah Kit told the association “there is a 
completely false view that Aboriginal communities, from outstations and pastoral 
excisions, to larger communities and townships -  through indeed to inhabitants of towns 
and cities -  exist in splendid isolation from each other. It is a view based on colonialist 
notions” (cited in Sanders 2005: 59).
Might, then, the AAP Project Community A member’s comments about outstations being 
in the community’s dreams be differently interpreted? Perhaps he meant the sharp focus 
of self-determination on outstations here and elsewhere is part of a form of Aboriginal 
identity that is in a sense imaginary. Benedict Anderson’s book ‘Imagined Communities’ 
(1983) explains how the formulation of identity in the collective imagination occurs in 
colonisation. His chapter Census, Map and Museum is most insightful. It reflects 
standard documentation in ALRA land claims: claimant profiles, these a form of census 
prepared from comprehensive genealogies; sacred site maps; and site registers on which 
Anderson’s ‘museums’ would not be out of place. This claim documentation is frequently 
organised in terms of associated local descent group or clan estates.
Anderson says the “fiction” of the census is its claim to account for everyone in the target 
population, and that all those counted have one -  and only one -  very clear place. There 
are no “fractions” (ibid: 166), no uncertainty that may upset a sense of consolidation in 
space and time. Like censuses, Anderson believes European-style maps worked towards a
133
“totalizing classification” (ibid: 173), by implication further consolidating space in the 
colonies. He notes that so-called historical maps of colonies, especially in the late 
nineteenth century, were designed to prove the antiquity of specific, tightly bounded -  ie. 
localised -  territorial units there (ibid: 175). They facilitated “a sort of politico- 
biographical narrative” of the colonial realm, adopted, and often adapted, by the nation 
states that succeeded colonial regimes (ibid). Increasingly linked to tourism, state- 
sponsored monumental archaeology -  the museums of Anderson’s chapter heading -  
allowed the state to appear as the guardian of tradition (ibid: 181). These “old sacred 
sites” were incoiporated into the maps “and their ancient prestige (which, if this had 
disappeared, as it often had, the state would attempt to revive) draped around the 
mappers” (ibid: 181,182). Together, census, map and museum provided:
a totalizing classificatory grid, which could be applied with endless flexibility to anything 
under the state's real or contemplated control: peoples, regions, religions, languages, 
products, monuments and so forth. The effect of the grid was always to be able to say of 
anything that it was this, not that; it belonged here, not there. It was bounded, 
determinate, and therefore - in principle -  countable (ibid: 184).
Countable meant manageable, to say nothing of the potential in the grid for divide and 
rule. In the current PNG mining context, Jorgensen replaces countable with ‘legible’, 
where the “apparatus of legibility” similarly includes making maps, conducting censuses 
and collecting genealogies (Jorgensen 2007: 63); and where “creating legibility entails 
state simplification of sociai practices in the form of a standard grid whereby these can be 
recorded and monitored” (ibid: 57).
Especially with heightened globalisation, there are in fact unpredictable effects, in what 
Peterson refers to as “the politics of indigenism” (Peterson 1999: 850) for instance. In 
this, Aboriginal activists have argued, often on a world stage, for a distinctive Indigenous 
status, including protection for a unique cultural heritage, as Fourth World peoples in a 
first world state (ibid: 849). The response from the Australian public via the legislature 
has been to seek to limit the recognition of difference, and thus rights and entitlements, to 
extreme difference reflected in supposedly authentic practices (ibid: 858) earned out by
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so-called traditional Aboriginal people in remote areas. Peterson suggests this can cause 
urbanised Aboriginal people to creatively reconstitute relationships to place and heritage 
modeled on what they consider to be authentic practice, thus strengthening and further 
entrenching, but also transferring to new sites, the very cultural difference the state is 
seeking to contain spacially and conceptually (ibid). These relationships are often 
articulated and defended in terms of exclusive, bounded, localised group ownership of 
land, an important marker of what might be said to be imagined difference across 
Aboriginal Australia. I now further explore such complexities and their implications at 
the intersection of the national, the international and the local.
The state, nationalism and international influences on identity
In compensating for a lack of original spiritual connection with the country, Bauman 
believes non-Aboriginal Australians have “discovered the difference of the imagined 
exotic and primitive traditional, tribal, full blood, ‘real Aborigine’ of a northern outback 
Frontier” (Bauman 2006: 324). According to Beckett, this has occurred in the context of 
so-called welfare colonialism. Coined in connection with the Canadian north (Beckett 
1989: 122), Beckett says welfare colonialism is the state’s strategy for managing 
persistent Aboriginal social problems, despite rights, within a wealthy liberal democratic 
society (Beckett 1989: 122). Beckett specifically links the concept, and its influence on 
identity, to Anderson’s notion of imagined communities above. At this ideological level, 
he says in welfare colonialism “the ‘native’ who once stood in opposition to the ‘settler’ 
and outside the pale of society undergoes an apotheosis to emerge as its original citizen” 
(ibid). This recalls Filer on PNG above. The difference between Aboriginal people that 
Bauman speaks of became most pronounced when the Australian state first grappled with 
welfare and other entitlements for them, according to Beckett. While almost anyone who 
identified as Aboriginal was accepted as such by those working to assist them, he says “it 
was the traditionally oriented Aborigines of the centre and north who held the public 
imagination and sympathy” (ibid: 130). This general public ‘group think’ is what is 
significant here. It can lead to policy based on little more than a collective sense of guilt 
or a ‘fair go’.
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To Merlan, the imagining of the ‘real Aborigine’ accords with the ideology of Australians 
generally as a people ‘on the land’, the strength of which lies partly in our “positive 
moral valuation of primary production” (Merlan 1998: 159). As tourism now exceeds 
primary production in terms of actual contribution to the economy in parts of northern 
Australia, Aboriginal people are then portrayed to tourists in “fetishized form”, as 
“essential to what the nation is”, according to Merlan (ibid: 161). In national park 
interpretative material, for instance, they are invariably shown as at one with the land 
(ibid), particularly outback land, that land so central to Australian nationalism.
In these ways, Merlan notes that a particular dimension of Aboriginality -  its traditional 
dimension -  has come to be seen as inherent to Australian national identity, some would 
say appropriated, to it (ibid: 234).
This appropriation is a two-way street. With the help of land claims and native title 
claims and their foregrounding of “mimetic approximations of the forms of traditional 
socio-territorial organization”, Merlan believes there is now a “nationlike status of 
Aboriginality writ large” (ibid: 235). Consistent with the politics of indigenism discussed 
above, Indigenous peoples the world over have discovered that national governments 
with whom they must now negotiate for land and other rights sometimes take them more 
seriously if they refer to themselves as nations. There is, then, at least the semblance of 
equality in the negotiations. The nation is here what Poirier calls a “strategy of 
accommodation, resistance and engagement” (Poirier 2010: 48) on the part of Indigenous 
people in Australia and Canada vis-a-vis the state.
Here unity and continuity of tradition are emphasised but frequently, perhaps predictably, 
the opposites occur. Despite native title applications to prove continuity of connection 
with land, Merlan suggests Aboriginal people are increasingly resigned to a divide 
between their past and the present stimulated by intensified national efforts to reconstitute 
and maintain Aboriginality in particular forms (ibid). Meanwhile Bauman describes the 
tendency in the Katherine area of the NT towards the “Balkanisation” of language groups
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into smaller, more exclusive, nevertheless nation-like component groups identifying with 
discrete blocks of land and drawing heavily on tradition to differentiate themselves and 
their land from others in the wider group (Bauman 2006: 323,325). Group membership is 
determined and denied according to “nationalistic and exclusive eligibility criteria”, says 
Bauman (ibid: 323). Belonging is in fact “institutionalised in the membership criteria of 
the constitutions of legally incorporated associations, and in legal definitions of 
traditional owners and native title holders” (ibid). Royalty Project Association 1 in the 
CLC’s Royalty Project would be at home. It is indeed in this ideological environment in 
which local autonomy is privileged that the Royalty Project, and to a lesser extent the 
AAP Project, must operate.
In community consultations in Royalty Project Community A on the option of adopting 
(and adapting) an early childhood program there as part of the project, CLC staff were 
told by an influential community elder that the program would have to fit into the 
“nation” that he and others equate with the language group in the project. With nations 
generally considered large entities, there would appear to be plenty of room for the 
program. But like nationalism everywhere, the apparently inclusive here masks almost 
inevitably exclusive tendencies framed according to essential characteristics of the nation 
-  typically language and culture characteristics -  whether or not these are framed around 
ownership of land. Indeed the elder proceeded to assert that not only must language and 
culture come first in any discussion of development programs in his community, but that 
two of the other three communities in the project have lost their language and culture. In 
the same Royalty Project early childhood program consultations, this elder’s son, the 
main organiser of the Tjukurpa festivals discussed in chapter 6, also lobbied for language 
and culture in education. This was to determine who is of the language, he said, as well as 
to advance the language itself. Might the implication be that the two communities who 
have supposedly lost their language and culture are considered no longer part of the 
language group or fast heading that way? The son, meanwhile, has “been bom” a man of 
this language and “will finish up” one, he said. That is, he asserts he is certainly part of 
the group. And a fellow member of his community and language group insisted in 
separate consultations that funding under the CLC’s AAP Project, funding destined to
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help stop kidney disease sufferers ‘finishing up* before their time, only be released if the 
funds recipient, a reputable regional Aboriginal health organisation, change its name to 
one in this language. Furthermore, the name should be drawn from and thus signify his 
community, he said. In reaction to a supposedly definitive essence of belonging on 
display here, to this linguistic delimiting of development, a firm (female) supporter of an 
early childhood program for Royalty Project Community A declared the language group 
is in fact “living two ways whether we like it or not”. At least two ways.
Melinda Hinkson says identity among the Warlpiri, associated with country southwest of 
Katherine, northwest of Alice Springs, is no longer enacted through highly localised 
social formations long associated with Aboriginal societies in general. Instead she says it 
is increasingly enacted through the more abstract formations, the fluid processes, we 
commonly think of when we consider globalisation (Hinkson 2002: 212). Yet, as 
contradictory as it may seem, localisation has also come from globalisation, despite 
predictions that globalisation would permanently break down distinctions between 
peoples. So, “are globalization and localization of cultural production two moments of 
the same process?” (Foster 1991: 236), as Foster has asked. Appadurai’s theories of the 
impacts of globalisation on colonised peoples help with the answer. His theories include 
the concepts of ethnoscapes, ideoscapes and mediascapes. He defines ethnoscapes as “the 
landscape of persons who constitute the shifting world in which we live: tourists, 
immigrants, refugees, exiles, guest workers and other moving groups and individuals” 
(Appadurai 1996: 33). Appadurai’s ideoscapes describe chains of terms and images from 
the “Enlightenment worldview”, including freedom, welfare, rights, sovereignty and 
representation (ibid: 36). Here, however, the imagination “is the key component of the 
new global order” (ibid: 31). Appadurai notes widening generation and gender gaps in 
this context. Women, he believes, become “pawns in the heritage politics of the 
household” (ibid: 44), often subject to abuse by “men who are themselves tom about the 
relation between heritage and opportunity in shifting spatial and political formations” 
(ibid), where the opportunity is often enough an imaginary one generated in mediascapes. 
It seems men in particular are disoriented -  distressed, to again use an Austin-Broos term
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-  by the expectations of tradition and modernity where these states are seen as separated 
not merging along a continuum.
In this context, Appadurai observes “ethnic implosions”, essentially conflict among 
oppressed peoples dividing into “primary solidarity groups” in search of security as they 
try to withdraw from the state (ibid: 149, citing Zolberg et al 1989). Meanwhile, 
preoccupied with the “control, classification, and surveillance” of their subjects, nation 
states have “created, revitalized, or fractured ethnic identities that were previously fluid, 
negotiable, or nascent” (ibid: 162). By means of such control, classification and 
surveillance, Appadurai sees nation states “everywhere seeking to monopolize the moral 
resources of community, either by flatly claiming perfect coevality between nation and 
state, or by systematically museumizing and representing all groups within them in a 
variety of heritage politics that seems remarkably uniform throughout the world” (ibid: 
39). Yet, as globalisation leads states to in fact lose their monopoly over “the idea of 
nation” -  a “potentially explosive situation” in its own right according to Foster (Foster 
1991: 252) -  Appadurai believes it is understandable that all manner of groups will tend 
to use the logic of the nation to claim or maintain entitlements from the state, even as 
some attempt to withdraw from it (Appadurai 1996: 157). He believes identities produced 
“in a field of classification, mass mediation, mobilization and entitlement dominated by 
politics at the level of the nation state” will necessarily “take cultural differences as their 
conscious object” (ibid: 147). Similarly, says Foster:
The cultural forms in which both national elites and non-elites represent themselves -  
objects, images, and acts -  are part of a global flow of commodities accelerated by new 
media technologies of reproduction and diffusion. As commodities, these forms are made 
available for consumption on a massive scale. And through consumption, as several 
anthropologists have stressed recently, consumers create (and/or acquiesce in) personal 
and social identities, including nation-cultural identities (Foster 1991: 248).
In this way, too, privileged localism has spread across the Aboriginal domain, and 
conditions for conflict are created.
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Conflict
Among the barriers to sustainable Aboriginal community and regional development, 
Dodson and Smith list the capture of organisations by factions, ie. particular families 
(Dodson and Smith 2003:8). Exclusion is clear in this, while conflict lurks -  in and 
around Hermannsburg west of Alice Springs, for instance, as chapter 5 above suggests. 
Peters-Little is concerned with the consequences in northwest NSW and beyond. 
Aboriginal people, she says, are:
further divided amongst themselves, with families against families, even family members 
against each other. This is not a concern specific and characteristic to the northwest alone. It 
appears that the provision of government funding to community services under the label of 
‘self-determination’ is creating further welfare dependency in Aboriginal communities and 
widening the socio-economic gap between the people who fund the services, those who work 
in them and those who depend on the services (Peters-Little 2000:11).
The causes of Aboriginal community conflict are many and complex. Peters-Little in 
effect suggests here that the customary use of periodic dispersal as a means of limiting 
conflict (Sutton 2009: 50), often used now to justify outstations, is in fact among the 
causes of conflict in communities where the dispersal is manifested in the proliferation of 
Aboriginal organisations, each a ‘home’ for a faction. Like outstation support, support for 
this proliferation, often resulting in entification, was central to Aboriginal self- 
determination.
So was land rights legislation, helping to facilitate juridification. Another common theme 
in analyses of Aboriginal conflict is the distinction between those recognised as 
traditional Aboriginal land owners under the ALRA or native title holders under the 
Native Title Act and those without such recognition. Often no less disadvantaged 
Aboriginal people on the same land as those recognised became mere residents, affected 
communities or historical people with inferior rights, even where their forebears were 
effectively forced to move to the area. Levitus writes that “the localised distinctions 
between ‘traditional’ and ‘historical’ peoples structure internal Aboriginal conflicts”
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(Levitus 2009: 86). In some cases, land rights and native title have been perceived by 
historical people as instruments to further disadvantage and in fact potentially dispossess 
them (MacDonald 1997: 73). In the volume ‘Fighting Over Country: Anthropological 
Perspectives’ (1997), MacDonald says that analytically the issue is one of the differing 
values implied in the recognition of cultural tradition on the one hand and justice as 
social equality on the other, an issue with underestimated impacts in NSW (ibid: 66). She 
says:
It is possible to understand justice as stemming both from rights as Indigenous owners of 
country and culture and from citizenship and civil rights in a modern nation state. Ideally, 
one might argue it is both but, if the contradictions are not acknowledged and the issues 
involved prioritised, then conflict and miscommunication seems inevitable (ibid: 79).
MacDonald suggests a better understanding might start with comprehending “colonially- 
constructed intra-Indigenous relations” (ibid: 81). In the same volume, Finlayson points 
to the perception among some Aboriginal people that anthropologists along with 
legislators have helped deny them access to their own heritage by reifying particular 
forms of Aboriginal cultural tradition supposedly essential to Aboriginality (Finlayson 
1997: 145). Finlayson says it is now clear that Aboriginal identity is in fact derived from 
a range of additional, often less firm influences, including regional ritual affiliations, 
residence and collective historical experiences like those shared by the ‘stolen 
generation’ (ibid: 146).
In the Fighting Over Country volume, David Martin says it could be argued that the 
commonalities developed from living together in remote Aboriginal communities 
outweigh differences among residents (Martin, D. 1997: 157). This is certainly in 
evidence in most CLC consultations with communities to prioritise and plan initiatives in 
each under its Rent Project. It was also evident in community consultations to prioritise 
program options in the CLC Royalty Project, if less clearly there. In suggesting that 
entities representing Aboriginal interests in many regions should reflect large-scale 
migrations, David Martin points out that the traditional-historical distinction is in fact 
frequently indistinct (ibid: 159,160). In this context, Merlan believes Aboriginal land
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based conflict can occur precisely because actual relationships to land are at odds with 
“the fixity demanded by Anglo-Australian law, bureaucracy and business interests” 
(Merlan 1997: 9). Here, she says, we cannot ignore that such demands in land claim 
processes may be a major factor in Aboriginal community conflict (ibid: 13). While 
Morton sees the focus on difference long central to anthropology as a large part of the 
problem (Morton 1997b: 84), he recognises factors beyond this and beyond 
anthropological practice in land claims. Conflict between Aboriginal groups is, Morton 
believes, related to the “paradoxical moral framework which insists that Aboriginal 
people remain simultaneously ‘unique’ and ‘part of the nation’” (ibid: 89), a framework 
in which land rights nevertheless now have a key place (ibid) as the discussion above 
should bear out. Consistent with this discussion, ‘part of the nation’ is in fact frequently 
interpreted as membership of a rather more localised group. Again, separation is the 
underlying theme.
The result can be quite open conflict inhibiting and/or distorting community development 
for years. A program assessment report by the large NGO now managing what has 
become the Royalty Project’s Early Childhood Health and Education program found 
many children not attending a child care centre in the project area because of family 
conflicts. A study tour involving the Indigenous education organisation central to the 
Royalty Project could not proceed because members of the organisation from Royalty 
Project Community B feared for their safety at the tour destination, a nearby community 
home to both a new library/training centre the subject of the study tour and families 
displaced in a bitter land-based dispute. Royalty Project Community B is also involved in 
the CLC’s AAP Project. Here it was considered apt to re-register with the Registrar of 
Indigenous Corporations the community’s sports association to take ownership of a 
sports bus funded under this project. Yet this would have required a community meeting 
of the membership, and some of the members are from the displaced families. Other 
members advised the CLC CD Unit that their meeting together with the displaced 
members would surely cause fighting. To find a home for the sports bus in this hostile 
environment, the AAP Project was then reduced to the incorporation of a new, quite 
exclusive sports association to add to the proliferation of Aboriginal associations
142
nationwide under Aboriginal self-determination. The NGO’s program assessment report 
above meanwhile laments the disconnectedness of Aboriginal organisations within the 
very remote, isolated communities of the region.
Aboriginal people retreating to outstations to reside exclusively with close family is not 
necessarily the solution to conflict it is often held up to be, even when overcrowded 
housing is removed as a source of conflict. Pre-contact, says Sutton, “while people were 
injured and killed in set-piece battles and organised raids, serious violence was probably 
more likely to happen during unplanned emotional flare-ups between kin who lived 
together” (Sutton 2009: 105). This intimate nature of most serious conflict has remained 
the norm since contact, according to Sutton (ibid: 106-108), in a social “transformation, 
not revolution” (ibid: 108). At a summit convened recently to address suicides occurring 
in the “tiny” and seemingly idyllic Aboriginal outstation of Billard 3kms fropi Beagle 
Bay north of Broome, participants heard from the WA Coroner that feuding can trigger 
suicide (Victor O’Reeri 2009).
In the context of conflict Finlayson encourages anthropologists, then, to:
rethink assumptions of the constitution of socio-territorial groups and community 
organisations, especially if tradition is used to imply pre-colonial structures and alliances. 
In addition, we need to expose popularly-held ideas of tradition for their narrowness and 
limitations, especially where there is denial of the active role of history in shaping the 
content and form of social institutions and symbolic domains. More incorporative models 
of group relations to land, based on ideas of historical continuities rather than dislocations 
of lived experience, are needed (Finlayson 1997: 148).
This would assist CD in the Aboriginal domain.
Conclusion
Finlayson’s suggestions are made in the face of powerful influences that have helped to 
spread adherence to a privileged localism ultimately based on a certain Aboriginal
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traditional form. I use the word certain here to mean a particular tradition, because 
Aboriginal traditions of relatedness, on the other hand, are de-emphasised as privileged 
localism has spread. Aboriginal people are left with a cultural half-match. But I also use 
certain to allude to the certainty for commercial development investment facilitated 
through privileged localism. The imperatives of investment at the intersection of the 
wider capitalist economy and the Aboriginal domain demand the certainty available via 
key factors in privileged localism, socio-cultural reification for instance. The change that 
is privileged localism is also spread across the Indigenous domain in the realms of the 
collective imagination. This chapter has explored how this occurs in mimesis, through the 
role of the state in so-called welfare colonialism, in nationalist thinking and globalisation. 
I discussed conflict coming of the separation here, the separation of traditional from so- 
called historical people for instance, as conflict is a significant development constraint 
worldwide. Against such strong and widespread constraints, the next chapter will 
advance the possibilities of overcoming separation in the Aboriginal domain towards 
lasting improvements in Aboriginal communities utilising CD.
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Chapter 8
Regions of common good
In chapter 7, Finlayson encouraged anthropologists to rethink accepted wisdom about the 
constitution of Aboriginal socio-territorial groups and community organisations. She 
suggests it now too often contradicts lived experience, leaving groups and organisations 
less incorporative or inclusive than they could be, ie. more localised. In this chapter I 
specifically canvass prospects for an Aboriginal common good largely bom of 
relatedness across regions, without dismissing local autonomy needs and loyalties. That 
is, I look for the lost balance in the autonomy-relatedness dynamic. There is uncertainty 
in this, to be sure, because of the process involved, specifically the process -  the lived 
experience -  of relatedness. Such process is bound to be messier than the reification,
f
juridification and entification that privilege localism in the Aboriginal domain. I devote 
part of my chapter to the uncertainty and some implications. Despite the uncertainty, 
relatedness amounting to a common good across regions, while accommodating localism, 
provides a better basis for Aboriginal civil society than currently exists. There are better 
chances for CD to improve conditions in Aboriginal communities. Ironically perhaps, as 
it comes via some critiques of development, the notion of hybrid culture is usefully 
introduced in this chapter. Profoundly intercultural, the notion helps to bridge the 
separation, including the dislocations of lived experience Finlayson highlights, now in 
various ways a deep-seated limitation to better Aboriginal community conditions.
Capacity for a common good
Through the ICGP research, Hunt and Smith found a major advantage of federalised 
forms of regional governance “appears to lie in their tolerance of diversity, complex 
identities, and the interdependency of groups” (Hunt and Smith 2006: 25 and 2007: 19). 
That is, it appears this can pre-empt some of the conflict discussed in the previous 
chapter, perhaps negate the very assumption of difference in the conflict, towards a 
foundation for Aboriginal community improvements via CD. In this context, Hunt and
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Smith observed a consistent “concertina effect” between smaller and larger groups of 
Aboriginal people caused by the “permeability” of collective identities (ibid: 24). Yet 
even in federalised form, the foundation for CD in regional governance is forever on too 
shaky ground, it would seem. Sutton has written recently that:
elected representatives who do the right thing by the rules of Aboriginal cultural practice 
are principally there to speak for their own, and to maximise the benefits flowing to their 
constituents, their own mobs, more than to pursue a higher collective structure at the 
expense of local autonomy and of locally brokered largesse (Sutton 2009: 197).
Similarly, among “pervasive Aboriginal values”, David Martin lists the “pursuit of family 
and local group loyalties against notions of the ‘common good’” (Martin, D. 2006: 4). 
Sutton says a common good cannot be assumed in outback Aboriginal communities 
(Sutton 2009: 48).
But for all this local autonomy imperative, there is an “equally compelling strain” 
towards connectedness and relationship in Aboriginal sociality, according to Smith 
(2005b: 183). Indeed, to the significant extent that this is informed by relationships to 
land, elsewhere Sutton recognises that relatively localised “proximate” traditional title 
and entitlement is widespread in Aboriginal Australia while “underlying titles” are 
simultaneously maintained by wider, regional social networks (Sutton 2003: 116). The 
Gagudju Association found a balance here between relatedness and autonomy, towards 
good governance and good development prospects, then lost the balance, as Levitus 
explained in chapter 3. And there is a sense from Levitus that this might have been 
avoided, that there is nothing automatic in autonomy outweighing relatedness in the 
dynamic between the two states, but that this is what transpired when Gagudju became 
culturally matched with privileged localism. High mobility in the Darwin hinterland 
limits this occurring according to Sansom as above. Sansom counted 14 different 
language groups represented at his main research site of ‘Wallaby Cross’. Yet, he says, 
“despite these diverse ethnic origins, Wallaby Cross people would resist the assertion that 
their mob was ‘mixed’. They would claim instead to be all of them ‘the same’” (Sansom 
1980: 11). Interestingly, he says ‘mixed’ is “paired with ‘noisy’ where noisy stands for
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fractiousness” (ibid), suggesting Wallaby Cross was, then, instead a relatively 
harmonious node in the hinterland region. In earlier times, says Keen:
it may be that religious practices, crucial to political control in every local network of the 
population, linked each to its neighbours and to more distant peoples. Relations of 
authority of a more local scope seem to have been dependent upon the nature of relations 
with neighbours, especially religious cooperation (Keen 1997b: 269).
Keen says within some regions of pre-contact Australia discrete ethnic groups may have 
formed, “but we should look for evidence of such a pattern, not assume it a priori” (ibid). 
And “whatever the pattem, any local system must be set in its wider context” (ibid: 273), 
Keen believes, adding we must “substitute a more regional perspective” (ibid: 261).
Myers adopts such a perspective on the Pintupi, also as above. Myers says “the 
indigenous model of relatedness among individuals reveals how mobility and flexible 
boundaries for land use are organized into a larger structure of regional organization” 
(Myers 1986: 73). A key Pintupi concept is walytja, which specifies “a sense of 
belonging together or shared identity” and symbolises mutual support (ibid: 109). A 
person’s walytja are not only consanguines but those familiar to the person, those he or 
she grew up with, those who have provided the person care and those with whom the 
person frequently camps (ibid: 109,110). Myers says “the Pintupi view of the self and the 
other, therefore, receives validation from the experience of social life in which kin 
throughout a region should and do help each other” (ibid: 111). It is expected that those 
with something should share it with the less fortunate (ibid: 115). A common good is, we 
get from this, not only strong but associated with regional Pintupi identity pre-dating 
colonisation, certainly pre-dating socio-cultural reification, juridification and entification.
Superimposed on this and Aboriginal identity across Australia were the results of 
Radcliffe-Brown’s fieldwork in the early 1900s. This “formed the basis of his later 
generalizations for Australia as a whole, which in due course became established as 
anthropological orthodoxy and, as such, undoubtedly influenced the definition of 
‘traditional Aboriginal owners’” in the ALRA, according to Hiatt (Hiatt 1984: 12). Hiatt
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suggests this fieldwork ushered in the perceived primacy of land ownership by local 
groups in the determination of Aboriginal identity, over both individual and regional 
connections to land (ibid); but it also advanced the theoretical basis for fixity to prevail 
over process. Hiatt says Radcliffe-Brown “brought order to a prevailing state of 
confusion. But did he discover the order, or did he impose it?” (ibid: 13). What he did 
through the influence of his writing on the ALRA traditional ownership definition is 
promote certainty. An immediate concern in any correction is the prospect of over­
correcting and increasing conflict. Conflict will likely increase if Aboriginal groups and 
organisations see the privileged local autonomy they have become accustomed to being 
eroded in regional governance arrangements, again posing development constraints.
Through its governance arrangements, participants in the CLC’s Rent Project continue to 
progress community development over, a wide region despite the privileging of local 
autonomy. An occasional concern of the primary participant group, the relevant 
traditional owners, is that communities they target for funding include members of the 
group as defined in the ALRA as well as other Aboriginal people, much like Sansom’s 
Wallaby Cross though with fewer language groups represented. There is, then, a sense of 
reluctance among some when the group targets funding at big communities with sizeable 
non-traditional owner populations. Yet they seem to also recognise that the distinction 
between group members and other Aboriginal residents is increasingly blurred, that they 
are in fact increasingly related. The recognition here is that “religious, economic and 
political interests in land are not held exclusively by primary land-owning groups of 
families. Rather, patterns of rights and responsibilities overlap and are dispersed across a 
range of people and interests” (Smith 2005b: 184). Still, this recognition of the lived 
experience of relatedness competes with what has become accepted as a much more 
localised identity and set of associated allegiances, contrary to a common good and an 
obstacle to strong participation in community development. At Rent Project consultations 
in one large community, attendance was initially high then dropped dramatically. People 
who are not traditional owners in the project according to the ALRA, ie. members of a 
local descent group with common spiritual affiliations to a site on the relevant land, had 
quickly left. They had wrongly thought the meeting was none of their business. In fact,
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consistent with the project’s governance arrangements as outlined above and at the 
meeting, they could have played an important part simply as residents of the community, 
regardless of descent and spiritual links to the traditional owners and their land. 
Fortunately, within other similarly sized communities rarely is such a distinction raised 
through the Rent Project between the traditional owners and the residents.
In the NT’s Haasts Bluff area, Sarah Holcombe has found how “powerful sentiments are 
attached to each community, as people have re-located themselves and their traditional 
imaginations” (Holcombe 2004: 13). Contemporary forms of inclusive identity, what 
Holcombe calls simply “community identities”, have begun to emerge with development 
(ibid) after years of development in the broadest sense facilitating more localised identity. 
Echoing Keen above, she concludes “local groups must be situated in their wider contexts 
as contingent and relational entities” (ibid: 14). Accordingly, most large Aboriginal 
residential communities are now simultaneously places of relative autonomy and nodes in 
networks of wide relatedness. With Sanders, Holcombe recommends governance 
arrangements that acknowledge the layers of identity here, including identity coalescing 
around larger communities as sites of development. “What seems to us is required,” they 
write, “is a combination of single-settlement localism and multi-settlement regionalism; 
or as it might perhaps be put, regionalism which respects and builds on localism rather 
than discounts or disparages it” (Sanders and Holcombe 2006: 3). Consistent with this, I 
suggest, are arrangements that accommodate if not facilitate the Indigenous common 
good, a federalism that finds balance in the autonomy-relatedness dynamic utilising such 
principles as subsidiarity. This may be at the expense of some certainty as to the right 
people to participate in development.
Uncertainty
A fundamental certainty in NT Aboriginal affairs understandably appeals to Aboriginal 
people and organisations, especially given the extreme policy flux of recent years. It has 
long appealed to those behind commercial development in the NT, facilitating as it has 
predictable access to Aboriginal Freehold land for mining in particular. Still others see it,
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as Filer notes it is often seen in PNG (Filer 2007: 146), as providing the means to limit 
some within groups manipulating culture to take more than their share of monies from 
commercial development. But how firm is the certainty in the NT despite being built on a 
locally emplaced Aboriginal tradition enshrined in the ALRA, long-standing legislation 
administered by powerful land councils? How useful is it downstream of successful 
ALRA land claims and commercial development on that land? “It has been relatively 
easy, since the advent of land rights policies, to demarcate a distinct Indigenous territorial 
order,” says Rowse, but “one cannot simply infer a jurisdiction from a title deed” (Rowse 
2007: 52,53). Legitimate governance in the Indigenous domain does not necessarily 
follow from such title no matter how juridified that governance, no matter how many 
corporation rules and regulations, how entified the groups concerned and how reified 
their socio-cultural processes. In fact, the opposite is of course often true.
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Rowse commends a “permeable and adaptive notion of ‘custom’” that might actually 
“corrode local identities” (ibid: 52). Corrosion is occurring regardless because, despite 
the reification, juridification and entification involved in privileged localism throughout 
the self-determination policy era, dynamic identity processes have continued. These 
processes are customary, even traditional, in the low cultural sense. State policies have 
unwittingly encouraged these processes, welfare payments encouraging demand sharing, 
for instance (Peterson 1999: 853). Higher, if intermittent, volumes of money that 
Aboriginal people receive from commercial developments or other usage of Aboriginal 
lands have further fueled the processes. These processes will inevitably have an impact 
on downstream development and, because they are dynamic, the impact will be quite 
unpredictable. That is, despite quests for and a degree of success in attaining investment 
certainty, considerable uncertainty will continue in the broader development context. As 
David Martin observes, at the intersection of money and culture “relatedness between 
individuals and indeed collectivities can never be taken for granted” (Martin, D. 1995: 6). 
Denying this -  denying the comparatively unpredictable socio-cultural processes -  
downstream of land claims, land use agreements and the proceeds paid to Aboriginal 
people will only jeopardise the benefits to those people, namely in their ability to identify 
with and thus participate in community development from the proceeds.
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What can be considered a given is the strength of relatedness in the autonomy-relatedness 
dynamic in Aboriginal society, notwithstanding the emphasis on local autonomy in recent 
decades and that specific relations between individuals are uncertain. Sansom reminds us 
that groups formed through a process of shared experience, as opposed to, say, a 
documented genealogical link, “are not entities as are corporations. Rather a mob brought 
into being in this way is, at any moment of its existence, a realisation. A consequence is 
that its members live in lively appreciation of social continuity” (Sansom 1980: 16). I 
take continuity here to mean relatedness continuing over a wide area and group of people 
and the non-fixed nature of relations.
This need not mean wide open slather. So what do we consider legitimate, or merely 
relevant, Indigenous process in the development context, including legitimate or relevant 
types of relatedness? Myers says Pintupi sociality, for instance, is constituted largely 
“through the emotional response of individuals to significant others” (Myers 1986: 124). 
Shame “coordinates the demands of relatedness with those of personal autonomy” (ibid: 
120). The emotion of shame, then, becomes a key consideration in Pintupi identity 
processes. Shame may be related to sorrow in the CLC Rent Project area. One year, 
apparently against their combined better judgment, the traditional owners in the project 
chose for project funding the community of one woman among them whose inclusion in 
the traditional owner/primary participant group is not in dispute. She had argued for this 
funding overly aggressively and somewhat irrationally in the minds of some of the group. 
As a result, as one senior man from the group explained later, the group felt sorry for her 
in selecting her community. The group may have also felt shame, a desire to satisfy her 
demands to keep her quiet in the quite public meeting involved. Fears that this would set 
a precedent in the project have proved unfounded. The project could not ultimately 
proceed at this woman’s community anyway, but that is not my point. This meeting 
outcome appeared to have the potential to legitimise the wasting of rent money on a 
whim. Yet on the other hand, it could be construed as just part of the traditional owners’ 
close identification with and participation in a project via which they have for six years 
consistently turned to relatively wide community benefit funding they had previously.
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individually (or as small family groups) devoted almost exclusively to the purchase of 
used cars that rarely last long. Perhaps scope for decisions of this sort increases the 
cultural match between project process and Indigenous social process.
But at what point does Indigenous process go from facilitating Indigenous participation to 
consistently undermining sustainable development outcomes for Indigenous people 
despite their collective best intentions? Might a CD approach that accommodates 
contemporary processes of relatedness important to Aboriginal identity only reinforce 
factors that can, without some attention, severely limit lasting improvements in remote 
Aboriginal communities? Might the uncertainty in the process amount to increased 
community dysfunction not community development? As Austin-Broos notes, in the 
remote Aboriginal domain “a car discarded or a shabby house can stand as testimony to 
an active world of relatedness rather than reflect mere carelessness” (Austin-Broos 2006: 
9). If we consider a development project to be that car or house, with even more relatives 
involved, how far should it accommodate the active world of relatedness before it 
becomes unworkable, and unrecognisable to the development provider, no matter how 
well it seems to be set up? What would be the outcome of CLC CD meetings if emotions 
ruled? Myers warns that the emotion of compassion in particular among the Pintupi has 
adverse implications for development, inhibiting action against corrupt Pintupi, for 
instance. He says that, “no matter how well-intentioned, most threats of sending away 
wrong-doers or removing individuals from their jobs are rescinded subsequently with the 
decision to ‘give them one more chance’. The wrongdoers often prompt this result by 
referring explicitly to kinship links” (Myers 1986: 115). Development agencies will want 
to draw the line at emotions as process, but my point here is that they cannot ignore 
Indigenous process per se even where certainty is much more attractive.
Successful uncertainty
At the start of its Rent Project, the CLC was attracted to the implementation of the project 
in four larger communities only, the same four each year. These are named in the CLC 
executive resolution from which the project arises, though the resolution allows for
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implementation in other communities. There was a degree of anxiety among CLC staff if 
not its executive at the prospect of the relevant traditional owners instead deciding for 
themselves where the project should be implemented, which communities should receive 
the rent money. As it is, the traditional owners have settled on one community, Rent 
Project Community A, to receive rent every year and choose three other places annually 
(and any region-wide initiatives) to get the rest. Of course, compared to implementation 
in the same places every year, this choice amounts to uncertainty, though here the 
uncertainty is not passed back to the development provider, the government that pays the 
rent to lease the land for the national park concerned. The uncertainty is retained by the 
CLC. It is of a different order to that faced by commercial investors; but it remains 
uncertainty. As well as fears that the most powerful in the traditional owner group would 
routinely choose in their interests and/or that emotions, including anger, would decide the 
choice, concerns included those around the sustainability of project initiatives and about 
participation.
Whereas implementing the project in the same places every year could lock in ongoing 
operational and maintenance funding for initiatives towards their sustainability, targeting 
the rent every year at three different places as determined by the traditional owners has 
made for comparatively short term initiatives. There is indeed now less scope for ongoing 
support from the rent at each community except Rent Project Community A, and thus 
less point in long term project planning. While this is less than ideal, it has not resulted in 
a crisis of sustainability in the project. It has increased the imperative for some good 
planning at the outset, including to optimise operational support through the funding. It 
has scaled back expectations of the project and it has convinced the traditional owners of 
the wisdom of targeting the rent to three places annually, no more, in addition to Rent 
Project Community A, so as not to spread the rent too thin. In six years of the project, all 
communities associated with the relevant traditional owners appear to have been targeted, 
because they have recently targeted to receive more rent some places that received it in 
the first years of the project. That is, the money is now going around again, so to speak -  
though not necessarily all around or in the order it first went around. The traditional 
owner group decides this. In 2009, for instance, the group directed the money to two
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small places that have never before received it and again to one of the larger places that 
received funding in the project’s first year and has since built a new store with it plus 
complementary government funding. With its 2009 rent allocation, this larger community 
plans to further improve the store.
An arguably more critical concern than the sustainability of individual Rent Project 
initiatives was the prospect that members of the relevant traditional owner group would 
stop participating in the project as part o f this primary participant group once their 
community received rent. Why would they participate as this group, was the thinking, if 
there was no certainty their community would receive rent again, or not soon anyway? 
Assumptions of their intense localism clearly informed the prediction that without this 
certainty they would have no incentive to participate as part of this group for the common 
good. Why would Aboriginal people participate in this way if they felt they may have got 
all they could from the process for their place? Following this thinking, the originally 
preferred certainty of the places to be funded in the project would either obviate the main 
need for the traditional owners as a primary participant group -  ie. to make key decisions 
for a common good, namely choosing the communities to receive rent each year -  or it 
would make it more likely that at least those of the traditional owner group associated 
with the predetermined places would regularly participate, even if no-one else did. The 
last traditional owner meeting for the Rent Project in 2009, five years after the project’s 
inception, contradicted this thinking and the concerns for certainty here.
This meeting was not only very well attended by the relevant traditional owners, but 
participation in the discussion was sufficiently thorough as to preclude discussion of the 
last two of seven agenda items. One of these items was to advance a regional education 
initiative as part of the Rent Project, as suggested by one of the traditional owner group. 
Instead of discussing this item, with the help of the CLC CD Unit the group formed an 
education working party to advance the education initiative and report back later to the 
group. Group members not seen previously at such meetings attended the meeting. A 
senior man, not in fact included on the original CLC anthropological advice used to 
convene the group, attended for the first time. His active participation was clearly
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welcomed by the group, his membership of it not questioned despite his name not 
appearing on the CLC anthropological advice -  on the ‘list’, as it is known. Such a reified 
rendition of the traditional owner group is not nearly as important in the Rent Project’s 
governance as it is in juridified project governance arrangements where it is deemed 
essential for certainty. What is important is acceptance or not from the group according to 
group dynamics of which the Rent Project is now actually a part. This senior man 
addressed the group to seek project Rinding for an initiative for his family. But discussion 
politely moved on to deliberation of how much rent to provide initiatives planned in the 
three communities already chosen by the group to receive some rent in 2009, consistent 
with the Rent Project governance arrangements. This was the key matter of this meeting, 
not selection of further communities for funding which occurs at a meeting at the 
beginning of each year. Initiatives planned for 2009 in the three relevant communities 
included several differently costed options for each place from the potential project 
managers, the most costly of which together exceeded the total amount of rent available 
for the year. The group was able to agree on budgets for the three communities’ 
initiatives, however. This was largely thanks to the family associated with one of these 
places, an outstation, accepting the considerably cheaper option of less extensive works 
there in the interest of an outcome that allowed project works to proceed in all three 
places in 2010. The family’s agreement balanced its relatedness to the rest of the 
traditional owner group with the family’s autonomy or localism invested in the 
outstation.
This is not to suggest that this meeting was either easy or unusual. During six years now 
of the Rent Project, the relevant traditional owners as the primary participant group have 
consistently made decisions such as those at this late 2009 meeting through what at times 
has been quite passionate debate involving firmly held, differentiated positions. Close 
and consistent engagement of CLC staff with the group through the project, but in a way 
that leaves room for group dynamics or processes, has clearly helped. It appears that to 
accommodate uncertainty in community development is to necessitate such engagement 
as an alternative to reification, juridification and entification as related social 
technologies for the management of culture in project governance.
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Intercultural engagement
In chapter 3, I noted what von Sturmer suggested early in the Aboriginal self- 
determination era is critical to the engagement that subsequently became largely absent in 
that era. He suggested a comprehensive understanding of the Aboriginal groups 
concerned is critical, along with assimilation of researchers, government personnel and 
relevant others into development projects, among other factors. The assimilation here in 
turn suggests an intercultural approach to development. Such an approach can begin to 
overcome development dilemmas posed by difference between Aboriginal and non- 
Aboriginal people, as well as that between otherwise entified Aboriginal groups. Of 
course this is a challenge to cultural relativism and its reliance on a notion of bounded 
and separate cultures (Gardner and Lewis 1996: 156). Sutton may reject the intercultural 
view that Aboriginal people are able to maintain pre-colonial cultural and social patterns 
while pursuing development and associated governance arrangements (Sutton 2001: 129), 
but in fact an intercultural approach can actively help surmount such separations between 
tradition and modernity. Firstly, modernity is not dismissed merely because it may be 
foreign; then the very idea of the foreign begins to weaken. Holcombe now observes it 
this way on the ground:
Indigenous conceptions and values are not isolated from the local micro structures of 
social organisation, of which the non-Aboriginal service workers and the affiliated 
institutions are a part, nor from Aboriginal bureaucrats and the macro structures of 
various Federal and State bodies from which these workers (more or less) take their lead. 
This macro organisation cannot be glossed simply as ‘introduced’, just as the micro 
organisation cannot be understood solely as locally ‘Indigenous’ (Holcombe 2005: 224).
There can be a “mutuality of interests” (ibid: 230) among the Aboriginal residents of 
Aboriginal communities, extending to their non-Aboriginal population, Holcombe says. 
Merlan goes as far as to recommend measures to address Aboriginal disadvantage that 
are “more explicitly informed by understandings of accommodation and relationship, 
historically and presently, with people and institutions of settler and post-settler society”
156
(Merlan 2006: 101). To surmount the kinds of separations that have instead developed 
here is to create space for Indigenous agency in change, suggests Holcombe (Holcombe 
2005: 230).
Consistent with this, David Martin recommends Aboriginal organisations be vehicles for 
strategic engagement with the dominant society in a way that provides choices for them 
and their constituents (Martin, D. 2005: 191). Reversing the self-determination era 
expectation of them, he sees effective Aboriginal organisations now as key intercultural 
intermediaries in change that unavoidably includes cultural change (Martin, D. 2006: 9). 
Good governance of Aboriginal organisations, he suggests, must allow for some values 
and practices from the Aboriginal domain to be challenged, indeed circumvented (Martin, 
D. 2005: 196), and Rowse echoes this (Rowse 2007: 49-51). To the same effect, other 
values and practices might simply be given due weight, the value of relatedness for 
instance, to balance rather than bypass those proving problematic. Martin’s suggestion 
here applies to development projects as much as to organisations, projects like the CLC’s 
Rent Project.
The traditional owners in the Rent Project, with the assistance of the CLC CD Unit as per 
chapter 4, have progressively adopted the following project principles to assist their 
project decision making:
1. Initiatives are supported according to need.
2. The money is to be shared around, with three communities receiving it each year 
(in addition to Rent Project Community A) according to need as opposed to an 
even three-way division of the money.
3. The project should show clearly what the money is being spent on, reporting this 
back to the traditional owners. (As one said, it is important the traditional owners 
see project initiatives completed. There is plenty of money around in a range of 
development projects with Central Australian Aboriginal people, she said, but few 
initiatives finished to show for it.)
4. The project cannot do everything.
5. The project is for bringing wide community benefit to the traditional owners.
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6. The project supports initiatives that will last and keep going, strong projects.
7. People should stay in the places where initiatives are funded, ie. the people who 
lobbied for rent money to go there.
8. The project supports outstations where people are living, or people who want to 
move to outstations.
9. The project is for helping people for the future, helping young people.
10. Initiatives require good planning.
11. The project must work under the ALRA.
Rowse concludes that Indigenous cultural heritage as currently conceptualised is not 
sufficient source of ideas about, and tools for, contemporary governance (Rowse 2007: 
60). In the Rent Project principles above, Indigenous cultural heritage as conceptualised 
in the ALRA is augmented, indeed balanced, by other ideas for governance. Some of 
these ideas may seem foreign at first to remote Aboriginal people. Indeed the principle of 
rent allocated to communities according to need requires repeat explanation at project 
meetings. Meeting interpreters struggle to find words to translate need into the relevant 
language. The principle of bringing wide community benefit to the traditional owners, 
and the relatedness inherent in it, on the other hand, requires no explanation. But this 
principle is increasingly conflated with the project’s principle of support for outstations: 
wide benefit is interpreted geographically, and what could be wider in this way than far- 
flung outstations?
On David Martin’s advice, principles such as those above might include some to cope 
with diversity, competition and conflict and potentially move further from expectations of 
any match of values “supposedly appropriate to a culturally autonomous Indigenous 
domain” (Martin, D. 2005:192). Fortunately, conflict has not featured in the Rent Project, 
competition is managed in the second principle above and the project is open to diversity 
as determined by the traditional owners themselves. Other anthropologists have pointed 
similarly to a need for an intercultural approach in this context to mitigate conflict caused 
in legal incorporation and thus ossification of previously fluid and contestable relations 
between Aboriginal groups (Sullivan 2005: 193); and to reform self-determination into a
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policy more attuned to the realities of Aboriginal community life (Hinkson 2002: 216). 
There is little legal incorporation involved in the Rent Project, certainly none at the 
primary participant group level. It is not juridified. In more ways than one, as I have 
shown, the Rent Project is more attuned to the realities of contemporary Aboriginal 
community life, to lived experience, than either the CLC Royalty Project or the AAP 
Project. It works with what Rowse has referred to as “livable traditions” (Rowse 1998b: 
95).
Hunt and Smith in their Indigenous community governance research findings remark that 
in reality Aboriginal organisations that populate Aboriginal civil society are by their veiy 
nature intercultural (Hunt and Smith 2006:13) and thus all potentially similarly attuned. 
Yet every case study behind their findings highlights that Indigenous groups are actively 
designing contemporary governance arrangements informed by their “traditional land- 
ownership jurisdictions” (ibid: 11). Accordingly, say Hunt and Smith in echoes of the 
governance in the Royalty Project, “familial descent-group identity has become linked to 
the concept of ‘community’ and to community organisational governance and forms of 
political representation” (ibid: 10); and issues of representation, membership, leadership 
and decision making are invariably embedded in discussions of land ownership and 
kinship (ibid: 16). The fixed, localised articulation of Indigenous identity drawing on 
certain traditions has to date prevailed in this discourse.
Towards a deeper engagement
Ironically perhaps, given my evidence in the CLC Rent Project of community 
development potentially overcoming the separations implicit in privileged localism, it is 
through critiques of such development that we might further advance my argument to its 
logical conclusion. With an appropriately ambiguous title, Tn the Way of Development’ 
(2004) is largely a story of Indigenous organisations in the Americas in networks of civil 
society attempting to craft community development in so-called ‘life projects’ out of or in 
the face of large scale commercial development of land and water resources (Blaser, Feit 
and McRae 2004: 1-21). “The particularity of life projects”, says Mario Blaser in this
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volume, “resides in their constant awareness that place and identity arise from the 
mutually constitutive nature of vertical and horizontal threads” (Blaser 2004: 31). 
Vertical social threads can be equated with those forming the dominant, fixed, localised 
identity in the Australian Aboriginal domain; horizontal social threads can be equated 
with broader, less bounded relationships.
Accordingly, Glenn McRae frames a contemporary localism (McRae 2004: 123) where 
“what is newly forged is a set of linkages that create a dynamic stream of communication 
and understanding” (ibid: 112) between Indigenous groups and their far-flung supporters, 
a “heterogeneous but connected set of messages based in actions grounded in local 
landscapes” (ibid). And Pramod Parajuli describes “ecological ethnicities”, groupings 
that “might be internally fragmented with respect to religion, caste or language” but 
where “those internal distinctions cannot always be considered ^s antagonistic to each
i.
other” (Parajuli 2004: 238). The upshot of the notion of ecological ethnicity is project 
governance that foregrounds community -  by definition a regional community of interest 
because of its members’ common links to an ecosystem (ibid) -  while respecting more 
discrete or localised identities.
Harvey Feit in Tn the Way of Development’ emphasises the history of intercultural 
relationships over hundreds years of Cree involvement as hunters and trappers in the 
Canadian fur trade. In this essentially globalised setting, Cree land-based identities -  
“place-making” -  are not given and static but have emerged from long-standing process. 
“The processes of place-making are accomplished not only through the actions of those 
on the land but also through their long histories of connections to markets and 
governments” (Feit 2004: 94), according to Feit. Connections to land are de- 
romanticised. They are a part of rather than apart from development. Likewise in Brian 
Craik’s account of Cree efforts to strike a final agreement, called a New Relationship, 
with the proponents of large scale hydro electric development in Canada. Craik says the 
Cree behind the agreement “eschewed the vision of the Crees as stewards and spoke of 
this view as portraying them as janitors, taking care of the territory so others could 
develop it” (Craik 2004: 183). Ultimately the Cree chose development (ibid: 184) and “in
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doing so, they questioned the stereotypes that they have seen in themselves and that 
others see in them” (ibid). Says Cree leader Larry House:
Our way of life is ancient. It is built on respect for the land and for other people. We have 
ceremonies and traditions that are sacred. We have our language that is different from 
that of people around us. We seek to protect these things and also we seek to develop and 
adapt our way of life to the changing world. We are not against development. We 
encourage it (cited in McRae 2004: 123).
The ‘way’ in ‘In the Way of Development’, then, is more a path to than a barrier erected 
against development.
The critique of development as something the poor and disadvantaged can harness for 
their benefit is stronger in ‘Participation: The New Tyrann^?’ (2001) but still equivocal, 
as this title suggests. Two prominent and related elements of the critique here are: that an 
actual determination or at best delimitation of local knowledge occurs through 
participatory or community development discourse, whereas the rhetoric of this form of 
development has it elevating pre-existing local or Indigenous knowledge; and that a 
failure or unwillingness to understand local power dynamics further empowers the so- 
called development industry and local elites when the purported aim is to empower the 
poor. The editors Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari say in participatory development “the 
language of empowerment masks a real concern for managerialist effectiveness” (Cooke 
and Kothari 2001: 14). Similarly, Nicholas Hildyard, Pandurang Hedge, Paul Wolvekamp 
and Somasekhare Reddy say in this volume that, “far from being a transformative process 
in which local people are able to exert control over decision-making, participation 
becomes a well-honed tool for engineering consent to projects” (Hildyard, Hedge, 
Wolvekamp and Reddy 2001: 59). Kothari writes of the purification of local knowledge 
here, its classification and codification and simplification of people’s lives into charts, 
diagrams and tables (Kothari 2001: 142). She says research for participatory development 
can:
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purify social interactions and social space by framing and ordering people’s messy and 
varied experiences, needs and interests, but a further characteristic of this purification 
process is that difference will register as deviance. Classification and boundary 
maintenance are characteristic of participatory development and thus the potential for 
difference to be deviant and the subsequent exclusion of deviant individuals and groups 
(ibid: 148).
As such, the critique in ‘Participation: The New Tyranny?’ most readily applies in 
Aboriginal Australia to self-determination policy and its associated arrangements, 
including the ALRA and the certainty it helps to convey, arrangements generally 
characterised by disengagement from, as opposed to participation with, Aboriginal 
people. Giles Mohan says in this volume that participatory development generally 
“centres upon the valorization of local, non-Westem knowledge” (Mohan 2001: 158). In 
Australia this is central to the particular form that CD has taken under Aboriginal self- 
determination policy, in which non-Westem knowledge is equated with localised 
tradition. Concerned with “the damaging localism inherent in much participatory 
development” (ibid: 165), Mohan believes “the state has manipulated civil society and 
used ‘the local’ as a political discourse that disempowers” (ibid: 163). Ultimately, it is 
now possible to say this about the Australian state in relation to Aboriginal self- 
determination, especially after the euphoric first years of the policy. Mohan’s solution is 
essentially an intercultural one that calls for greater engagement between locals and 
others. As Cooke and Kothari put it, “Mohan calls for a radicalized hybridity, beyond 
notions of self/other and insider/outsider; and the scaling up of local interventions” 
(Cooke and Kothari 2001: 12), taking them in fact well beyond the local (Mohan 2001: 
166).
Hybridity
In ‘Encountering Development: the Making and Unmaking of the Third World’ (1995), 
Arturo Escobar’s development critique is also applicable in Aboriginal Australia to self- 
determination arrangements. He writes of “documentary practices” consistent with 
development discourse, labeling in particular (Escobar 1995: 108-110), determining
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relations between “actors” in development -  from the subjects or clients of development 
to development agencies and agribusiness corporations -  according to discrete categories 
that originate in the discourse (ibid: 109). A “key mechanism at work” in development, 
Escobar believes, “is that the whole reality of a person’s life is reduced to a single feature 
or trait” (ibid: 110), just as in remote Australia Aboriginal people are since self- 
determination often reduced to traditional owners on the one hand and non-traditional 
owners, mere residents or historical people on the other.
Escobar calls for “the reformulation of the question of cultural identity in nonessentialist 
ways” (ibid: 218), applauding processes of identity construction that are “more flexible, 
modest and mobile, relying on tactical articulations arising out of the conditions and 
practices of daily life” (ibid: 216). According to Escobar, these processes are best on 
display now in Latin America, a continent “peither on the way to lamentable eradication
I
of all traditions nor triumphantly marching toward progress and modernity” (ibid: 218). 
He puts his faith in hybrid cultures, plural, (ibid: chapters 1 and 6) and more research into 
the ways in which development “operates as an arena of cultural contestation and identity 
construction” (ibid: 15). He believes “the remaking of development” must start by 
examining “local constructions” of identity and the extent to which “they are the life and 
history of a people, that is, the conditions of and for change” (ibid: 98). Local 
constructions of identity in Aboriginal Australia, in the NT at least, do not now provide 
well for such conditions; they do not adequately reflect the life and history of the 
Aboriginal people concerned. Socio-cultural reification, juridification and entification are 
critical factors in a privileged localism that has led instead to a cultural half-match at best. 
As something of a counter to the mimesis that has helped spread the privilege, Escobar 
says hybrid cultures entail cultural freedom to modify, appropriate, and re-appropriate 
without peoples being locked in imitation (ibid: 220). In short, he says “hybrid cultures 
are not about fixed identities” (ibid: 220,221). He believes from this profoundly 
intercultural concept “might emerge other ways of building economies, or dealing with 
basic needs, or coming together into social groups” (ibid: 225).
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The basis for a healthy civil society involving Indigenous people seems possible here. Of 
my three case studies, this is emerging most strongly in the Rent Project. Relatedness 
might be said to be most mature in the Rent Project. There is some similar potential 
through the two other projects, even in the Tjukurpa festivals in Royalty Project 
Community A discussed in chapter 6. The Tjukurpa 2008-2011 business plan’s strategic 
direction section starts with a statement about Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people 
“drawing on knowledge from both strong cultures to develop a richer and stronger life” 
through the festivals; its executive summary speaks of enabling Aboriginal youth to 
express their culture in new forms. The CLC’s Royalty Project itself is potentially a 
strongly intercultural project, via its advisory committee for instance.
Yet neither the CLC’s Rent Project, its Royalty Project nor its AAP Project are building 
economies from hybrid culture, or building them in any way, even if some small scale 
Aboriginal business and employment occurs occasionally, an incidental outcome of the 
projects. Notwithstanding their achievements and those of like schemes, CD cannot make 
sufficiently widespread and sustainable improvements in Aboriginal communities in 
order to make deep inroads into Aboriginal disadvantage, if this is what Aboriginal 
people want, without building economies. Widespread Aboriginal over-dependence on 
non-Aboriginal people, on welfare payments, and indeed on the Aboriginal kinship 
economy these payments are now a part of, will remain. As suggested in chapter 6, only 
more Aboriginal people earning wages (at parity with the wider community) will, over 
time, curb the excesses of the Aboriginal kinship economy. Only this will provide the 
earners and close kin with something of a way out of this economy, towards individual 
self-determination, should they wish it. Meanwhile, paradoxically, the process in the 
kinship economy remains important in the identification of remote Aboriginal people 
with development, as my thesis should show. Community development in its own right or 
as an aid to economic development is at risk without this identification. Indigenous 
ownership of and participation in development projects and outcomes cannot be expected 
without it. Meanwhile too, many Aboriginal people in northern and central Australia live 
in highly dispersed, very remote communities partly courtesy of the local autonomy 
privileged during the Aboriginal self-determination era. In most of these communities,
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with or without CDEP, the availability of more wage work or business profits may 
always be limited. Says Altman:
If we replace the emotive gloss of ‘real’ economy with the more precise terms ‘market’ 
or ‘private sector’ of the economy, then the purported prospects for achieving the state 
project of economic equality and independence in remote and very remote Australia are 
currently impossible on any regional scale (Altman 2005: 122).
There is simply insufficient market opportunity, combined with still insufficient 
individualism required for healthy market-based activity, Altman says (ibid: 130). The 
extremely marginal nature of much of the land beneath these communities augments this 
dilemma, though mineral riches may lie deeper.
Beyond simplistic expectations of sudden mass Aboriginal wage employment in the latest 
mining boom, the solution to the dilemma with all its ‘chicken or egg’ elements is to find 
the appropriate “articulation between kin-based and market-based societies” (ibid: 121), 
Altman suggests. My research suggests this is fundamentally what is necessary for 
successful community development, finding an appropriate balance in and articulation 
with wider society of the autonomy-relatedness dynamic in particular. A perfect cultural 
match may not be possible, or even desirable, but a closer match is needed. Altman 
pushes this into the realm of economic development, the natural realm of market based 
society. Towards the necessary articulation there, he recommends the standard 
contemporary capitalist “two sector economy”, with its market and state or public sectors, 
be dispensed with in favour of what he calls a hybrid economy of “highly inter-dependent 
customary, market and state sectors” (ibid: 125). The idea offers the intellectual 
wherewithal to further break down separations inhibiting improvements in Aboriginal 
communities. Examples of activities based in the customary sector are bush foods 
harvesting for consumption and/or sale, art production for sale and environmental 
management, including of mine sites, extending to “carbon abatement and sequestration 
associated with effective fire management and healthy wooded landscapes” (Altman 
2006a: 10 and Altman 2009: 46). Altman stresses “the hybrid economy is not some 
autonomous Indigenous domain; it is thoroughly intercultural” (Altman 2005: 122 and
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Altman 2009: 48), as these examples based in its customary sector attest. He stops short 
of assuming hybrid culture would emerge from this economy; but as culture is enmeshed 
with economy, as I have shown and Altman acknowledges (Altman 2005: 130), this is 
inevitable. Indeed, contemporary Aboriginal culture is of course already a hybrid one, as 
are all cultures now to differing degrees. Perhaps this goes without saying.
Altman does say, significantly, that the hybrid economy accommodates Aboriginal 
mobility in sociality” (ibid: 125): “people can, and do, move freely between sectors of 
this economy” (ibid) as they continue to move widely between communities as an 
imperative of wide relatedness. As such, the concept has been put up as something of a 
solution to the unsettled place of outstations in the current Aboriginal affairs policy mix. 
Says Altman in a paper on this:
There are diverse futures for Indigenous people at outstations at variance with the 
monolithic mainstreaming perspective that appears to be dominating emerging policy. 
Such futures might see Indigenous people living on land they own, moving between 
larger and smaller communities, and pursuing livelihoods in a hybrid economy that 
includes payment for the delivery of environmental services, participation in the 
customary or non market sector, and the pursuit of commercial opportunities (Altman 
2006b: 15).
Here, in the context of climate change, mounting feral animal damage and the new 
mining boom, payment for environmental services may hold the key. The growing 
Aboriginal ranger group program appears a suitable vehicle for this.
But applying the hybrid economy model is not unproblematic. Participation in the 
customary sector is easily inflated, disguising further disengagement of remote 
Aborigines from the wider world. Much of Altman’s evidence in support of the hybrid 
economy comes from the regional development agency Bawinanga Aboriginal 
Corporation, based in Maningrida in Arnhem Land. Administering CDEP consistent with 
the hybrid economy model, Altman admits nearly 300 of Bawinanga’s CDEP participants 
were “categorized as cutstation residents and paid for 36 hours a fortnight for
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unsupervised participation in customary work” (Altman 2005: 128). Presumably some of 
this work was acquitted as hunting and gathering. This betrays a general over-optimism 
to the point of naivety about the hybrid economy, especially in desert environments 
which offer much less in the way of bush foods than the Arnhem Land environment. 
Altman says for the foreseeable future the hybrid economy will “need to be underwritten 
by the state” (ibid: 130) but “will never statistically close the gap” (Altman 2009: 11). 
The foreseeable future is then conceivably for a long time.
This reduces the issue to the extent to which the general public will back the necessary 
expenditure to allow remote Aboriginal people to remain living largely outside the 
mainstream economy, albeit with the added incentive now to the public of potentially 
significant environmental benefits. Along with some more Aboriginal employment in 
mining, rent, ^royalties and affected area monies can assist Aboriginal life largely outside 
the mainstream. So would more (or better publicised) measurable benefits to Aboriginal 
health from an outstation environment, from diets including more bush tucker for 
instance, to match with the theory here and actually demonstrate the value of the public 
expenditure to facilitate this. To date the benefits are measured in but two studies from 
the one group of outstations in Central Australia, according to Kowal (2010: 183). A 
carbon trading scheme may take pressure off the public purse by generating more private 
capital to help some remote Aborigines retain the choice of remote community living, in 
improved conditions, with the market coming to them. This awaits further research, 
including into ways to ensure the likes of carbon trading advances actual economic 
activity within remote Aboriginal communities, so that it does not simply have the effect 
of more welfare for Aboriginal people and overheat their kinship economy.
Conclusion
It has become clearer from this chapter that the pull of relatedness is as strong as that of 
autonomy/localism in Aboriginal sociality. This makes for a compelling argument for 
more regional perspective in the discussion, as Keen recommended. We heard from 
Myers of the socio-cultural requirement that Pintupi kin throughout a region should help
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each other and do. They are not the only language group with this requirement and 
practice. Of my case studies, the Rent Project in particular shows a common good can 
exist among kin across regions in Aboriginal Australia at the same time as smaller kin 
subsets seek and maintain autonomy. That the wide relatedness side of this equation is 
activated in complex and fluid process ensures uncertainty of wider group membership 
and identity compared to the certainty I have shown is now associated with the local in 
Aboriginal Australia. Strong community development engagement can work with this 
uncertainty and make the most of the common good in it. Via some critiques of 
development I arrived in this chapter at a notion of hybrid culture that supports and 
extends the emerging understanding of relatedness as the basis for Aboriginal civil 
society and effective CD through this civil society. From there I considered the equally 
intercultural concept of the hybrid economy. It offers some scope to bring together 
community development and economic development towards the greater benefit and 
ultimate sustainability of projects like my case studies and of development generally.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
An intercultural perspective entertaining the notion of hybrid cultures as per the previous 
chapter begins to bridge the separation that has plagued efforts to improve Aboriginal 
community conditions throughout the self-determination era: separation of community 
development from the market and economic development for instance, Aboriginal people 
from the state and wider society, some Aboriginal people from other Aboriginal people. 
Community development projects that explicitly or implicitly adopt this perspective can 
improve conditions without forsaking self-determination. With this perspective they in 
effect begin to merge community development and economic development into 
community economic development or CED as it is formally known, by Jenny Lo and 
Greg Halseth (2009) for instance. This approximates the potential offered in the 
Community Development Employment Projects program or CDEP if properly managed. 
The above perspective provides something of a platform on which to slowly and 
sustainably build Aboriginal employment and enterprise instead of either rushing to reach 
targets to ‘close the gap’ in Aboriginal disadvantage or assuming Aboriginal people are 
too traditional for work, indeed are culturally immune or unwilling to change. It is a 
platform perhaps strongest to date in the CLC’s Rent Project, compared to the other two 
CLC CD projects studied in this thesis. But it is not strong enough in any of the three 
case studies to sustain improvements in communities over the long term. Aligning such 
projects with the so-called hybrid economy may assist, particularly where this starts to 
tap the opportunity for work for remote Aboriginal people in environmental management.
Welfare payments to remote Aboriginal people are an element of the hybrid economy, 
including through CDEP. As such, we should, as Rowse recommends, avoid jumping to 
the conclusion that real self-determination is only possible once Aboriginal people have 
moved outside the welfare system (Rowse 2001: 42). But outside CDEP, in fieldwork in 
communities across my case studies it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that welfare 
payments directly to remote Aboriginal individuals must be comprehensively reformed or
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else the growth of Aboriginal employment and business, especially against remote 
Aboriginal community population growth, will remain so slow as to be non-existent. 
Welfare payments within the kinship economy are simply too great and too regular a 
disincentive to train for and take up what work there is. This is not a capitulation to neo­
liberalism, but recognition of the critical importance of the kinship economy in 
Aboriginal development. Without a critical mass of people in the wider kinship group 
consistently earning wages and spending these on supporting themselves and their 
dependents, the kinship economy is where many if not most within the group will do their 
daily ‘work’, drawing people back into this economy from the world of wage work. 
Faced also with a limited number and/or range of employment opportunities, the rarity of 
working role models, racism in the workplace and the standard impediments of poverty 
including poor education levels, breaking with the kinship economy and welfare 
dependence in favour of wage work is now extremely difficult for remote Aboriginal 
people. Meanwhile, boredom sets in and drug and alcohol abuse. Careful yet 
comprehensive welfare reform is needed to assist here.
Hybridity through an intercultural perspective countenances, indeed requires, engagement 
between groups, communities and organisations in Aboriginal civil society on the one 
hand and the state and other agencies that can assist on the other. The self-determination 
era has rightly been characterised as one of disengagement of Aboriginal people from the 
state and wider society in which it was assumed Aboriginal people needed little help if 
their traditional culture remained strong. This separation has left many Aboriginal 
communities in appalling conditions by any standards. Despite their limitations, the three 
projects that constitute my case studies -  the Rent Project, the Royalty Project and the 
AAP Project -  all now work to closely engage the CLC with Aboriginal groups from 
which it had hitherto largely disengaged when it came to their receipt and expenditure of 
rent, royalty and affected area payments from land uses. The three projects all mirror the 
third tradition of community development as outlined in chapter 2, involving professional 
practitioners working in partnership with communities or community groups. This is 
compared with the first tradition, a ‘top down’ CD tradition into which fit the more 
benign elements of the Commonwealth intervention into NT Aboriginal affairs since its
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2008 review; and the second CD tradition with its goals to create self-managing, self- 
governing, cooperative communities separate from the state and the encapsulating 
society, consistent with self-determination policy, albeit with state surveillance. While 
the CLC’s engagement efforts are particularly thorough in the AAP Project, the Rent 
Project ultimately results in the closest engagement with its participants because they 
identify with it more closely than the relevant participants identify with the Royalty 
Project and the AAP Project. The Rent Project processes are relatively resonant with the 
Rent Project participants’ social and cultural processes, the most important of which are 
those constituting the autonomy-relatedness dynamic in Aboriginal society. Its mere 
accommodation of such processes, particularly those of relatedness, is a significant 
advance on the other tw'o projects. It builds towards legitimacy through cultural match in 
this way.
Yet there are dilemmas aplenty in this. With insufficient attention, contemporary 
Indigenous processes, including those in the autonomy-relatedness dynamic, can easily 
undermine sustainable CD projects, particularly w'hen fueled by rents, royalties and like 
payments. Demand sharing and allocative power excesses are examples of this. Closer 
engagement with Aboriginal people in development risks rendering them in the short 
term even more dependent on non-Aboriginal people than at the outset. The CLC Royalty 
Project is superior to its Rent and AAP projects in specific capacity building efforts 
towards reduced dependency in the longer term. Closer engagement meanwhile need not 
mean more meetings, rather more efficient or productive consultations. It need not be 
more expensive than self-determination to date. But unless the consultations yield 
tangible results, it can mean little more than participation for participation sake. 
Consistently good results for all concerned would require far better coordination between 
the providers of development, particularly government agencies. But even then, close 
engagement seems bound to take up more of Aboriginal peoples’ time in talks they 
generally are not paid for, talking about doing things the rest of the population accepts as 
needed and takes for granted will be done without their intimate involvement. Intimate 
Aboriginal involvement can be a euphemism for heightened intmsion into and control of 
Aboriginal lives. On the other hand, Aboriginal people living in small and very remote
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locations cannot necessarily now take for granted tax payer funded services there, 
especially if so few are paying taxes because so few have jobs; and development without 
meaningful participation can now be received as draconian intervention, with its 
sustainability immediately called into question. There are delicate balancing acts required 
in all of this, not least of which is finding the balance between relatedness and autonomy 
translated as localism in Aboriginal sociality.
More fundamentally, an intercultural approach to engagement helps to bridge the 
separation of tradition and modernity. This countenances change in the Aboriginal 
domain, including development, otherwise frequently implicitly denied. Arguably the 
biggest change in the Aboriginal domain since first contact has been change facilitated by 
self-determination policy. This has privileged localism and a certain associated tradition 
over cultural processes no less traditional necessarily that continue to relate people across 
regions. Socio-cultural reification, juridification and entification are key, connected 
factors here. My discussion of these factors, and of the collective imagination in the 
spread of adherence to the change they represent, is not to suggest locally emplaced 
Aboriginal tradition per se is artificial any more than to suggest that traditional processes 
of wide relatedness are dying of neglect. High remote Aboriginal mobility alone will long 
delay that death. Collective identity -  the self in Aboriginal self-determination -  has 
become increasingly localised and exclusive, beneath which there nevertheless remains 
Aboriginal acknowledgement and maintenance of more inclusive identity. Localism is 
now entrenched but relatedness exists deeper still.
To the significant extent that identity remains informed by land ownership in remote 
Aboriginal Australia, localised identity matches with what has been referred to as 
statutory traditional ownership, the more inclusive identity with so-called vernacular 
traditional ownership. The latter term hints at the negotiable, performative and fluid 
nature of ownership and identity at this level -  its process; the former term shows the 
support that legislation, namely the ALRA, has given to exclusive identity. This is most 
obvious in juridification. Support for the fixity and finiteness of Aboriginal groups found 
in such localising factors has come too from developers, particularly commercial
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developers and miners most particularly. They seek the certainty thereby facilitated for 
investment in Aboriginal land, investment the CLC’s constituents generally welcome 
provided the rent, royalty and like payments are right. Through such payments, these 
developers become key development providers and, as in Melanesia, entification is 
likewise in their interests to optimise their returns in the so-called social contract with 
Indigenous groups. Localising factors like entification are built on reified kastom in 
Melanesia, which has become a yardstick of change there. The CLC’s Royalty Project 
and its AAP Project operate in a comparable environment of reification, juridification 
and/or entification and seem to suffer accordingly. It is at once a highly localised 
environment and one now widespread across Aboriginal Australia. Yet the CLC’s Rent 
Project, in comparison, largely operates outside this environment to its advantage.
An important criterion for development has become whether or not the ‘right people’
V
participate in development project governance and/or receive development benefits, 
where right implies exclusivity and certainty and often specifies traditional as opposed to 
historical or residential connections to land. This criterion has overshadowed the 
legitimacy that comes with a track record of getting things done in a project, itself 
sometimes at odds with the slow pace of high participation in development. Cultural 
match has come to mean matching governance with the ‘right’ peoples’ traditions, in a 
way not dissimilar to nationalist imperatives. Culture is quite strictly circumscribed and 
in fact cultural half-match at best occurs in the governance. Where there are ‘right 
people’ there are, then, ‘wrong people’ too. And in this context the latter commonly 
mimic the former in terms of social organisation and/or clash with them. Worldwide, 
there is perhaps no greater impediment to development for the poor than conflict. The 
CLC’s Royalty and AAP projects have not avoided this, and their operating environment, 
if not their actual governance arrangements, seem significant here. Their operating 
environment is characterised by a greater degree of social separation, including imagined 
difference, than the Rent Project environment is.
The participants in the case studies must navigate the project environments at a time of 
Indigenous policy flux. That the Rent Project environment seems more navigable reflects
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the participants’ relatively high degree of identification with the project. Navigable or 
impenetrable in their governance, the result is always degrees of uncertainty considering 
the money involved in such projects, despite the quest for the opposite. Uncertainty is 
accentuated in the context of globalisation. But the Rent Project shows that agreement 
around a common good can emerge from this if facilitated in governance arrangements 
that recognise regional identity without forsaking the local. It also shows the importance, 
despite the dilemmas, of close engagement with remote Aboriginal groups through 
projects like the Rent Project. Such engagement is necessary in order to manage complex 
contemporary social dynamics instead of assuming they will settle independently to 
everyone’s benefit or, alternatively, juridifying them for instance. Reification, 
juridification and entification jeopardise community development in ways I have 
illustrated. Assuming the dynamics will independently settle favourably for all risks 
widening wealth disparities, and thus heightened health problems, within communities.
i .
When Austin-Broos says “ineffectual demanders located at the poles of life can have 
difficulty realizing relatedness” (Austin-Broos 2003: 127) she means to point to the 
difficulty the very young and very old sometimes have simply getting enough to eat in a 
contemporary Aboriginal kinship economy frequently distorted by excessive demand 
sharing in particular. Those at the poles of Aboriginal life need most assistance whether 
or not they are victims of abuse as such.
This does not warrant a clumsy scramble to ‘close the gap’. It suggests self-determination 
should be recast to encourage greater assistance from qualified and experienced outsiders 
where they include both non-Aboriginal people and Aboriginal people outside the local 
group. The collective self in self-determination should accommodate regions of 
Aboriginal people and the communities that are now regional centres where the peoples, 
plural, of a region live together. My research on the CLC’s Rent Project in particular 
should show these communities are now no more artificial than the local descent group 
that constitutes the test of traditional Aboriginal land ownership in the ALRA and has 
thus become critical in the localisation of NT Aboriginal identity. The very notion of 
community in community development and its governance arrangements must begin to 
emphasise networks of people and organisations, as does the definition of community 1
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adopted in chapter 2 from the recent research findings of the Indigenous Community 
Governance Project. This in turn suggests that if it is too late to reverse the proliferation 
of largely locally autonomous Aboriginal organisations under self-determination policy 
and ideology, this should at least be slowed and greater cooperation encouraged between 
organisations. The trouble is they, like the outstations that likewise proliferated, have 
become the tangible and much prized manifestation of local identity, of privileged 
localism. Networks suggest regional development, with arrangements like subsidiarity 
structures to protect local interests. At the very least, this all suggests the need to 
deconstruct difference, particularly among the regionally related, in the interests of a 
stronger Aboriginal civil society.
If the discussion more broadly suggests assimilation, this will not be the outcome if 
community development can give strength to Aboriginal people and ;their communities, 
and choice. Nearly four decades since the start of self-determination, the Mardu people 
are limited in their future as relatively autonomous agents managing communities on 
their own lands or engaging successfully in the wider economy, to recall Tonkinson’s 
comments. In other words, if development is in essence the opportunity to live full human 
lives, as I have it, that opportunity is currently limited for the Mardu whether they remain 
in or leave the familiarity of their remote communities, whether they go to the market, it 
comes to them or neither. They are by no means the only remote Aboriginal group in this 
situation, as governments scale back support for remote community living. It may be now 
or never that remote Aboriginal people harness the resources necessary to take up the 
slack and remain remote. Rents, royalties and like payments will be important. But at 
least as important will be for Aboriginal people to gain the skills to manage their 
communities, and such payments into the communities, as relatively autonomous agents. 
This capacity will not be found in locally emplaced tradition. It does not necessarily 
follow from legal rights like land rights and the right to welfare. It can, however, be 
gained in community development that maximises the participation of the relevant people 
in close engagement with them. If something of a hybrid culture emerges this is not the 
same as assimilation into the encapsulating society. As Escobar reminds us, “many
175
'traditional cultures’ survive through their transformative engagement with modernity” 
(Escobar 1995:219).
Paradoxically, it is conceivable many Aboriginal communities will lose traditions at a 
greater rate if we continue to rely so heavily on tradition. Despite self-determination’s 
“unprecedented sanction to the traditional” (Rowse 1998: 98), the expectation in the 
policy that pre-colonial systems of social control would naturally revive (Sutton 2001: 
128) of course proved highly optimistic and misplaced. With these systems now so 
weakened, it seems anything and everything is sanctioned that will ultimately destroy 
many Aboriginal traditions. Levels of dysfunction on top of sheer poverty mean many 
Aboriginal people without relevant capacity are literally losing control of the 
communities themselves. The replacement of NT local community councils with shires
can be seen as government willingness to shift control if Aboriginal people cannot retain
r
it. The Commonwealth intervention into NT Aboriginal affairs, alleged ulterior motives 
aside, shows governments will go as far as to wrest control from Aboriginal people. 
Improvements to Aboriginal communities are especially imperative in this context.
My thesis demonstrates how improvements are possible through community development 
projects like the CLC’s Rent Project in particular. It also highlights key limiting factors to 
CD in the Australian Indigenous domain.
176
References
Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act, 1976 
Aboriginal Land Rights (NT) Act, 1976
Altman, J. 2001. ‘Mutual obligation’, the CDEP scheme, and development: Prospects in 
remote Australia in Morphy, F. and Sanders, W. (eds) 2001. The Indigenous Welfare 
Economy and the CDEP Scheme, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, 
Australian National University, Canberra
Altman, J. 2005. Economic Futures on Aboriginal Land in Remote and Very Remote 
Australia: Hybrid Economies and Joint Ventures in Austin-Broos, D. and Macdonald, G. 
(eds) 2005. Culture, Economy and Governance in Aboriginal Australia, University of 
Sydney Press, Sydney
Altman, J. 2006a. The Future of Indigenous Australia, Arena, 84, August - September 
2006
Altman, J. 2006b. In Search of an Outstations Policy for Indigenous Australians, Centre 
for Economic Policy Research, Australian National University, Canberra
Altman, J. 2009. Beyond Closing the Gap: Valuing Diversity in Indigenous Australia, 
Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Australian National University, 
Canberra
Altman, J. 2009. Indigenous communities, miners and the state in Australia in Altman, J. 
and Martin, D. (eds) 2009. Power, Culture, Economy: Indigenous Australians and 
Mining, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Australian National 
University, Canberra
177
Altman, J., Linkhom, C. and Clarke, J. 2005. Land rights and development reform in 
remote Australia, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Australian National 
University, Canberra
Anderson, B. 1991. Imagined Communities. Verso, London
Anderson, P. and Wild, R. 2007. Ampe Akelyernemane Meke Mekarle “Little Children 
are Sacred” Report of the Northern Territory Board of Inquiry into the Protection of 
Aboriginal Children from Sexual Abuse, Northern Territory Government, Darwin
Appadurai, A. 1996. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, 
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis
Austin-Broos, D. 2003. Places, practices and things: The articulation of Arremte kinship 
with welfare and work, American Ethnologist 30(1), February 2003
Austin-Broos, D. 2006. ‘Working for’ and ‘Working’ among Western Arremte in Central 
Australia, Oceania, vol. 76 no. 1, March 2006
Austin-Broos, D. 2009. Arremte Present, Arremte Past: Invasion, Violence, and 
Imagination in Indigenous Central Australia, University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Australian Government 1988. Dept of Aboriginal Affairs submissions to the House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs, Official Hansard Report, vol. 
1,225-97
Australian Government 2007. Northern Territory Emergency Response Fact Sheets, 
Australian Government, Canberra
178
Australian Government 2008. Increasing Indigenous Employment Opportunity: Proposed 
Reforms to the CDEP and Indigenous Employment Programs, Australian Government, 
Canberra
Australian Government 2009. Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) 
web page from 3 June 2009, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and 
Indigenous Affairs website
Bainton, N. 2009. Keeping the Network out of view: Mining, Distinctions and Exclusion 
in Melanesia, Oceania, vol. 79
Bauman, T. 2006. Nations and Tribes ‘Within’: Emerging Aboriginal ‘Nationalisms’ in
Katherine, The Australian Journal of Anthropology, vol. 17, no. 3
I-
Beckett, J. 1988. Kinship, mobility and community in rural New South Wales in Keen, I 
(ed) 1988. Being Black: Aboriginal cultures in 'settled' Australia. Aboriginal Studies 
Press, Canberra
Beckett, J. 1989. Aboriginality in a Nation-State: The Australian Case in Howard, M (ed) 
1989. Ethnicity and Nation-building in the Pacific, The United Nations University, Tokyo
Bemdt, R.M. 1977. Aboriginal identity: reality or mirage in Bemdt, R.M. (ed) 1977. 
Aborigines and change: Australia in the 70s, Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, 
Canberra
Berry, S. 2009. Property, Authority and Citizenship: Land Claims, Politics and the 
Dynamics of Social Division in West Africa, Development and Change, vol. 40, no. 1, 
January 2009
Birdsall, C. 1988. All one family in Keen, I (ed) 1988. Being Black: Aboriginal cultures 
in 'settled1 Australia, Aboriginal Studies Press, Canberra
179
Blaser, M. 2004. Life Projects: Indigenous Peoples’ Agency and Development in Blaser, 
M., Feit, H. and McRae, G. (eds). 2004. In the Wav of Development: Indigenous Peoples, 
Life Projects and Globalisation, Zed Books, London
Blaser, M., Feit, H. and McRae, G. 2004. Indigenous Peoples and Development 
Processes: New Terrains of Struggle in Blaser, M., Feit, H. and McRae, G. (eds). 2004. In 
the Wav of Development: Indigenous Peonies, Life Projects and Globalisation, Zed 
Books, London
Brady, M. 2004. Indigenous Australia and Alcohol Policy: Meeting Difference with 
Indifference, University of NSW Press, Sydney
V
Broegaard, R.B. 2009. Land Access and Titling in Nicaragua, Development and Change, 
vol. 40, no 1, January 2009
Campfens, H. 1997. International Review of Community Development in Campfens, H. 
(ed) 1997. Community Development around the World: Practice, Theory, Research, 
Training, University of Toronto Press, Toronto
Cooke, B. and Kothari, U. 2001. The Case for Participation as Tyranny in Cooke, B. and 
Kothari, U. (eds) 2001. Participation: The New Tyranny?, Zed Books, London
Coombs, H.C. 1978. Kulinma: Listening to Aboriginal Australians, Australian National 
University Press, Canberra
Coombs, H.C. 1994. Aboriginal Autonomy: Issues and Strategies, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge
Cohen, A.P. 1985. The Symbolic Construction of Community, Ellis Horwood, 
Chichester, Sussex and Tavistock, London
180
Cornell, S. and Begay, M. 2003. What is Cultural Match and Why is it so Important? 
Lessons from 14 Years of the Harvard Project, presentation to the Building Effective 
Indigenous Governance Conference, Jabiru, NT, 4 -7  November 2003
Craik, B. 2004. The Importance of Working Together: Exclusion, Conflicts and 
Participation in Blaser, ML, Feit, H. and McRae, G. (eds). 2004. In the Wav of 
Development: Indigenous Peonies, Life Projects and Globalisation, Zed Books, London
Dillon, M.C. and Westbury, N.D. 2007. Beyond Humbug: Transforming government 
engagement with Indigenous Australia, Seaview Press, West Lakes (Aust.)
Dodson, M. and Smith, D. 2003. Governance for sustainable development: Strategic
V
issues and principles for Indigenous Australian communities. Centre for Aboriginal 
Economic Policy Research, Australian National University, Canberra
Eriksen, T.H. 1993. Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives. Pluto 
Press, London
Ernst, T.M. 2004. Land, stories and resources: Some impacts of large-scale resource 
exploitation on Onabasulu lifeworlds in Rumsey, A. and Weiner, J. (eds) 2004. Mining 
and Indigenous Lifeworlds in Australia and Papua New Guinea, Sean Kingston 
Publishing, Wantage (UK)
Escobar, A. 1995. Encountering Development: the Making and Unmaking of the Third 
World, Princeton University Press, Princeton
Esteva, G. 1992. Development in Sachs, W. (ed) 1992. The Development Dictionary: A 
Guide to Knowledge as Power, Witwatersrand University Press, Johannesburg and Zed 
Books, London
181
Feit, H. 2004. James Bay Crees’ Life Projects and Politics: Histories of Place, Animal 
Partners and Enduring Relationships in Blaser, M., Feit, H. and McRae, G. (eds). 2004. 
In the Way of Development: Indigenous Peoples, Life Projects and Globalisation, Zed 
Books, London
Filer, C. 2006. Custom, Law and Ideology in Papua New Guinea, The Asia Pacific 
Journal of Anthropology, vol. 7, no. 1, April 2006
Filer, C. 2007. Local Custom and the Art of Land Group Boundary Maintenance in Papua 
New Guinea in Weiner, J.F. and Glaskin, K. (eds) Customary Land Tenure and 
Registration in Australia and Papua New Guinea: Anthropological Perspectives, Asia- 
Pacific Environment Monograph 3, Australian National University E Press, Canberra
V
Finlayson, J. 1997. Aboriginal tradition and Native Title Representative Bodies in Smith, 
D. and Finlayson, J. (eds) 1997. Fighting Over Country: Anthropological Perspectives, 
Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Australian National University, 
Canberra
Foster, R.J. 1991. 'Making National Cultures in the Global Ecumene', Annual Review of 
Anthropology, 1991, 20: 235-60
Gardner, K. and Lewis, D. 1996. Anthropology, Development and the Post-Modern 
Challenge, Pluto Press, London
Gerritson, R. 1982. Blackfellas and Whitefellas: The Politics of Service Delivery to 
Remote Communities the Katherine Region in Loveday, P. (ed) 1982. Service Delivery 
to Remote Communities, Australian National University North Australian Research Unit, 
Darwin
Glaskin, K. 2007. Outstation Incorporation as Precursor to a Prescribed Body Corporate 
in Weiner, J.F. and Glaskin, K. (eds) Customary Land Tenure and Registration in
182
Australia and Papua New Guinea: Anthropological Perspectives, Asia-Pacific
Environment Monograph 3, Australian National University E Press, Canberra
Golub, A. 2007. From Agency to Agents: Forging Landowner Identities in Porgera in 
Weiner, J.F. and Glaskin, K. (eds) Customary Land Tenure and Registration in Australia 
and Papua New Guinea: Anthropological Perspectives. Asia-Pacific Environment 
Monograph 3, Australian National University E Press, Canberra
Griffiths, M. 2006. Aboriginal Affairs 1967 -  2005: Seeking a Solution, Rosenberg, 
Dural
Hiatt, L.R. 1984. Traditional land tenure and contemporary land claims in Hiatt, L.R. (ed) 
1984. Aboriginal Landowners: Contemporary Issues in the Determination of Traditional 
Aboriginal Land Ownership, University of Sydney, Sydney
Hildyard, N., Hedge, P., Wolvekamp, P. and Reddy, S. 2001. Pluralism, Participation and 
Power: Joint Forest Management in India in Cooke, B. and Kothari, U. (eds) 2001. 
Participation: The New Tyranny?, Zed Books, London
Hinkson, M. 2002. New Media Projects at Yuendumu: Inter-Cultural Engagement and 
Self-Determination in an Era of Accelerated Globalisation, Continuum, 16: 201-20
Hobsbawm, E. 1983. Introduction: Inventing Traditions in Hobsbawm, E. and Ranger, T. 
(eds) 1983. The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Holcombe, S. 2004. Socio-political perspectives on localism and regionalism in the 
Pintupi Luritja region of central Australia: Implications for service delivery and 
governance. Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Australian National 
University
183
Holcombe, S. 2005. Luritja Management of the State, Oceania, vol. 75, no. 3, March/June 
2005
Hollinsworth, D. 1996. Community Development in indigenous Australia: self- 
determination or indirect rule, Community Development Journal, vol. 31, no. 2, April 
1996
Hunt, J. and Smith, D.E. 2006. Building Indigenous community governance in Australia: 
Preliminary research findings. Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, 
Australian National University, Canberra
Hunt, J. and Smith, D.E. 2007. Indigenous Community Governance Project: Year Two 
Research Findings, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Australian National 
University, Canberra
Ife, J. and Tesoriero, F. 2006. Community Development: Community-based Alternatives 
in an Age of Globalisation, Pearson Education Australia, Frenchs Forest (Aust.)
Jorgensen, D. 2004. Who and what is a landowner? Mythology and marking the ground 
in a Papua New Guinea mining project in Rumsey, A. and Weiner, J. (eds) 2004. Mining 
and Indigenous Lifeworlds in Australia and Papua New Guinea, Sean Kingston 
Publishing, Wantage (UK)
Jorgensen, D. 2007. Clan-Finding, Clan-Making and the Politics of Identity in a Papua 
New Guinea Mining Project in Weiner, J.F. and Glaskin, K. (eds) Customary Land 
Tenure and Registration in Australia and Papua New Guinea: Anthropological 
Perspectives, Asia-Pacific Environment Monograph 3, Australian National University E 
Press, Canberra
Keen, I. 1984. A question of interpretation: the definition of “traditional Aboriginal 
owners”in the Aboriginal Land Rights (NT) Act in Hiatt, L.R. (ed) 1984 Aboriginal
184
Landowners: Contemporary Issues in the Determination of Traditional Aboriginal Land 
Ownership, University of Sydney, Sydney
Keen, I. 1997a. The Western Desert vs the Rest: Rethinking the Contrast in Merlin, F, 
Morton J and Rumsey, A (eds) 1997. Scholar and Sceptic: Australian Aboriginal Studies 
in Honour of L R Hiatt. Aboriginal Studies Press, Canberra
Keen, 1. 1997b. A continent of foragers: Aboriginal Australia as a ‘regional system’ in 
McConvell, P. and Evans, N. (eds) 1997. Archaeology and Linguistics: Aboriginal 
Australia in Global Perspective, Oxford University Press, Oxford
Keesing, R. 1982. Kastom in Melanesia: An Overview, Mankind, vol. 13, no. 4, August 
1982
Keesing, R. 1989. Creating the Past: Custom and Identity in the Contemporary Pacific, 
The Contemporary Pacific, vol. 1, nos. 1 and 2
Kenny, S. 2006. Developing Communities for the Future, Thomson, South Melbourne
Kothari, U. 2001. Power, Knowledge and Social Control in Participatory Development in 
Cooke, B. and Koihari, U. (eds) 2001. Participation: The New Tyranny?, Zed Books, 
London
Kowal, E. 2010. Is culture the problem or the solution? Outstation health and the politics 
of remoteness in Altman, J. and Hinkson, M. (eds) 2010. Culture Crisis: Anthropology 
and Politics in Aboriginal Australia, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney
Levitus, R. 2005. Land Rights and Local Economies: The Gagudju Association and the 
Mirage of Collecti/e Self-Determination in Austin-Broos, D. and Macdonald, G. (eds) 
2005. Culture, Ecoiomy and Governance in Aboriginal Australia. University of Sydney 
Press, Sydney
185
Levitus, R. 2009. Aboriginal organisations and development: The structural context in 
Altman, J. and Martin, D (eds) 2009. Power, Culture, Economy: Indigenous Australians 
and Mining, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Australian National 
University, Canberra
Lindstrom, L. 1982. Leftamap Kastom: The Political History of Tradition on Tanna, 
Vanuatu, Mankind, vol. 13, no. 4, August 1982
Linniken, J. and Poyer, L. 1990. Introduction in Linnekin, J. and Poyer, L. (eds) 1990. 
Cultural Identity and Ethnicity in the Pacific, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu
Lo, J. and Halseth, G. 2009. The practice of principles: an examination of CED groups in 
Vancouver, BC, Community Development Journal, vol. 44, no. 1, January 2009
London School of Economics and Political Science, Centre for Civil Society website
McClelland, R., Macklin, J. and Sherry, N. 2010. Commonwealth Government media 
release, 18 May 2010
Macdonald, G. 1997. ‘Recognition and justice’: the traditional/historical contradiction in 
New South Wales in Smith, D. and Finlayson, J. (eds) 1997. Fighting Over Country: 
Anthropological Perspectives, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, 
Australian National University, Canberra
Maquarie Dictionary (Concise). 1982 (revised 1983). Doubleday Australia, Sydney
McRae, G. 2004. Grassroots Transnationalism and Life Projects of Vermonters in the 
Great Whale Campaign in Blaser, M., Feit, H. and McRae, G. (eds). 2004. In the Wav of 
Development: Indigenous Peoples, Life Projects and Globalisation, Zed Books, London
186
Macklin, J. 2008a. Speech at the Garma Festival Indigenous Economic Development 
Conference, 9 August 2008
Macklin, J. 2008b. Beyond Mabo: Native title and closing the gap, 2008 Mabo Lecture, 
James Cook University, Townsville, 21 May 2008
Maddock, K. 1982. Aboriginal Land Rights Traditionally and in Legislation: A Case 
Study in Howard, M (ed) 1982. Aboriginal Power in Australian Society, University of 
Queensland Press, St Lucia (Aust.)
Maddock, K 1983. 'Owners', 'managers' and the choice of statutory traditional owners by 
anthropologists and lawyers in Peterson, N. and Langton, M. (eds) 1983. Aborigines. 
Land and Land Rights. Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, Canberra
Mantziaris, C. and Martin, D. 2000. Native Title Corporations: a legal and 
anthropological analysis. The Federation Press, Leichhardt (Aust.)
Martin, D. 1995. Money, business and culture: issues for Aboriginal economic policy. 
Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Australian National University, 
Canberra
Martin, D. 1997. The incorporation of ‘traditional’ and ‘historical’ interests in Native 
Title Representative Bodies in Smith, D. and Finlayson, J. (eds) 1997. Fighting Over 
Country: Anthropological Perspectives, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy 
Research, Australian National University, Canberra
Martin, D. 2001. Community development in the context of welfare dependence in 
Morphy, F. and Sanders, W. (eds) 2001. The Indigenous Welfare Economy and the 
CDEP Scheme, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Australian National 
University, Canberra
187
Martin, D. 2003. Rethinking the design of indigenous organisations: The need for 
strategic engagement. Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Australian 
National University, Canberra
Martin, D. 2005. Governance, Cultural Appropriateness and Accountability in Austin- 
Broos, D. and Macdonald, G. (eds) 2005. Culture, Economy and Governance in 
Aboriginal Australia, University of Sydney Press, Sydney
Martin, D. 2006. Why the ‘new direction’ in Federal Indigenous affairs policy is as likely 
to ‘fail’ as the old directions, seminar at the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy 
Research, Australian National University, Canberra
Martin, K. 2007. Land, Customary and Non-Customary in East New Britain in Weiner,
I
J.F. and Glaskin, K. (eds) Customary Land Tenure and Registration in Australia and 
Papua New Guinea: Anthropological Perspectives, Asia-Pacific Environment Monograph 
3, Australian National University E Press, Canberra
Memmott, P., Blackwood, P. and McDougall, S. 2007. A Regional Approach to 
Managing Aboriginal Land Title on Cape York in Weiner, J.F. and Glaskin, K. (eds) 
Customary Land Tenure and Registration in Australia and Papua New Guinea: 
Anthropological Perspectives, Asia-Pacific Environment Monograph 3, Australian 
National University E Press, Canberra
Merlan, F. 1994. Entitlement and need: concepts underlying and in Land Rights and 
Native Title Acts in Edmunds, M. (ed) 1994. Claims to Knowledge, Claims to Country: 
Native Title, Native Title Claims and the Role of the Anthropologist, Australian Institute 
of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, Canberra
Merlan, F. 1996. Formulations of claim and title: a comparative discussion in Finlayson, 
J. and Jackson-Nakano, A. (eds) 1996. Heritage and Native Title: Anthropological and
188
Legal Perspectives, Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, 
Canberra
Merlan, F. 1997. Fighting over country: four commonplaces in Smith, D. and Finlayson 
J. (eds) 1997. Fighting Over Country: Anthropological Perspectives, Centre for 
Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Australian National University, Canberra
Merlan, F. 1998. Caging the Rainbow: Places, Politics and Aborigines in a North 
Australian Town, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu
Merlan, F. 2006. Beyond Tradition, The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology, vol. 7, no. 
1, April 2006
Mohan, G. 2001. Beyond Participation: Strategies for Deeper Empowerment in Cooke, B. 
and Kothari, U. (eds) 2001. Participation: The New Tyranny?, Zed Books, London
Morton, J. 1997a. Arremte (Aranda) Land Tenure: An Evaluation of the Strehlow Model 
in Strehlow Research Centre Occasional Paper L 1997
Morton, J. 1997b. Why can’t they be nice to one another?: Anthropology and the 
generation and resolution of land claim disputes in Smith, D. and Finlayson, J. (eds) 
1997. Fighting Over Country: Anthropological Perspectives, Centre for Aboriginal 
Economic Policy Research, Australian National University, Canberra
Musharbash, Y. 2008. Yuendumu Everyday: Contemporary life in remote Aboriginal 
Australia. Aboriginal Studies Press, Canberra
Myers, F.R. 1986. Pintupi Country. Pintupi Self: Sentiment Place and Politics among 
Western Desert Aborigines, Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington, with the 
Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, Canberra
189
Myers, F.R. 1987. Always Ask: Resource Use and Land Ownership among Pintupi 
Aborigines of the Australian Western Desert in Edwards, W.H. (ed) 1987. Traditional 
Aboriginal Society. Macmillan, South Melbourne
Northern Territory Government 2009. A Working Future policy, Northern Territory 
Government, Darwin
Office of the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations website
Onyx, J. 1996. Community development in Australia: trends and tensions, Community 
Development Journal, vol. 31, no. 2, April 1996
Parajuli, P. 2004. Revisiting Gandhi and Zapata: Motion of Global Capital, Geographies
V
and Difference and the Formation of Ecological Ethnicities in Blaser, M., Feit, H. and 
McRae, G. (eds). 2004. In the Way of Development: Indigenous Peoples, Life Projects 
and Globalisation, Zed Books, London
Peters-Little, F. 2000. The community game: Aboriginal Self-Determination at the Local 
Level, Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, Canberra
Peterson, N. 1993. Demand Sharing: Reciprocity and the Pressure for Generosity among 
Foragers, American Anthropologist, 95(4): 860-74
Peterson, N. 1999. Hunter-Gatherers in First World Nation States: Bringing 
Anthropology Home, Bulletin of the National Museum of Ethnology, 23(4)
Peterson, N. 2008. ‘Too sociological’? Revisiting ‘Aboriginal territorial organisation’ in 
Hinkson, M. and Beckett, J. (eds) 2008. An Appreciation of Difference: W.E.H. Stanner 
and Aboriginal Australia, Aboriginal Studies Press, Canberra
190
Peterson, N. and Taylor, J 2003. The modernising of the indigenous domestic moral 
economy: kinship, accumulation and household composition, The Asia Pacific Journal of 
Anthropology. 4(1 and 2) 2003: 105-22
Poirier, S. 2010. Change, Resistance, Accommodation and Engagement in Indigenous 
Contexts: A Comparative (Canada-Australia) Perspective, Anthropological Forum, vol. 
20, no. 1 March 2010
Premdas, R. 1989. Ethnicity and Nation-building: The Papua New Guinea Case in 
Howard, M.C. (ed) 1989. Ethnicity and Nation-building in the Pacific, The United 
Nations University, Tokyo
Price, B. 2009. Speech to family violence forum, Canberra, 30 January 2009
Rowley, C.D. 1971a. Outcasts in White Australia: Aboriginal Policy and Practice - Vol 
II, Australian National University Press, Canberra
Rowley, C.D. 1971b. The Remote Aborigines: Aboriginal Policy and Practice - Vol III, 
Australian National University Press, Canberra
Rowse, T. 1992. Remote Possibilities: The Aboriginal domain and the administrative 
imagination. North Australia Research Unit, Australian National University, Darwin
Rowse, T. 1998a. White flour, white power: from rations to citizenship in Central 
Australia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Rowse, T. 1998b. Indigenous Citizenship and Self-determination: The Problem of Shared 
Responsibilities in Peterson, N. and Sanders, W. (eds) 1998. Citizenship and Indigenous 
Australians: Changing Conceptions and Possibilities, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge
191
Rowse, T. 2000. Obliged to be Difficult: Nugget Coombs’ Legacy in Indigenous Affairs, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Rowse, T. 2001. The political dimensions of community development in Morphy, F and 
Sanders, W. (eds) 2001. The Indigenous Welfare Economy and the CDEP Scheme, 
Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Canberra
Rowse, T. 2005. The Indigenous Sector in Austin-Broos, D. and Macdonald, G. (eds) 
2005. Culture, Economy and Governance in Aboriginal Australia, University of Sydney 
Press, Sydney
Rowse, T. 2007. The National Emergency and Indigenous Jurisdictions in Coercive 
Reconciliation: Stabilise, Normalise, Exit Aboriginal Australia, Arena Publications 
Association, North Carlton (Aust.)
Sanders, W. 2002. Towards an Indigenous order of Australian government: Rethinking 
Self-determination as Indigenous affairs policy. Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy 
Research, Australian National University, Canberra
Sanders, W. 2005. Dispersal, Autonomy and Scale in Indigenous Community 
Governance: Some reflections on recent Northern Territory experience, Australian 
Journal o f Public Administration, 64(4), December 2005
Sanders, W. 2006. Local Governments and Indigenous Interests in Australia’s Northern 
Territory, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Australian National 
University, Canberra
Sanders, W. and Holcombe, S. 2006. Sustainable governance for small desert settlements: 
Combining single settlement localism and multi-settlement regionalism, paper for the 
Desert Knowledge Symposium and Business Showcase, Alice Springs (Aust.)
192
Sansom, B. 1980. The Camp at Wallaby Cross: Aboriginal fringe dwellers in Darwin. 
Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, Canberra
Sansom, B. 1982. The Aboriginal commonality in Bemdt, R.M.(ed) 1982. Aboriginal 
Sites, Rights and Resource Development, University of Western Australia Press, Perth
Sansom, B. 1988. A grammar of exchange in Keen, I (ed) 1988. Being Black: Aboriginal 
cultures in 'settled' Australia, Aboriginal Studies Press, Canberra
Schwab, R.G. 1995. The calculus of reciprocity: principles and implications of 
Aboriginal sharing. Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Australian 
National University, Canberra
V
Sikor, T. and Lund, C. 2009. Access and Property: A Question of Power and Authority, 
Development and Change, vol. 40, no. 1, January 2009
Smith, D. 1984. “That Register business”: the role of the Land Councils in determining 
traditional Aboriginal owners in Hiatt, L.R. (ed) 1984. Aboriginal Landowners: 
Contemporary Issues in the Determination of Traditional Aboriginal Land Ownership. 
University of Sydney, Sydney
Smith, D. 2001a. Valuing native title: Aboriginal, statutory and policy discourses about 
compensation. Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Australian National 
University, Canberra
Smith, D. 2001b. Community Participation Agreements: A model for welfare reform 
from community-based research. Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, 
Australian National University, Canberra
Smith, D. 2005a. Regionalism for Indigenous Governance: Emerging Models and Policy 
Challenges -  Observations from the Indigenous Community Governance Project (ICGP),
193
paper for the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research/Reconciliation Australia 
ICGP Workshop in Darwin, 5 December 2005
Smith, D. 2005b. Indigenous Families, Households and Governance in Austin-Broos, D. 
and Macdonald, G (eds) 2005. Culture, Economy and Governance in Aboriginal 
Australia, University of Sydney Press, Sydney
Smith, D. 2007. From COAG to Coercion: A story of Governance Failure, Success and 
Opportunity in Australian Indigenous Affairs, an address to the Australia and New 
Zealand School of Government conference Governing Through Collaboration: Managing 
Better Through Others, 28 - 29 June 2007, Canberra
Stanner, W.E.H. 1958. Continuity and Change among the Aborigines in White Man Got 
No Dreaming: Essays 1938 - 1973, Australian National University Press, Canberra
Sullivan, P. 2005. Searching for the lntercultural, Searching for the Culture, Oceania, vol. 
75, no. 3, March/June 2005
Sullivan, P. 2006. Indigenous Governance: The Harvard Project on Native American 
Economic Development and appropriate principles of governance for Aboriginal 
Australia, Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, Canberra
Sutton, P. 2001. The Politics of Suffering: Indigenous policy in Australia since the 1970s, 
Anthropological Forum, vol. 11, no. 2, November 2001
Sutton, P. 2003. Native Title in Australia: An Ethnographic Perspective, Cambridge 
University Press
Sutton, P. 2008. Stanner and Aboriginal land use: Ecology, economic change, and 
enclosing the commons in Hinkson, M. and Beckett, J. (eds) 2008. An Appreciation of 
Difference: W.E.H. Stanner and Aboriginal Australia, Aboriginal Studies Press, Canberra
194
Sutton, P. 2009. The Politics of Suffering: Indigenous Australia and the end of the liberal 
consensus, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne
The Australian newspaper 2008, 10 May 2008
The Australian newspaper 2010, 4 June 2010
Tonkinson, R. 2007. Aboriginal ‘Difference’ and ‘Autonomy’ Then and Now: Four 
Decades of Change in a Western Desert Society, Anthropological Forum, vol. 17, no. 1, 
March 2007
Victor O’Reeri, M. 2009. Speech to forum on housing and families, Canberra, 17 August 
2009
von Sturmer, J. 1982. Aborigines in the uranium industry: toward self-management in the 
Alligator River region? in Berndt, R.M. (ed.) Aboriginal Sites. Rights and Resource 
Development, University of WA Press, Perth
Weiner, J.F. 2001 The Foi Incorporated Land Group: Law and Custom in Group 
Definition and Collective Action in the Kutubu Oil Project Area, PNG. Research School 
of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra
Weiner, J.F. 2006. Eliciting Customary Law, The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology, 
vol. 7, no. 1, April 2006
Weiner, J.F. and Glaskin, K. 2006. Introduction: The (Re-)Invention of Indigenous Laws 
and Customs, The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology, vol. 7, no. 1, April 2006
Whitlam, E.G. 1985. The Whitlam Government: 1972 -  1975, Viking, Ringwood
195
Woodward, A.E. 1973. Aboriginal Land Rights Commission First Report The 
Government Printer of Australia, Canberra
Woodward, A.E. 1974. Aboriginal Land Rights Commission Second Report, The 
Government Printer of Australia, Canberra
Young, E. 1995. Third World in the First: Development and indigenous peoples. 
Routledge, London and New York
Yu, P., Duncan, M.E. and Gray, B. 2008. Report of the NTER Review Board, Australian 
Government, Canberra
196
David Jagger Anthropology MPhil thesis submitted 15 April 2011
ABSTRACT
For 35 years, Aboriginal self-determination policy privileged local autonomy in the 
autonomy-relatedness dynamic central to Aboriginal sociality. This privileging brought a 
major change to Aboriginal sociality and collective identity. The self in self- 
determination policy had a strongly local focus through which it was thought community 
development would thrive. Key connected factors in the privileging of local autonomy 
are socio-cultural reification, juridification and entification. The reification is with respect 
to  identity associated with land-based tradition. All three of these factors are contrary to 
the profound processes of relatedness in the Australian Aboriginal domain. The so-called 
intervention by the Commonwealth into Northern Territory Aboriginal affairs in 2007 
dramatically changed the policy settings in the NT at least. But local autonomy remains 
privileged over relatedness. As such, this thesis argues, the foundation for an Aboriginal 
civil society able to negotiate the now very fluid policy environment and make the most 
o f  the opportunities presented in community development projects like the thesis case 
studies in fact remains generally weak.
The thesis argues that recognition of relatedness is the basis of civil society in the 
Aboriginal domain and a key to improvements in Australian Aboriginal communities, 
without dismissing local autonomy. The common good inherent in community 
development is limited Without this recognition. So is cultural match, said to be important 
in development project governance in the Indigenous domain. The thesis examines these 
matters through three case studies, community development projects that use moneys 
paid to Aboriginal people from the use of Aboriginal land for mining and a national park. 
An important finding is that autonomy-relatedness balance reflected in the governance 
arrangements of community development projects is needed for Aboriginal people to 
properly identify with the projects and thus participate meaningfully in them in order to 
realise tangible and sustainable community benefits from them. Meanwhile, commercial 
development like mining continues to favour the certainty afforded in the localising 
factors of reification, juridification and entification.
Aboriginal self-determination has been characterised as a policy of disengagement of 
wider society from Aboriginal people. Consistent with this, and again contrary to 
relatedness, an underlying theme in the thesis is that of separation. As well as the 
disengagement of the policy, this separation includes the separation of some Aboriginal 
people from other Aboriginal people arising from locally emplaced identity, tradition 
from modernity and community development from economic development and the 
market economy. At this level, the thesis points to the importance of an intercultural 
approach to development entertaining the notion of hybridity including that of the hybrid 
economy.
This is not to deny the benefits of self-determination policy over its policy predecessors, 
much less to suggest a return to assimilation policy in particular, but to suggest some 
ways to help resolve the serious problems still facing remote Aboriginal communities as 
well as to flag the limitations of community development in this context.
